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JUSTICE WIDE OPEN 
 
These working papers mark the launch of the Centre of Law, Justice and 
Journalism’s new initiative, ‘Open Justice in the Digital Era’, which aims to 
make recommendations for the way judicial information and legal data are 
communicated in the 21st century 
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FOREWORD 
 
Professor Howard Tumber welcomes a much needed public 
dialogue on open justice in the digital era 
 
The justice system cannot remain alien to the rapid flows of information and 
collective sharing of resources through social media and other forms of new 
technology. The justice system must use digital technologies not to violate privacy 
rights, freedom of expression and other civil liberties, but to safeguard them. The 
publication of legal data is a requirement that cannot be deferred if citizens are to 
participate in democratic societies that are based upon public scrutiny and 
transparency of institutional practices. When the ethos of national security reigns 
over individual liberties and social justice, the need to research and advocate for an 
open justice system becomes a matter of urgency.  
‘Justice Wide Open’ will hopefully contribute to this challenging enterprise. As 
the third publication in the Centre for Law Justice and Journalism working paper 
series, it marks the launch of our new research project: Open Justice in the Digital 
Era. The project aims to research into the best ways to make legal and judicial data 
more accessible by using new technologies, and to disseminate the information 
among policy-makers, lawyers, judges, and the general public.   
This edited collection compiles papers presented at the ‘Justice Wide Open’ 
conference on 29 February 2012 by leading lawyers, academics and journalists who 
share a similar concern: how to make judicial information more accessible in order to 
develop and monitor an open justice jury system. The event was organised by Judith 
Townend who has done an excellent job not only in organising the event but in 
editing this collection of working papers. Her own research on legal restraints on the 
interaction between media organisations and defamation and privacy laws has 
certainly informed the organisation of this important event and this much needed 
collective publication. 
These papers comprise a call for freedom of access to legal information and 
transparency of court proceedings. We need open courts which welcome the public 
and the press and inform citizens of how judges are enacting the liberal value of 
justice. Court reporting needs to take full advantage of new technologies and perform 
a scrutiny function engaging members of the public. How else can both justice and 
judges be judged?  Openness lies at the very heart of justice. This edited collection 
therefore will be of great interest to those concerned with how best to serve the 
public interest, the role of journalism in reporting court cases, free access to legal 
information, the existing threats to the rule of law, and the ethics of the judicial 
information system.  
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Collaborative and interdisciplinary projects like ‘Justice Wide Open’ are the 
first step towards a much needed public dialogue on open justice. It is in this sense 
that we greatly welcome it. 
 
Professor Howard Tumber 
CLJJ Director (Journalism) 
 
 
Howard Tumber is Professor of Journalism and Communication within the 
Graduate School of Journalism, City University London and has published widely 
in the field of the sociology of news and journalism.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Judith Townend explains the origins and aims of the Centre for Law, 
Justice and Journalism’s new open justice project  
 
‘Justice must be seen to be done’ is the familiar dictum, summarising the principle of 
open courts, developed in English law since the mid-17th century. Despite this long-
established tradition for open justice, the English courts have failed to fully utilise 
online technology for the dissemination of legal knowledge and communication of 
the courts – as yet. This new publication is a call to action and debate.  
The UK Supreme Court, which opened its doors to the public in 2009, leads 
the way in sharing court proceedings via the internet and television, but other courts 
in England and Wales lag behind. Publication of legal information has grown up in a 
piecemeal fashion in the digital era – part privatised, with few central guidelines. The 
so-called ‘super injunction’ furore in 2010-11 was partly fuelled by a lack of public 
data, something the Master of the Rolls is now seeking to remedy with new 
guidelines for its collection and publication.  
The Centre for Law, Justice and Journalism’s ‘Open Justice in the Digital Era’ 
project was born out of numerous frustrated conversations with lawyers, journalists, 
academics, computer programmers and bloggers about accessing the courts in the 
21st century. For many of them, ‘open justice’ is not their primary research or legal 
focus but absolutely intrinsic to their daily work and the wider public interest. The 
issues are extensive and diverse: the recommendations of the government’s ‘secret 
justice’ green paper, which would see more cases behind closed doors; the decline in 
local and national court reporting as a result of cuts in journalism; the courts’ 
barriers to entry due to ill-informed staff; and the difficulties in obtaining free legal 
information.  
The project launched with the ‘Justice Wide Open’ conference on 29 February 
2012, at which journalists, lawyers and academics came together to ask how judicial 
information and courts data could be made more easily accessible and considered the 
legal and ethical implications of an increasingly open and digitised approach. The 
speakers1 explored the history and academic context of open justice, as well as the 
realities of modern court reporting.  Additionally, we invited several other leading 
figures in the field to also contribute working papers to this subsequent publication.  
This collection of working papers will be made available online and also 
distributed in print to members of government, civil service, lawyers, journalists and 
academics. We hope it encourages the Ministry of Justice and Her Majesty’s Courts 
                                                   
1 Listed in Appendix, pg 119 
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and Tribunals Service to consider an increasingly open and free approach to the 
diffusion of legal knowledge in the 21st century.  
In the first section on the tradition and context of open justice, Geoffrey 
Robertson QC, our keynote speaker at the event, sets out the history of the 
principle and argues that the government’s Justice and Security Green Paper’s 
recommendations are simply not be compatible. The Master of the Rolls, Lord 
Neuberger, examines the way in which open justice is said to underpin the rule of 
law and our liberal democracy and Dr David Goldberg looks to Sweden and 
Scotland for historical and comparative examples of open justice. 
The second section explores the flow of legal knowledge: Hugh Tomlinson 
QC makes recommendations for the online availability of case law and lists; while 
Emily Allbon analyses the ‘free legal info landscape’. Nick Holmes introduces the 
‘Free Legal Web’ initiative and David Banisar comments on a ‘bold’ Court of 
Appeal judgment ordering the publication of certain documents in criminal 
proceedings.  
In the third section, we examine the role of the media and journalists: 
Heather Brooke describes the evolving culture of ‘secret justice’ and Mike Dodd 
reflects on the numerous obstacles to court reporting. Adam Wagner explains how 
legal blogs can act as a corrective to poor journalism, while William Perrin sets out 
his own ‘courts transparency charter’ for the publication of daily legal data. 
Three academic researchers tackle open justice issues in our final section: 
Professor Ian Cram looks at the effect of Twitter on juries; Dr Lawrence 
McNamara considers how the judiciary contributes to legal reform through ‘extra-
judicial’ statements; and Lucy Series examines secrecy in the Court of Protection.  
The debate continues beyond the pages of this publication, however. We have 
created a special page on the City University London website to track this project’s 
development2, which includes audio from the event and hyperlinks to relevant 
reports. Please contact us with your own thoughts and experiences, which will feed 
into our ongoing research and work in this area and our forthcoming 
recommendations to the Ministry of Justice. 
Thank you to Sarah Muzio for administrative help, Oliver O’Callaghan for 
editing assistance, and Andrew Stuart for photography.  I hope you enjoy the papers.  
 
Judith Townend, May 2012  
 
Judith Townend is director of the ‘Open Justice in the Digital Era’ project and editor 
of this publication. She is a PhD research student at the Centre for Law, Justice and 
Journalism, City University London, exploring the effects of libel and privacy law 
on journalism in the UK.  
                                                   
2 See <http://www.city.ac.uk/centre-for-law-justice-and-journalism/projects/open-justice-in-the-
digital-era> accessed May 2012 
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A GREAT TRADITION 
OF OPEN JUSTICE 
 
Geoffrey Robertson QC delivered the keynote speech at the ‘Justice 
Wide Open’ conference and set out the history of the open justice 
principle, arguing that the government’s justice and security green 
paper will not be compliant with our great tradition 
 
‘Justice must be seen to be done’ is a principle that Britain has contributed to the free 
world.  It was first articulated in 1649 by ‘Freeborn John’ Lilburne, the Leveller, 
when Cromwell’s judges tried him for treason: they accepted his submission that ‘the 
first and fundamental liberty of an Englishman’ is that ‘no man whatsoever ought to 
be tried in holes and corners, or in any place where the gates are shut and barred’.   
It is this great open justice tradition, which has made our courts so superior to 
other legal systems, that Kenneth Clarke is set upon destroying.  He plans secret 
courts, for what his officials admit will be ‘an extremely wide range of civil 
proceedings’.  He is doing this for unworthy reasons – to protect the security services 
from embarrassment.  And he proposes to do it by unworthy means, hiring ‘vetted’ 
barristers whose private lives and politics will be investigated by the intelligence 
services they are supposed to oppose. 
That the government can contemplate this at all is due to the malign influence 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.  Before it, our law was that laid down 
by Lord Halsbury: ‘Every court in the land is open to every subject of the King’. 
European countries were not so fastidious – the Nazis had secret ‘morals courts’ 
where they persecuted homosexuals, and the Scandinavians were always closing 
court doors in the interests of privacy.  So the European Convention adopted the 
lowest common denominator, using weasel words that allow courts to be closed in 
the interests of morality, privacy or national security.  Mr Clarke’s green paper is full 
of boasts that its secret courts will be compliant with the Euroconvention, but it will 
certainly not be compliant with our open justice tradition.  As Jeremy Bentham put 
it, ‘Publicity is the very soul of justice.  It keeps the judge, while trying, under trial’.  
Parliament can, of course, legislate to keep certain information from the 
public, and there are gagging provisions in the Official Secrets Act.  But these have 
been seriously abused in the past. In 1978, for example, the security services wanted 
to jail two journalists from Time Out for revealing the existence of GCHQ (which was 
then an ‘official secret’). They called a witness whose name they pretended was so 
secret that it would be a crime to reveal it. But this Colonel, H.A. Johnstone, was so 
well known that journalists wrote it in the sand at Whitby and when Scotland Yard’s 
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Special Branch rushed up to arrest them,  the high tide had washed it away by the 
time they arrived.  Then an MP (Robert Kilroy-Silk, in his finest hour) said the 
forbidden name on the floor of the House of Commons, and the Attorney General 
threatened to prosecute any media organisation – including Hansard – that 
published it.  His bluff was called, but the case shows just how bogus some security 
service claims can be, and to what extent governments will fall over backwards to 
accommodate them. 
Another example was the attempt to stop the Mail on Sunday from reporting 
how secret files were being kept on many of Blair’s cabinet ministers.   MI5 applied 
for an injunction against the newspaper at a judge’s home on Saturday afternoon, but 
the open justice principle meant that this attack on press freedom could at least be 
reported.  Under Ken Clarke’s scheme, this civil action would be heard in secret – the 
effect would be like a super-injunction. 
It is usually Labour governments, full of nervous liberals, who give up liberties 
under pressure from the police or the spooks.  Why is a Conservative government 
abandoning a proud tradition?  Partly because of the upcoming cases where MI6 is 
being sued over its complicity in ‘rendering’ dissidents to Libya, to be tortured by the 
brutal Gaddafi regime.  The evidence is sensitive because it will be extremely 
embarrassing, but the public must be entitled to hear it.  The government is also 
under pressure from the US, upset that some of CIA ‘torture memos’ were disclosed 
to lawyers for Bin Mohammed. The green paper wrongly claims that there is a 
‘control principle’ that requires Britain never to reveal the secrets supplied to them 
by other states.  In the Bin Mohammed case however, Mort Halperin, a top US 
national security advisor, explained that the ‘control principle’ meant only that 
Britain should do its best to keep US secrets, but would always comply with court 
orders to disclose them – as would the US if required to disclose ours. 
The green paper makes a number of extremely dubious claims. It states that 
because the government cannot reveal ‘sensitive’ information, it has to settle cases 
before they come to trial, and so pays a lot of money to undeserving claimants. I do 
not believe this is the truth, although it has featured greatly in the rhetoric of Messrs 
Cameron and Clarke.  First and foremost, the government does not settle civil cases 
because it does not want to expose secret evidence; it settles cases because otherwise 
it will lose them.  It has ample power to keep really secret evidence from disclosure 
by using a Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificate.  And isn’t it interesting that 
whenever the government does settle cases, it is never prepared to tell the public how 
much taxpayers’ money it has thrown away?  If Parliament were interested in holding 
the government to account, it would demand to know how much the government was 
paying in these secret settlements, and whether taxpayers money was being spent to 
avoid the public embarrassment of losing in open court. 
There is another tradition that Mr Clarke is prepared to destroy in order to 
make his secret courts work, and that is the independence of the bar.  Barristers must 
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act fearlessly for their clients, and cannot do so if they are not allowed to talk to 
them.  Mr Clarke proposes that ‘sensitive’ information should not be seen by 
claimants or their lawyers, but only by ‘special advocates’ – barristers allowed into 
the secret court to represent clients they are not allowed to meet.  They are ‘special’ 
because they have passed security vetting tests which confirm that the security 
services find them acceptable – to act against the security services!   
This vetting may (although I have grave doubts) be acceptable in the narrow 
context of immigration appeals: to have civil courts that can be entered only by 
security-cleared barristers who can’t speak to their clients raises serious issues of 
ethics for a profession that boasts of its independence.  When your fee is dependent 
on a security clearance, can you be perceived as free to act robustly against those on 
whom your income depends?  The Bar should refuse to accept the government’s plan 
to discriminate in favour of those barristers with an MI6 seal of approval. 
Mr Clarke has form, although everyone seems to have forgotten it.  Back in 
1992, when he was Home Secretary, he was embroiled in the ‘Iraqgate’ scandal: he 
and several other ministers signed secrecy orders to cover up the fact that the 
Thatcher government had encouraged the illegal export of bomb-making equipment 
to Saddam Hussein.  Three innocent men were put on trial and might well have been 
convicted and jailed had Michael Heseltine not had the integrity to blow the whistle. 
Mr Clarke had put government ‘sensitivities’ i.e. its fear of embarrassment –  above 
the need for justice and above the public interest.  That is precisely what he is doing 
by constructing these secret courts. 
 
 
© Geoffrey Robertson QC 
 
Geoffrey Robertson is author of ‘Robertson & Nicol on Media Law’, and was defence 
counsel in the Iraqgate (Matrix Churchill) case. 
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OPEN JUSTICE UNBOUND? 
 
The Master of the Rolls, The Right Honourable Lord Neuberger 
of Abbotsbury, delivered this paper at the Judicial Studies Board 
Annual Lecture on 16 March 2011.1 He explores the fundamental 
principle of open justice, which is said to underpin the rule of law and 
our liberal democracy 
 
We live in a country which is committed to the rule of law. Central to that 
commitment is that justice is done in public – that what goes on in court and what 
the courts decide is open to scrutiny. This is not a new fundamental principle. In 
1829, for instance, Bayley J in Daubney v Cooper2 said this: 
 
… we are all of opinion, that it is one of the essential qualities of a Court of Justice 
that its proceedings should be public, and that all parties who may be desirous of 
hearing what is going on, if there be room in the place for that purpose, – provided 
they do not interrupt the proceedings, and provided there is no specific reason why 
they should be removed, – have a right to be present for the purpose of hearing what 
is going on.3 
 
Of course, it goes back further than that. As one 20th century commentator put it: 
 
[O]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice, that all judicial trials are  
held in open court, to which the public have free access … appears to have been the 
rule in England from time immemorial.4 
 
Time immemorial means, of course, older than 6 July 1189, the date of King Richard 
I’s accession to the throne,5 although the date is not so much a tribute to him, as to 
his father, King Henry II, whom he succeeded. So it is a common law principle which 
stretches back into the common law’s earliest period. 
The importance of open justice as a fundamental principle has not only 
secured its place in our legal system. It has also secured its place in the legal systems 
of all those countries which are signatories to the European Convention on Human 
                                                   
1 The author wishes to thank John Sorabji for all his help in preparing the lecture. This lecture also 
appeared in The Judicial Review (2011) 10 TJR 259-276. It is reproduced with the kind permission of 
the author and the publishers, the Judicial Commission of New South Wales.  
2 (1829) 109 ER 438 
3 ibid at 441 
4 E Jenks, The book of English law, 6th revised edn, PB Fairest (ed), Murray, London, 1967 at 
73–74, cited in Richmond Newspapers Inc v Virginia 448 US 555 (1980) at 566–567. See also 
JJ Spigelman, ‘The principle of open justice: a comparative perspective’, paper presented at 
the Media Law Resource Centre Conference, 20 September 2005, London, at <www.lawlink. 
nsw.gov.au/lawlink/Supreme_Court/ll_sc.nsf/pages/SCO_spigelman200905>, accessed 
11 August 2011 
5 Statute of Westminster (1275) 
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Rights. Article 6 of the convention was specifically drafted6 to replicate the House of 
Lords’ ringing affirmation of open justice in the seminal early 20th century decision 
of Scott v Scott.7 In that case, Lord Shaw described how open justice was ‘a sound 
and very sacred part of the constitution of the country and the administration of 
justice’.8 The principle is equally embedded into the framework of all common law 
systems; not least the United States, where, in 1791, it was enshrined as a 
constitutional right by the Sixth Amendment.9  It is as important as it is well-
travelled and long-lived. 
The importance of open justice arises from the role it plays in supporting the 
rule of law. Public scrutiny of the courts is an essential means by which we ensure 
that judges do justice according to law, and thereby secure public confidence in the 
courts and the law. This evening, I would like to focus on three discrete and currently 
relevant aspects of this constitutional principle. 
First, I want to talk about the nature of public judgments: if justice is seen to 
be done it must be understandable. Judgments must be open not only in the sense of 
being available to the public, but, so far as possible given the technical and complex 
nature of much of our law, they must also be clear and easily interpretable by 
lawyers, and also to non-lawyers. In an age when it seems more likely than ever that 
citizens will have to represent themselves, this is becoming increasingly important. 
Second, I want to talk about modern applications, and possible developments, of the 
principle. In particular, I would like to examine increasing the relevance and 
accessibility of the justice system to the public. Finally, I want to talk about some 
recent developments in the application of the principle; in particular, super-
injunctions and closed proceedings. 
 
Open justice and public judgments 
As the Romans had it, ignorantia juris haud excusat, ignorance of the law is no 
excuse, and that is true both of our criminal law and our civil law. However, if 
ignorance of the law is ruled out as an excuse, legislators, judges and lawyers owe a 
concomitant duty to ensure that the law is not so impenetrable or abstruse that even 
other lawyers and judges are unable to penetrate it. It is for this reason that 
legislation should be drafted clearly; and why, in recent years, there has been such a 
sustained and justified outcry at the inexorable volume, the tedious length, and the 
inept drafting of many of the Acts of Parliament that have found their way onto the 
statute book. 
                                                   
6 European Commission of Human Rights, Preparatory work on Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 8 October 1956 (DH (56) 11), 
pp 22–23, at <www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART6- 
DH(56)11-EN1338886.PDF>, accessed 11 August 2011. 
7 [1913] AC 417 
8 ibid at 473; compare AG v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 at 449–450 
9 Gannett Co Inc v DePasquale 443 US 368 (1979) at 385, albeit a right of the parties, not of the 
public. 
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However, clarity is not just important where legislation is concerned. If the 
law is to be properly accessible, then the courts are under the same duty of 
accessibility as is placed on the legislature – above all in a common law system, 
where, albeit within bounds, the judiciary make and develop the law, as well as 
interpret it. Oscar Wilde said that truth is ‘rarely pure and never simple’,10 and the 
same may be said of the law. However, that is no excuse for judges producing 
judgments that are readable by few, and comprehendible by fewer still. Indeed, the 
increasing complexity of the law imposes a greater obligation than ever on judges to 
make themselves clear. 
We can, of course, all think of particularly bad judgments: over-long, 
meandering, thick with digressions, obiter dicta, and needlessly complex. Not all 
have the precision of Lord Atkin’s judgment in Donoghue v Stevenson.11 
We might all benefit from reminding ourselves of the clarity with which he 
identified the issue and set out the principle. First, a crisp statement of the issue, 
then a tightly drafted consideration of the case law, and, finally, an equally crisp and 
clear statement of the law: 
 
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure 
your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a 
restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you 
can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is 
my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly 
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so 
affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in 
question.12 
 
The alleged snail may well have been in a ‘dark opaque glass’,13 but there was nothing 
dark or opaque about Lord Atkin’s opinion, nor was it too long or discursive: a very 
model of a modern major judgment. 
Judges are faced with choices as to which there is seldom a universally 
applicable answer. Should my judgment be short and to the point, or long and 
complete? Should I confine my reasoning to the facts of this case, or try and give 
guidance for the future? Should I try and reach a fair result in this case or keep the 
law clear and certain? Let me address those questions. 
 
Short or long 
On the face of it, the answer is obvious: judgments should be as short as possible. 
However, if a judgment is too abbreviated, the judge will risk not considering the 
issues and previous authorities properly. One of the main points of a judgment is to 
                                                   
10 O Wilde, The importance of being Earnest, Act 1 
11 [1932] AC 562 
12 ibid at 580 
13 Donoghue v Stephenson, 1932 SC (HL) 31; see further <www.scottishlawreports.org.uk/ 
resources/dvs/donoghue-v-stevenson.html>, accessed 11 August 2011 
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explain the decision to the parties, especially the loser, to their lawyers and to any 
appellate court, and more generally to future potential litigants, to their lawyers, as 
well as to academics. Particularly in our common law precedent-based system, 
judges often should refer to and consider past decisions. So the shorter the better, 
but, as with anything, you can have too much of a good thing. 
A prime example of brevity can be found in many judgments of one of my 
particularly formidable predecessors, Sir George Jessel MR. A good instance of his 
style can be found in a decision he gave in 1879, Henty v Schroder.14 An order for 
specific performance of an agreement for the purchase of an estate had been made, at 
the suit of the plaintiff contracting vendor. However, the defendant purchasers failed 
to complete. The vendor then applied to have the agreement rescinded, and an 
assessment of damages, relying on three previous judgments. Sir George took less 
than eight lines in the law reports to analyse the law and reach his conclusion: 
 
[He] considered that the Plaintiffs could not at the same time obtain an order to have 
the agreement rescinded and claim damages against the Defendant for the breach of 
the agreement. His Lordship declined to make an order in the form [approved in the 
three previous judgments] and only ordered that the agreement should be rescinded; 
that all other proceedings in the action should be stayed; and that the Defendant 
should pay the Plaintiffs’ costs.15 
 
Sir George Jessel was a titan of the law, and not without confidence. It is said that 
when his colleague in the Court of Appeal, James LJ, asked him whether it was true 
that he had said ‘I may be wrong, but I am never in doubt’, he replied: ‘very true, 
except I never said “I may be wrong’’’. Perhaps that explains the concision of his 
judgment; his ability to despatch three prior precedents without any consideration; 
and his ability to set out a principle which every Chancery judge and practitioner 
accepted for the next 100 years. Perhaps all that explains why, unfortunately, his 
decision was utterly wrong. However, it took the House of Lords to say so in Johnson 
v Agnew16 a full century later. 
Although the judgment in Henty is immediately accessible to anyone reading 
it, it was given without careful analysis of the law and without due consideration of 
the authorities. Perhaps if Sir George had given the point more consideration and 
had set out his reasons properly, he would have seen the error of his ways, and, if 
that is too much to ask, then perhaps a considered judgment, setting out his reasons 
for holding as he did would have resulted in his error coming to light earlier than 
1980. 
Brevity is important, but clarity is more important, and, as the law, reflecting 
society as well as legislation, becomes ever more complicated, the duty of judges to 
                                                   
14 (1879) 12 Ch D 666 
15 ibid at 667 
16  [1980] AC 367 
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communicate the law through their judgments as clearly as possible becomes ever 
more important. 
 
Confined reasons or general guidance 
Particularly if a case comes to the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) or, even 
more, to the Supreme Court (UK) (which only takes cases of general public 
importance), it can be said that the public has a right to expect general guidance to be 
given. In some cases, the courts cannot duck a general principle, as often happens 
when they are called on to interpret a statute. In other cases, because it is the 
function of the courts to develop the common law, it is necessary to address a very 
wide-ranging point, as in Donoghue itself. However, the courts are inevitably 
hampered by being limited to the facts of the particular case. They cannot envisage 
every eventuality, and they do not have the same access to information, statistics, 
interested parties, organisations and pressure groups as the legislature. So 
generalising can be dangerous. 
There is no doubt that, in some areas, there is much to be said for letting the 
law develop on a case-by-case basis, even though it risks leaving potential litigants in 
a state of uncertainty. Indeed, it is interesting to note that, in recent times, the House 
of Lords seems to be keen on the idea that the extent of the scope of duty of care, the 
very topic which Donoghue was concerned with, should be developed on a case-by-
case basis, as stated by Lord Bridge in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman.17 That may 
be because the House of Lords took the law too far in Anns v London Borough of 
Merton,18 from which the Privy Council, in Yuen Kun Yeu v A-G (HK),19 and then the 
House of Lords in Caparo famously retreated. 
An example of the dangers of using a case to lay down general principles is to 
be found in a Court of Appeal case decided 35 years ago. In Re Hastings Bass,20 a 
principle was set up that was only laid to rest (subject to the Supreme Court) last 
week by the Court of Appeal in a magisterial judgment in a case called Pitt v Holt.21 It 
might be thought that the 239 paragraphs in Pitt would offend the principle that 
judgments should be readily accessible. In some cases such a criticism would have 
real force. In this case though, such length was a necessary curative. For the last 20 
years, following on from the case of Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans,22 as Lloyd 
LJ put it in Pitt: 
 
… a principle, described as the rule in Re Hastings-Bass, has been developed… [that 
principle] is that the exercise of a discretionary dispositive power by trustees may be 
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declared void and set aside, even many years after the event, on the basis that the 
trustees failed to take into account relevant matters when exercising the power.23 
 
In the course of his judgment in Hastings-Bass, Buckley LJ summarised part of his 
reasoning by reference to some general propositions, no doubt with a view to laying 
down principles to assist lawyers and other advising trustees and beneficiaries. One 
of those general principles has formed the cornerstone of an entire edifice of the 
law,24 but it was a cornerstone placed on sand. In the context of the case before him, 
Buckley LJ’s summary seemed unexceptionable, but, as the Court of Appeal has held 
in Pitt, it was far too broadly, and therefore erroneously, expressed. 
It may yet be the case that the Supreme Court (UK) will be asked to consider 
whether the rule is indeed a rule, depending on whether an appeal is brought from 
the Court of Appeal’s decision in Pitt. However, the point for today’s purpose is 
straightforward. Too broad an expression of a principle in a judgment led the law 
down an erroneous byway for over a third of a century – and deprived the Revenue of 
a great deal of money on the way. To characterise an issue as ‘justice or the law?’ 
might seem a solecism, and I suppose it is. Justice in a particular case is a decision 
according to the law. However, the question poses in useful shorthand the question 
how far a judge should go to refashion the law to produce what most people would 
regard as a fair result in a particular case. Professor Dworkin famously compared the 
role of a common law judge with that of a scriptwriter engaged to write an episode of 
a well-established soap opera: he is fixed with the story so far, but is otherwise free to 
develop it as he thinks fit. 
Just as the scriptwriter has to think of not merely what seems to him to be a 
good story, but also how to keep the audience satisfied, so must a judge think not 
merely of the case and the parties in front of him, but also of the countless potential 
litigants and their advisers, who will read his judgment, and seek to rely on it. 
Certainty and simplicity are, in that connection, I would suggest, more important 
than getting a fair answer in a particular case. That is, of course, not a new idea: it is 
what is embodied in the dictum that hard cases make bad law, because, as somebody 
once put it, bad law makes hard cases. 
Sometimes, however, one does get a difficult case where principle is made to 
yield to justice. A well-known example is White v Jones,25 where, by a bare majority 
of three to two, the House of Lords held that someone who would have been a 
beneficiary under a will, which was not properly executed due to the negligence of 
the deceased’s solicitor, could claim damages from the negligent solicitor. The 
fairness of this conclusion to the average person may seem clear, not least because 
otherwise the negligent solicitor gets away with it and the intended beneficiary is out 
of pocket. However, the extent to which the decision conflicts with principle is clear 
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from the masterly dissenting opinion of Lord Mustill, and, some might say, from the 
rather tortured reasoning of the leading majority opinion of Lord Goff. 
I am something of an agnostic about the actual decision in White, but I think it 
would have done the common law and its reputation much more favour if the House 
of Lords had based its conclusion on the simple proposition that there are exceptions 
to every principle, rather than unconvincingly seeking to suggest that the decision 
accorded with established principles. After all, the common law is ultimately based 
on pragmatism, so one should not be surprised if there are exceptions to most of the 
rules it has developed. Nonetheless, we judges should avoid tailored exceptions to, or 
dubious extensions of, established principles, simply in order to achieve what may be 
regarded as a fair result in the particular case. 
That leads to my final specific point on clarity in judgment writing – the vexed 
question of the desirability of a single composite judgment in appellate courts. The 
desire to write your own judgment, particularly in an interesting and important case, 
can be quite considerable. The wish is reinforced where, as often happens, you think 
you can write an even better judgment than the one your colleague has produced. 
Virtually every appellate judge has been guilty of what might be called a vanity 
judgment: I certainly have. 
In some types of case, it is important to have a single judgment giving clear 
guidance, thereby avoiding any possibility of arguments as to whether two slightly 
differently expressed judgments mean the same thing. I was recently involved in a 
case in the Supreme Court (UK),26 where we were anxious to ensure that judges in 
the County Courts had clear guidance as to how to apply Art 8 of the European 
Convention to residential possession actions. Lord Phillips PSC was anxious that 
there was only one judgment, given the importance of clear guidance in such a case. 
Although it went out in my name, the contributions to the judgment of the other 
eight members of the court were substantial, in some cases very substantial. It was 
hard work, involving a number of meetings and a great deal of email communication, 
but the result was much better than my original draft. Whether it achieved its aim 
only other people and time can tell. 
I am very far from suggesting that we should entirely move away from 
multiple judgments. Sometimes the different judicial perspectives, even though the 
judges may agree on the actual outcome, render a single judgment impossible or 
would result in the unsatisfactory compromise product that we sometimes see 
emanating from Luxembourg or Strasbourg – very limited in effect, banal, opaque, or 
internally inconsistent. Sometimes, a short concurring judgment, more ‘punchy’ than 
the fuller leading judgment, helps identify the main points and the main thrust of the 
reasoning of the court. Sometimes, a second concurring judgment adds an extra 
dimension to the first, often because the two judges come at the issue from different 
angles or with different experiences or expertise. Sometimes, where the law is being 
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taken forward or expanded, it is positively useful to have judgments with different 
emphases, or adopting slightly different approaches. That is how the common law 
develops. 
In conclusion on this aspect, I would have thought then that one of the things 
which the Judicial Studies Board, the soon-to-be Judicial College, should consider as 
a topic is the skill of judgment writing. In saying this, I intentionally express myself 
in somewhat tentative language. Judgment writing is a very individualistic exercise, 
which is governed by the style and approach of the judge and the issues and 
character of the case. Unlike a summing-up, one cannot have standard passages 
which can be lifted from a bench book. Accordingly, there may be a limited amount 
one could usefully teach on the topic. Some might go so far as to say that anyone who 
needs to be taught how to write a judgment is unfit to be a judge. 
I accept that there is some force in all these points, but, in the end, I do not 
agree with the conclusion. Advocacy is taught, and that is every bit as much a 
personal, case-based art. There is always something which even an experienced judge 
can learn about judgment writing, as anyone who has sat in the Court of Appeal can 
testify. When I receive a colleague’s draft judgment, I often not only consider the 
reasoning and conclusion of the draft, but also realise that the approach, style or 
structure is different from that which I would have adopted, and, at least sometimes, 
I really think I learn from it. 
 
Open justice in the future 
Clarity and accessibility in judgments is one way in which we can continue to secure 
open justice in the 21st century. However, there are other measures we could adopt 
to ensure our courts remain properly accessible. I started this lecture with Bayley J’s 
thoughts as to the practical and principled limitations on public access to the courts. 
The practical limitations are twofold – lack of space in court, and disruption to the 
proceedings. The principled limitation is that there may be a good reason owing to 
the nature of the case that the public are denied access. For the moment I 
concentrate on the practical limitations. 
The fact that the court may be too small to accommodate all those who wish to 
attend the hearing is recognised by the Civil Procedure Rules (England and Wales), 
which do not place a positive obligation to provide sufficient access to the courtroom 
to all those who wish to observe proceedings.27 Newly built courtrooms are mostly 
smaller than the old ones. However, it is only on rare occasions that our courts are 
full of members of the public. The days of courts regularly being filled to the rafters 
by interested members of the public, as Dickens depicted during Charles Darnay’s 
trial in A Tale of Two Cities, are long gone. The combination of limited space and 
limited interest among the public suggests that the justice system may need to adapt 
in order to ensure that it truly remains open to the public. 
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Public awareness of what happens in our courts serves to bolster public 
confidence in the administration of justice. Providing fair trials in the public eye 
bolsters public confidence in the administration of justice, and hence in our 
democratic form of government. It is therefore a matter of concern if members of the 
public rarely come into our courts to observe what goes on in them. Stating that our 
courts, as a general principle, are open to all is one thing, but it must be a reality. 
The decrease in members of the public coming to visit the courts since 
Dickens’s day is attributable, at least to a substantial extent, to generic factors. The 
vast quantity of entertainment now available at home, and the opportunities of 
travelling whether in the United Kingdom or abroad, mean that there are many more 
distractions available than 150 years ago. The increased tempo of life has, I think, 
resulted in a shorter attention span, a greater desire for instant gratification, which 
the court process cannot satisfy – and, ironically, over the same period, court 
hearings have generally become much slower and longer. 
So there is a limited amount we can do to seek engage the public, and, anyway, 
we should be careful of taking any such steps. It is not the function of the courts or 
the judges to adjust their procedures or working practices with a view to stimulating 
public interest, let alone to curry favour with the public. However, we have to be 
open to the public, and, I would suggest, we have to do everything reasonably 
practical to enable the public to have access to see what is going on in court, provided 
that it does not interfere with the trial process. 
The Supreme Court televises its hearings in its impressively renovated 
building. As yet, though, there appears to have been little appetite for broadcasters to 
televise its hearings. I can see that there may not, from a commercial perspective, be 
an interest to do so. However, from a public interest perspective might there not be 
an argument now for its hearings, and some hearings of the Court of Appeal, to be 
televised on some equivalent of the Parliament Channel, or via the BBC iPlayer? 
Brazil’s Federal Supreme Tribunal now has its own TV channel. The channel, TV 
Justiça, does not only show recordings of its sessions, but it also shows a whole host 
of educational programs about the justice system. 
If we wish to increase public confidence in the justice system, transparency 
and engagement, there is undoubtedly something to be said for televising some 
hearings, provided that there are proper safeguards to ensure that this increased 
access does not undermine the proper administration of justice. Such an idea would 
have to be looked at very carefully, and it would not be sensible for me to try and 
make any firm suggestions. However, if broadcasting of court proceedings does go 
ahead, I think it would be right to make two points, even at this tentative stage. First, 
the judge or judges hearing the case concerned would have to have full rights of veto 
over what could be broadcast. Second, I would be very chary indeed about the notion 
of witness actions or criminal trials being broadcast – in each case for obvious 
reasons. 
22 Justice Wide Open  
 
It is not merely the television age we have entered. I welcome the Lord Chief 
Justice’s Interim Guidance on Tweeting in Courts.28 Without wanting to prejudge 
the contents of the Final Guidance, it seems to me that, subject again to proper 
safeguards, the advent of court tweeting should be accepted, provided of course that 
the tweeting does not interfere with the hearing. Why force a journalist or a member 
of the public to rush out of court in order to telephone or text the contents of his 
notes written in court, when he can tweet as unobtrusively as he can write? It seems 
to me, in principle, that tweeting is an excellent way to inform and engage interested 
members of the public, as well as the legal profession. Whatever the outcome of the 
consultation is, I doubt that we will see the development of tweeting from the Bench. 
The media have always played a fundamental role in reporting what goes on in 
the courts, and, with the fall-off in public attendance in the courts, and the increased 
role of the broadcast media, accurate press reporting is even more important to open 
justice than it was in Dickens’s time. One of the most fertile grounds for inaccurate 
reporting is the Human Rights Act 1998; reporting which may tempt some into 
thinking that it is hardly worth maintaining the State’s inability to deny you a fair 
trial, to kill or torture you, and to preclude you enjoying freedom of expression. 
There are many examples of inaccurate reporting; I shall limit myself to two. 
In May 2006, The Sun reported that ‘Serial killer, Dennis Nilsen, 60, received 
hardcore gay porn in jail thanks to human rights laws’.29 He had indeed issued 
proceedings based on human rights seeking the provision of such pornography. 
However, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its 2006 report pointed out, 
the claim was thrown out at the permission stage;30 that is to say immediately. If Mr 
Nilsen ended up being provided with what he wanted, and I don’t know whether he 
did or not, it had absolutely nothing to do with human rights laws. 
My second example relates to the reporting of the issue of the attempted 
deportation of Learco Chindamo, who killed Philip Lawrence, from the United 
Kingdom. He could not be deported, and, for some parts of the press, this was 
entirely the fault of Art 8 of the European convention.31 Although the Tribunal which 
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made the initial deportation ruling mentioned Art 8, the reason why he could not be 
deported had, however, nothing whatsoever to do with Art 8, but was based on the 
Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006.32 (So I suppose it was 
the fault of Brussels or Luxemburg, but not Strasbourg.) 
These are just two examples, and the Joint Committee 2006 report outlines a 
number of other myths and misconceptions. These myths are attributable to two 
different tendencies. The first is simply outright misreporting. The story said one 
thing, when the truth was the opposite. The second is a more subtle form of 
misreporting: the Human Rights Act is brought in to take the blame for a decision to 
which it might have played a part – and the part the critics suggested it did play, but 
which in truth it did not. 
It is a sign of a healthy democracy that there are different views within society 
and that the outcome of individual cases, and the balance struck between individual 
rights, can be vigorously debated. However, such debates must be based on fact not 
misconception, deliberate or otherwise. Persuasion should be based on truth rather 
than propaganda. It is one thing to disagree with a judgment, to disagree with a law 
and to campaign to change the law, but it is another thing to misstate what was said 
in a judgment, or to misstate the law. 
I think that a more active approach might usefully be taken by those of us who are 
concerned with the administration of justice to ensure that judgments are publicised 
and properly reported. We should: 
 
• build on the Supreme Court’s practice of issuing short, easily accessible 
judgment summaries with judgments 
• foster the already developing community of active informed court reporting 
on the internet through blogs, and tweeting 
• support the responsible legal journalists 
• initiate, support, encourage and assist public legal education. 
 
The great strength of our society is that it is built on the competing voices of free 
speech. Justice to be truly open must join its voice to the chorus; and must ensure 
that inaccurate or misleading reporting cannot gain traction. 
It is this point though which brings me to the final part of this lecture. How far 
does principle allow us to go in the direction of openness? 
 
Recent developments in cases on open justice 
There have been two recent developments which have called into question the 
boundaries of open justice. They concern Bayley J’s second limiting factor: the 
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existence of specific reasons of principle why the public should properly be excluded. 
The first is the development of the so-called superinjunction. The second is the 
development of closed proceedings where national security issues arise. 
A super-injunction is simply an interim injunction whose purpose is to 
restrain a person from publishing information which the claimant contends is private 
or confidential in nature. Traditionally, the most common example of such an 
injunction was to protect commercial secrets. What makes an injunction a super-
injunction is that it also restrains publication of the fact that the injunction has been 
sought and made and the very fact that proceedings are ongoing.33 Such injunctions 
can obviously only be granted where there is information which is capable of being 
legally protected. 
Super-injunctions like any other injunction can only be granted in support of 
substantive legal rights. They do not determine those rights. They simply exist, as all 
interim injunctions do, to ensure that the proper administration of justice is not 
frustrated pending trial and final judgment.  
For instance, if a claimant is entitled to an injunction restraining publication 
of a story that he (and it almost always is ‘he’) has had a sexual relationship with a 
third party, then it would be literally absurd if open justice prevented him from 
stopping the press reporting that he had obtained an injunction restraining 
publication of a story that he had had such a relationship. Thus, once one accepts 
that the court has power to grant an injunction restraining a breach of privacy, it has 
to follow that the court has the ancillary power to restrain publication of details of 
the injunction proceedings, application, hearing, proceedings or order. 
The concern over super-injunctions is that they have, as Professor Zuckerman 
has put it, developed into an entirely secret form of procedure. As he put it, ‘English 
administration of justice has not [previously] allowed’,34 that is: 
 
… for the entire legal process to be conducted out of the public view and for its very 
existence to be kept permanently secret under pain of contempt.35 
 
English law has not known of such a procedure – of secret justice – since 5 July 1641, 
when the Long Parliament abolished the Court of Star Chamber.36 
This concern is reflected in the proposition recently spelled out by the Vice-
President of the Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Maurice Kay LJ, that ‘the principle 
of open justice requires that any restrictions are the least that can be imposed 
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consistent with the protection to which [the claimant] is entitled’.37 Even more 
recently in JIH v News Group Newspapers Ltd,38 the Vice-President, Smith LJ and I 
set out 10 important items of principle and practice, based on those identified by 
Tugendhat J, with a view to minimising the inroads made on open justice when there 
is a need for some sort of reporting restrictions, whether it is the grant of anonymity 
to parties, limiting or excluding the reporting of the subject matter of the case, or 
other limitations. 
The case involved the grant of an injunction restraining the publication of 
alleged sexual activity of an international sportsman. The issue was whether we 
should let the name of the sportsman be published, in which case we would have had 
to ban publication of details of the story; or grant the sportsman anonymity, in which 
case the basic nature of the story could be published. Partly because, in the light of 
the history, naming the sportsman might well have enabled people to work out the 
nature of the story, we decided to grant him anonymity. However, this was also 
arguably justified by the point that the public interest is better served by knowing 
about the type of case which is coming before the courts, and the types of case in 
which reporting restrictions are being granted, than by knowing which famous 
sportsman is seeking an injunction for wholly unspecified relief. In this connection, 
there may well be a difference between what is in the public interest to know and 
what the public want to know – or perhaps what some newspapers want the public to 
want to know. 
The judicial concern to maximise openness of justice was reinforced by the 
judgment of the Lord Chief Justice in A v Independent News & Media Ltd,39 where 
he affirmed in clear terms the right of the media to attend a case before the Court of 
Protection, albeit that, in order to protect the interests of the disabled person 
concerned, the media could only report on what was said in court to the extent 
permitted by the judge hearing the case. I am currently chairing a committee on 
super-injunctions, and it includes judges, barristers, and solicitors representing both 
the press and claimants. I very much hope that we will be able to publish our report 
before the end of April, and that it will allay many of the understandable concerns 
about secret justice.40 
That concern also arises in respect of the development of closed proceedings 
in the justice system and the use of special advocates. Closed proceedings are those 
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to which not merely the public has no access, but also to which one of the parties has 
no access. That party will have his own advocates, but they cannot attend the closed 
proceedings or see the closed evidence, as they cannot have secrets from their client. 
Special advocates are not instructed by the party concerned, and normally have no 
contact with him, so they can attend the closed hearing, see the closed evidence, and 
make such representations as they think appropriate on his behalf. Their purpose is 
to ensure a degree of procedural justice, or at least to minimise the injustice, to that 
party. 
Closed proceedings were first introduced as a result of reforms made to the 
immigration system in 1973. Those reforms introduced a system of statutory appeals 
in deportation cases, except where national security was in issue. In those cases, a 
right of appeal from the deportation decision lay to a special Home Office Advisory 
Panel. That panel had access to all the evidence, including the national security 
evidence. The appellant however did not. The panel made recommendations to the 
Home Secretary, who could accept or reject them. A challenge to the Home 
Secretary’s decision could then be made by way of judicial review. The court, 
however, had no jurisdiction to examine the national security evidence. 
This system was challenged in a case which was ultimately resolved by the 
Strasbourg Court in Chahal v UK.41 As a consequence of its decision and one of the 
Luxembourg Court,42 the system was reformed. Those reforms saw the creation of 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK) which created both the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) in 1997 and the special advocate 
system, which operated in proceedings before SIAC. 
Since then, statute has provided for closed proceedings, and the use of special 
advocates, in six different types of cases; most specifically in respect of court review 
of control orders.43 The creation of closed proceedings, notwithstanding the use of 
special advocates, is a clear derogation from the principle of open justice. Not only is 
one party absent from one part of the proceedings, but equally the public are barred 
from having access to it. They are statutory derogations from the principle of open 
justice. Pending the decision of the Supreme Court, the position is that at common 
law there is no jurisdiction to create such a procedure, following the Al-Rawi44 
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decision to which I was a party in the Court of Appeal, and in respect of which the 
Supreme Court has heard argument on appeal. 
One of the functions of open justice is to guard against repression. Carrying 
out justice in the light of day ensures that courts do not become, as they did in the 
case of the Star Chamber, political courts or courts where lettres d’cachet are given 
the imprimatur of justice. However, as we emphasised in Al-Rawi,45 it is obviously 
open to the Parliament, if and when it thinks fit, to legislate for an appropriate closed 
procedure in cases in which it believes it to be appropriate and necessary. The 
Strasbourg court has decided that, subject to the measure being reasonably necessary 
and the procedure adopted being appropriate, no problem under Art 6 will arise. 
The development of both closed proceedings and the debate regarding super-
injunctions highlights a number of things. First, the disquiet about both 
demonstrates how deeply ingrained is our commitment, as a society, to open justice. 
It underlines Lord Shaw’s point that open justice is a sacred part of our constitution 
and our administration of justice. However, it also shows something else. It 
highlights how, in certain, narrowly defined circumstances, the general principle can, 
indeed must, be set aside and how in some circumstances both Parliament and the 
courts have done so. 
It can be set aside because open justice is subject to a higher principle: that 
being, as Lord Haldane LC put it in Scott v Scott, the ‘yet more fundamental principle 
that the chief object of Courts of justice must be to secure that justice is done’.46 
Where publicity, through the unqualified adherence to the general principle of open 
justice, would ‘frustrate or render impracticable the administration of justice’,47 then 
publicity must yield. As mentioned, an injunction protecting information pending 
trial would be pointless if the very information to be protected had to be disclosed 
publicly in order to obtain the injunction, and national security might be endangered 
if certain information had to be disclosed in open court. Open justice must however 
yield no more than strictly necessary to secure the achievement of the proper 
administration of justice. Where it goes beyond what is strictly necessary then we run 
the risk that the courts are no longer open to proper scrutiny, that their role in 
supporting democracy and the rule of law is undermined. 
 
Conclusion 
This evening I have touched on a number of aspects of the principle of open justice. 
It is a cardinal principle of our justice system. It underpins the rule of law and our 
liberal democracy. It is a principle which requires the courts to engage with the 
public. 
                                                   
45 ibid at [70] (c) 
46 [1913] AC 417 at 437 
47  A-G v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 at 450 
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It is not however an absolute principle. It has limits and allows for 
derogations. In particular it is limited by the need to ensure that it does not 
undermine the proper administration of justice. An absolutist stance would 
undermine our justice system. In approaching our commitment to open justice it 
seems then to me that we need to ask ourselves one question: to what extent does our 
commitment to it secure the rule of law? 
The role of judges and the courts in administering open justice was well 
described by one of my predecessors, Lord Donaldson. The judges, he said: 
 
… administer justice in the Queen’s name on behalf of the whole community. No one 
is more entitled than a member of the general public to see for himself that justice is 
done. Nevertheless it is well settled that occasions can arise when it becomes the duty 
of the court to close its doors.48 
 
If those doors are too often closed we undermine justice. If they are not closed when 
it is appropriate to do so, we equally undermine justice. Amidst this clash of arms, it 
is justice, the rule of law, which must be our guide. 
 
 
© The Right Honourable Lord Neuberger  
 
The Master of the Rolls is the Head of Civil Justice, and the second most senior 
judicial post in England and Wales, after the Lord Chief Justice. The Rt. Hon. Lord 
Neuberger of Abbotsbury (in the county of Dorset) was appointed as Master of the 
Rolls with effect from 1 October 2009. 
 
                                                   
48  R v Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies Ex p New Cross Building Society [1984] QB 227 at 235 
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JUSTICE IN A COLD CLIMATE 
 
Dr David Goldberg looks to Sweden and Scotland for historical and 
comparative examples of open justice  
 
The title of this paper is a play on the title of an article written by the eminent jurist 
H. L. A.  Hart, ‘Law in a Cold Climate’.  Hart’s article was about the school of 
jurisprudence known as Scandinavian Legal Realism.  This paper has no pretensions 
to jurisprudential import. Its ambition is limited to offering a couple of illustrations 
concerning ‘open justice’ from a comparative, historical perspective. The ‘cold 
climate’ is a reference to the fact that one example is drawn from Scotland and the 
other from Sweden. 
 
Scotland 
The principle of open justice in that country is not a recent development.  Two 
statutes of the (pre-1707) Scottish Parliament are illustrative. The second is still 
considered as being in force.  
 
a.  Evidence Act appointing publication of the testimonies of witnesses1 
 
Our sovereign lord, considering how much it does import and concern the good and 
interest of his majesty’s lieges, and the due administration of justice, that witnesses 
be distinctly and fully examined, and their depositions written in plain and clear 
words as they are given; therefore his majesty, with advice and consent of the estates 
of parliament, statutes and ordains that, in all processes presently depending or to be 
intended before the lords of privy council, lords of session and all other judges within 
this kingdom, the witnesses who are made use of and adduced therein shall be 
examined in the presence of the parties or their advocates, they being present at the 
diets of examination, and that there be publication of the testimonies of the witnesses 
in the clerks’ hands allowed to the parties gratis before advising, to the effect parties 
may have copies thereof if they think fit, any law or act of parliament, custom or 
usage to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
b.  Court of Session Act anent advising with open doors before the session2 
 
Our sovereign lord and lady the king and queen’s majesties, considering that the 
advising of causes with open doors is usual in the sovereign judicatories of other 
nations, and that the like practice here will be of advantage to the lieges, do, with 
advice and consent of the estates of parliament, statute and ordain that in all time 
coming, all bills, reports, debates, probations and others relating to processes shall be 
considered, reasoned, advised and voted by the lords of session with open doors, 
                                                   
1 Evidence Act, APS viii 599, c.30 <http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1686/4/46> accessed 3 March 2012 
2 Court of Session Act,  APS ix 305, c.42 <http://www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1693/4/93> accessed 3 March 
2012 
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where parties, procurators and all others are hereby allowed to be present, as they 
used to be formerly in time of debates, but with this restriction, that in some special 
cases the said lords shall be allowed to cause remove all persons, except the parties 
and their procurators, and that no person presume to speak after the lords begin to 
advise under the pain of imprisonment, unless he be desired by the lords. And hereby 
cass and annul all former laws and acts of parliament appointing or allowing the 
lords to advise with closed doors.3 
 
Also worthy of note is the dictum of Lord President Inglis in Richardson v Wilson 
(1879), regarding the right of newspapers to be in court to report proceedings.  He 
stated that 
The publication by newspapers of what takes place in court at the hearing of any 
cause is undoubtedly lawful: and if it be reported in a fair and faithful manner the 
publisher is not responsible though the report contain statements or details of 
evidence affecting the character of either of the parties or of other persons; and 
whatever takes place in open court falls under the same rule, though it may be either 
before or after the proper hearing of the cause. The principle on which this rule is 
founded seems to be that, as courts of Justice are open to the public, anything that 
takes place before a judge or judges is thereby necessarily and legitimately made 
public, and, being once made legitimately public property, may be republished 
without inferring any responsibility. [Emphasis added] 
 
Sweden 
Probably, most would not be surprised to learn that Sweden has a tradition of ‘open 
justice’.  However, historically, the main tack adopted with respect to ‘open justice’ in 
that jurisdiction has been rather distinctive. The key development took place during 
the so-called Age of Liberty, 1720 – 1772.4   
Whilst largely connected with political liberty – principally the rise of the four 
Estates (jointly, the Parliament/Riksdag) vis-à-vis the Monarchy – the period did 
also see increasing demands for civil liberty. 
A representative sentiment from a little-known source is that expressed by the 
world-renowned botanist and apostle of von Linne, Peter Forsskal. Almost unknown 
is the fact that he also authored a controversial pamphlet, Thoughts on Civil Liberty 
(1759).5 Committed to openness in the broader context of social and scientific 
progress, Forsskal wrote: 
 
So, the life and strength of civil liberty consist in limited Government and unlimited 
freedom of the written word... 
....it is also an important right in a free society to be freely allowed to contribute to 
society’s well-being. However, if that is to occur, it must be possible for society’s state 
                                                   
3 ‘Cass’ means ‘To make void, render ineffective, annul or disable’ 
<http://www.rps.ac.uk/static/glossary.html#C> accessed  3 March 2012 
4 Michael Roberts The Age of Liberty: Sweden 1719-1772 (Cambridge University Press 2003) 
5 <http://peterforsskal.com/node/25/#main-text>  accessed 9 March 2012; the printed copy of the 
text with commentary is available at  <http://www.peterforsskal.com/buy> accessed 9 March 2012 
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of affairs to become known to everyone, and it must be possible for everyone to speak 
his mind freely about it. Where this is lacking, liberty is not worth its name.6 
 
The pamphlet was banned on the day it was published.  This helped fuel the 
gathering firestorm that led, ultimately, to the passage of the ‘world’s first freedom of 
information act’ in December 1766.  In that sense, Forsskal’s work was an important 
intellectual catalyst for the measure.  Forsskal himself was dead (aged 32) by the 
time of its adoption, having contracted a fatal illness in Jerim, Yemen, whilst part of 
an expedition to ‘Felix Arabia’ commissioned by the King of Denmark.  
Conventionally understood, freedom of information laws are means of legally 
compelling public authorities (e.g., central and local government) to disclose 
information they hold. Significantly though, the 1766 law contains several sections 
pertinent to the issue of making the administration of justice more transparent and 
giving the right to publish legal and judicial information. 
On a point of nomenclature, the Swedish law is usually referred to as the 
‘Freedom of the Press Act’ (1766).  This is somewhat misleading. The full title of the 
measure is ‘His Majesty’s Gracious Ordinance Relating to Freedom of Writing and of 
the Press’.7  But, there was no developed ‘press’ in the sense of a media industry in 
mid-eighteenth century Sweden.  The connotation of ‘press’ (from the Swedish 
‘tryckfrihetsförordningenin’ in the law’s title) is a reference to the printing press.  
‘Tryck’ means something that is printed. 
The 1766 Ordinance addresses two main topics.  First, it deals with the 
abolition of prior censorship and the freedom to publish. The latter is far from 
absolute, a number of matters being made legally immune from criticism or 
questioning.  Second, there is the appearance of the legally revolutionary principle of 
public access to official information. This is described by the Swedish term 
‘offentlighetsprincipen’, which has an even broader connotation.8 
There are several sections which specifically mention court and legal 
information in addition to what would be included more conventionally as official 
documents.  
 
Article 6 states: 
 
This freedom of the press will further include all exchanges of correspondence, 
species facti, documents, protocols, judgments and awards, whether they were 
produced in the past or will be initiated, maintained, presented, conducted and 
issued hereafter, before, during and after proceedings before lower courts, appeal and 
superior courts and government departments, our senior administrators and 
consistories or other public bodies, and without distinction between the nature of the 
                                                   
6 Op.cit., paras 7 and 21 
7 English translation of the 1766 Ordinance by Peter Hogg, former Head, Scandinavian Section, British 
Library, <http://www.chydenius.net/pdf/worlds_first_foia.pdf >  accessed 7 March 2012 
8 <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2184/nocache/true/a/15521/dictionary/true> accessed 9 March 
2012 
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cases, whether these are civil, criminal or ecclesiastical or otherwise in some degree 
concern religious controversies; as well as older and more recent appeals and 
expositions, declarations and counter-declarations that have been or will be 
submitted to the Chambers of Our Supreme Court as well as the official 
correspondence and memorials that have already been or may in future be issued 
from the Office of the Chancellor of Justice; although no one may be obliged to obtain 
and print more of all this, either in extensor or abridged as a species facti, than he 
himself requests and regards as adequate and which, when requested, shall 
immediately be issued to anyone who applies for them, on penalty of the provisions 
in the following paragraph but in criminal cases that have been settled by an amicable 
reconciliation between private individuals no one may, without the agreement of the 
parties, make use of this freedom as long as they remain alive; while also, if anything 
concerning grave and unfamiliar misdeeds and abominations, blasphemies against 
God and the Head of State, evil and cunning schemes in these and other serious 
criminal cases, superstitions and other such matters should appear in court 
proceedings or judgments, they shall be completely excluded. 
 
Article 7 continues: 
 
Whereas a legally correct votum does not have to be concealed in cases where a 
decision is arrived at only by the vote of the judge; and as an impartial judge has no 
need to fear people when he has a clear conscience, while he will, on the contrary, be 
pleased if his impartiality becomes apparent and his honour is thereby 
simultaneously protected from both suspicions and pejorative opinions; We have 
therefore, in order to prevent the several kinds of hazardous consequences that may 
follow from imprudent votes, likewise graciously decided that they shall no longer be 
protected behind an anonymity that is no less injurious than unnecessary; for which 
reason when anyone, whether he is a party to the case or not, announces his wish to 
print older or more recent voting records in cases where votes have occurred, they 
shall, as soon as a judgment or verdict has been given in the matter, immediately be 
released for a fee, when for each votum the full name of each voting member should 
also be clearly set out, whether it be in the lower courts or the appeal and superior 
courts, government departments, executory authorities, consistories or other public 
bodies, and that on pain of the loss of office for whosoever refuses to do so or to any 
degree obstructs it; in consequence of which the oath of secrecy will in future be 
amended and corrected in this regard. 
 
Finally, Article 9 prescribes: 
 
In addition to the records of trials and other matters referred to above, everyone who 
has a case or other proceedings touching his rights before any court or public body 
whatsoever, as also before Ourselves, the Estates of the Realm, their select 
committees and standing committees, shall be free to print an account of it or a so-
called species facti, together with those documents relating to it that he regards as 
necessary to him; although he should in this matter keep to the truth, should he be 
concerned to avoid the liabilities prescribed in law. 
 
This short tour of two jurisdictions north and northwest of England highlights the 
point that the legal roots for the concept of ‘open justice’ are rather varied.  The 
Scottish items are sourced in pre-Union Scottish Parliamentary Acts. The Swedish 
contribution emerges from a less likely basis: its famous 1766 Ordinance.  
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Citing historical sources, however, is no guide to the current vitality of the 
notion in either jurisdiction – or the ways in which it can be expanded and improved 
upon. 
 
 
© Dr David Goldberg  
 
Dr David Goldberg is an information rights academic and activist. He directs 
deeJgee Research/Consultancy and is a Lecturer for Glasgow Caledonian 
University’s communications law course and Senior Visiting Fellow, Institute of 
Computer and Communications Law in the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, 
Queen Mary, University of London. 
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TOWARDS LEGAL 
TRANSPARENCY  
 
Hugh Tomlinson QC calls for online availability of case law and 
lists, as part of a new ‘Court Charter’   
 
The principle of ‘accessibility’ is a vital part of the rule of law.  In Tom Bingham’s 
seminal work it is the first of the essential principles which he discusses: ‘The law 
must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable’.1 
‘Accessible’ in this context means being ‘public and ascertainable’ – there must be 
simple and straightforward ways of finding out what the law is.  No one doubts that 
principle of accessibility but what is important are effective measures to put this 
principle into practice. 
For much of our history the law has, in practice, not been accessible to the 
public at all.  In contrast to civil law jurisdictions the law is not to be found in ‘codes’ 
but in a mixture of statute and judicial decision. Statutes and statutory instruments 
occupy hundreds of large volumes, available only in specialist libraries.  The volume 
of statutory material is immense.  A recent House of Lords Library Note2 shows that, 
since the war, there has been an average of more than 50 new Acts of Parliament a 
year and over 2,000 statutory instruments.  In 2009 there were 3,088 pages of new 
statutes and 10,662 pages of statutory instruments.  
Access is, on any view, not straightforward. The position in relation to case 
law was even worse.  In 1362 it was decreed that pleadings and judgments of the 
Courts of Westminster should be in English – but for many members of the public 
their language remains foreign and the judgments difficult to access.   
For hundreds of years knowledge of what happened in court was dependent 
on private enterprise law reporters – of varying quality.  There were many different 
series of reports, sometimes inaccurate, sometimes not published until years after 
the judgments were handed down.  There were over a hundred series of ‘nominate’ 
reports – often by moonlighting barristers.  
The first ‘official’ Law Reports were not published until 1866.  For over a 
hundred years they remained expensive and accessible only to those with specialist 
knowledge and access to law libraries. And the Law Reports only contained the cases 
which the reporters decided the public should know about.  Some judgments were 
left unpublished.  If a law reporter was not present in court then the judgment might 
                                                   
1 T Bingham, The Rule of Law (Faber, 2010), p.37 
2 House of Lords Library Note, LLN 2011/028, 16 September 2011 
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never become public.  Court of Appeal judgments were not transcribed until the 
1950s.  Even then the transcripts were only available in a small number of libraries.  
This remained the position when I began to practice the law 30 years ago.  These 
restrictions on access to ‘sources of law’ are one aspect of the restrictive practices of 
the legal profession.  
Has the internet changed the position? How far have we moved towards 
transparency? Much of the case law of the higher courts is, of course, now generally 
available online – usually from open free websites such as BAILII3 in this country 
and equivalent sites such as AusLII4 and CanLII5.  Decisions of the highest courts in 
this jurisdiction and many others around the world which influence our law are made 
publicly available, often on the same day they are given.  Accessibility in this area has 
improved beyond recognition over the past decade and a half.  
There are arguments about issues such as open justice and restrictions on 
publicity but the overwhelming trend over recent times has been positive. This has, 
in part, compensated for the coincidentally concurrent dramatic decline in court 
reporting.  Most courts no longer have a reporter present but some civil courts, at 
least, provide their judgments to the public shortly after hand down.  This does not, 
however, deal with the fact that the evidence given, particularly in civil cases, is 
rarely reported on. Although Crown Court and High Court hearings have been 
recorded for many years, transcripts are expensive.  
Hearings at the Supreme Court are now available on a live television feed.  In 
this respect the United Kingdom is ahead of the United States (although the US 
Supreme Court provides next day audio and transcripts of its short hearing). 
Similarly, statutory materials are now freely available on the internet via 
Legislation.gov.uk.6 This includes revisions to legislation, although not entirely up to 
date.  About half of legislation is now up to date and there are plans to bring all 
legislation fully to up to date.  This is very substantial progress. But there remains a 
lot to do. I will mention two particular areas of concern. 
First, the availability of case law remains incomplete.  The free public services 
cover only a small percentage of judgments and rulings given.  The transcription 
copies are not freely available and producers have copyright in the transcripts of 
judgments. First instance decisions of the civil courts are sometime only available on 
the payment of a fee.  First instance criminal decisions are rarely freely available at 
all. 
Second, and more importantly, over the past three decades English civil and 
criminal procedure has moved away from the traditions of ‘orality’.  In civil 
proceedings witnesses rarely give evidence ‘in chief, their witness statements are 
                                                   
3 British and Irish Legal Information Institute,  <http://www.bailii.org/> 
4 Australian Legal Information Institute, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/> 
5  Canadian Legal Information Institute, <http://www.canlii.org/> 
6 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/> 
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taken as read.  Much argument is conducted on paper through written submissions 
of various kinds.   
Witness statements and written submissions are usually very difficult to 
obtain.  A witness statement which stands as evidence in chief is open to inspection 
during the trial, unless the court directs otherwise.7 In practice, this is often difficult 
to do. Statements of case, judgments or orders are available from the court file 
without permission. Access to written submissions is more difficult. Civil Procedure 
Rule (CPR) 5.4C provides that a non-party can obtain from the records of the court, 
with the court’s permission, a copy of ‘any other document’ filed by a party. It is clear 
that a non-party has a right to obtain a skeleton argument from the court8 but there 
is no system in place to make such access automatic. An application must be made.   
It is remarkable that no courts in the United Kingdom make written 
submissions publicly available.  This is in stark contrast to the position in, for 
example, the United States, Canada or South Africa where the ‘briefs’ to the Court are 
freely available to the public on the internet.  This is a significant barrier to 
accessibility as, even when someone is in court, oral arguments are difficult to follow 
without sight of the written submissions. 
A number of reforms and improvements are required to ensure maximum 
accessibility of the law. A ‘Court Charter’ is urgently needed to make these rights 
clear and accessible to everyone. In the meantime, I would propose two which would 
greatly assist those who are seeking to follow and understand court cases. These 
could be implemented quickly at relatively modest cost as they involve the making 
public of information which the courts already have or which they could require to be 
provided by the parties.  
First, there should be online availability of full case information – all 
statements of case, judgments, orders, witness statements and written submissions.  
This could be done immediately in the Supreme Court – as court documents have to 
be filed electronically.  Systems would have to be put place in other courts to provide 
for electronic filing but there is no reason why this could not be done immediately in 
cases of public interest and progressively in other types of case. 
Second, there should be online availability of full and up to date court lists, 
with lists of upcoming cases and archives of previous listings.  The list could include, 
as a minimum, the case name, the subject matter of the case or, for criminal cases, 
the charges and the names of the parties’ lawyers. 
The progress of the law towards transparency and accessibility has been slow. 
The developments in electronic information storage over the past two decades have 
brought huge improvements.   
                                                   
7 See CPR 32.13 
8 For example, in R (Davies, James and Gaines-Cooper) v HMRC Court of Appeal allowed a non-
party’s application for access to HMRC’s skeleton argument 
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The ‘Justice Wide Open’ conference is an important opportunity to ensure 
that this movement does not lose momentum. 
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THE FREE LEGAL INFO 
LANDSCAPE 
 
Emily Allbon asks whether we can expect an inspiring view for the 
free legal future 
 
As ‘gatekeepers of information’ librarians are most concerned with ensuring the best 
quality information makes its way to our users, whoever they might be. Law 
librarians or legal information professionals work within all sorts of organisations: 
academic institutions, law firms, barristers’ chambers, government libraries, inns 
libraries and in-house within companies. The last 10-15 years have seen a massive 
shift in the nature of legal research and the tools available to us and yet we are still in 
a situation where many of the primary legal materials in the UK are inaccessible to 
those who cannot afford the cost of subscription legal databases.  
Librarians have always been very pro-active in pushing those resources 
provided at no cost, alongside the paid-for commercial services that we have no 
choice but to rely upon. These recommendations often materialise in the form of 
legal gateways, created by librarians to point their users in the direction of useful 
websites. The first of these was SOSIG Law (Social Sciences Information Gateway), a 
huge portal to law websites available at no cost on the internet. The resources were 
all evaluated and described by librarians. This later became the Intute service when 
funding ceased, and now with JISC halting funding in 2011, the Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies have taken over the data to integrate into their Eagle-I service.  
Others of note in the UK include Lawbore, the portal for law students from 
City University, created to ensure students would know where to find legal 
information online (even if they went on to work in places where legal databases 
would be unavailable), and the many examples of collaborations in other 
jurisdictions like EISIL from the United States. Within universities the push to invest 
in repositories has often been driven by the librarians, wanting to provide a service 
free to all, sharing the institution’s intellectual capital with the world whilst loosening 
the chains of reliance on prohibitive journal subscriptions.  
Essentially librarians play a role in promoting resources and advocating on 
behalf of our users, representing them against often-aggressive commercial 
publishers. Can we really make a difference?  
In the US the AALL (American Association of Law Libraries) have had 
enormous influence on the way federal and state documents are made available 
online with their un-snappily entitled ‘Principles and Core Values Concerning Public 
40 Justice Wide Open  
 
Information on Government Websites’.1 This document and accompanying pressure 
from AALL lays down minimum requirements for the publication of legal materials 
on the basis of accessibility, reliability, comprehensiveness and preservation. 
Importantly they draw out what is termed ‘official’, an important point we will visit 
later in this paper. This commitment to ensuring that the electronic document is as 
trustworthy as the print material has resulted in its adoption by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners in the US in the recently enacted Uniform Electronic Legal Materials 
Act.2  
 
The current situation 
In the UK paid-for services still dominate: the long-running duopoly of Lexis and 
Westlaw overshadowing all others. In the last one to two years the situation has 
altered a little in that smaller publishers have been withdrawing their content to run 
their own specialised services on their own platforms (Informa, Jordans). The ICLR 
(Incorporated Council of Law Reporting) have also created their own service ICLR 
Online, but at present the content remains on other platforms too.  
Whilst it is preferable to see the range of products increasing, it does leave 
information services and libraries in a difficult spot; we often still need to subscribe 
to the big two, but then need to pay extra for these niche products to retain our 
coverage. Many libraries have a policy of e-first, which means that they have cut the 
physical hard copy (to increase access, save space) and as most services don’t allow 
you to archive content, as soon as you cancel an electronic subscription access to all 
content disappears, no matter how many years you may have been subscribing.  
In addition many database providers focus their services around the 
requirements of their biggest customers, the global law firms, meaning that often the 
academic customers lose out in terms of functionality that works for them.  
 
So what can you find for free online?  
There is a great deal of law available at no cost online, certainly compared to a 
decade ago.  It is however, not always easy to find and sites are not ‘joined up’ to 
create any kind of cohesive picture. The one stop shop does not exist.  
In many countries now there is a culture of publishing judgments online, 
usually in full text. This may be via the specific court or might be held on a website 
run by a legal information institute (more on these later). Usually these are published 
on a case-by-case basis without the value-added features you would expect from a 
subscription service such as linking to similar cases or related legislation. Many 
                                                   
1 AALL, ‘Principles and Core Values Concerning Public Information on Government Websites’ (AALL, 
2007) <http://www.aallnet.org/main-menu/Advocacy/recommendedguidelines/principles-core-
values.html> accessed 11 March 2012  
2 Amy Taylor, ‘Authentication and Digital Law: Report from AALL’ (Government Information 
Division, SLA) <http://govinfo.sla.org/2011/07/28/authentication-digital-law-report-from-aall/> 
accessed 08 March 2012  
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courts publish their decisions online almost instantaneously and there are some 
great examples of those who extend this with commentary too: the UK Supreme 
Court blog being a prime example.  
Similarly many governments publish their legislation online, however the big 
stumbling block here is how the amendments are incorporated.  
Access to treaties and other instruments of ratification with legal impact is 
also scattered widely across the web. The disparate nature of these resources means 
that it can be quite a struggle to find what you need.  
Journals are very tied down. There are a few sources of free online legal 
journals like DOAJ (Directory of Open Access Journals) but in the UK these make for 
shamefully slim pickings. Academic writers gain their prestige via published work 
and the journal publishers make the most of this.  
To gain an insight into what’s available you simply need to look at some of the 
gateways mentioned at the beginning of this paper, however for primary legal 
materials the big two are as follows:   
 
BAILII  
As the main resource for free legal material in the UK, BAILII offers access to both 
case law and legislation. There are omissions, notably the criminal courts but what 
BAILII has achieved in a country so enslaved by commercial legal publishers is pretty 
remarkable. BAILII contains 80 databases and covers six jurisdictions, however 
there is a far greater volume of content post 1997.   
BAILII undertook some really useful work for the academic community under 
its OpenLaw project; asking lecturers and librarians for their recommendations of 
the key cases in each subject area and digitising 2500 of them. It has also made 
excellent progress around law reform coverage; making available Law Commission 
publications, and painstakingly scanning and converting over 6,900 Privy Council 
judgments.  
BAILII as a legal information institute (in this case the British and Irish Legal 
Information Institute) first launched in 2000, some eight years after the first 
incarnation of these at Cornell University Law School in 1992, which published US 
Supreme Court judgments online. After Cornell, came LexUM from the University of 
Montreal and the giant AustLII (University of Technology, Sydney and University of 
New South Wales) in 1995.  
You might ask what connects these LIIs? What features characterise them? 
Graham Greenleaf one of the founding members of AustLII describes their 
characteristics thus: 
 
1. They publish legal information from more than one source (not just ‘their 
own’ information), for free access via the internet, and 
42 Justice Wide Open  
 
2. They collaborate with each other through membership of the ‘Free Access to 
Law Movement’ (FALM).3  
 
Greenleaf goes on to list other features which are shared by the majority of LIIs, 
including collaboration through data sharing networks, independence of government 
and the use of open source search engines.  
The FALM is a collaborative and decentralised initiative formed in 2002, 
representing in excess of 900 databases from over 139 countries. Their principles are 
enshrined within a Declaration on Free Access to Law,4 and aims centre around the 
adoption of open standards, sustainability of models and effectiveness of use.  
Put simply, the LII concept is to gather all the free legal resources onto one 
uncluttered searchable platform, using a powerful search engine to index the 
material and allow users to search across different types of legal material.  
 
Legislation.gov.uk  
It has been a rocky road for the provision of free online legislation in the UK. We 
have had free access to legislation since 1996, then published by Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office (HMSO) (later known as the Office of Public Sector Information 
[OPSI]).5 Coverage was extended some years later to 1988, but until 2006 only the 
original un-amended statutes were available. Whispers of the development of a 
database of amended legislation had been circulating since the early 1990s and the 
Statute Law Database (SLD) finally arose in 2006. OPSI and the SLD were combined 
and re-launched as Legislation.gov.uk in July 2010. It was heralded by Lord McNally, 
then Minister of State and Deputy Leader of the House of Lords, who celebrated its 
launch with the following words:  
 
This is the public’s statute book. Legislation.gov.uk presents complex information in 
a clear and intuitive way. This is groundbreaking work that puts democracy at the 
heart of legislation and makes a major contribution to the government’s transparency 
agenda.6 
 
Ironically it is not until you have experienced navigating a publication like Halsbury’s 
Statutes in hard copy that you come to realise why our law might be so difficult to 
make provision for online.  
There are so many different ways we might require the law for a start: as it 
was when given royal assent, as amended today and also at a particular point in time. 
                                                   
3 Graham Greenleaf, ‘Free access to legal information, LIIs, and the Free Access to Law Movement’ in 
Richard A. Danner & Jules Winterton (eds), The IALL International Handbook of Legal Information 
(Ashgate, 2011) p.202 
4 Declaration on free access to law (WorldLII, 2007) <http://www.worldlii.org/worldlii/declaration/> 
accessed 10 March 2012  
5 Janice Sayer, ‘Review article on the Statute Law Database’ (2008) LIM 299 
6 ‘Groundbreaking legislation website launched’ (The National Archives, July 2006) 
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/news/478.htm> accessed 10 March 2012 
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The current situation is that we can find much of the first for free, less than half of 
the second and little of the last.  
 
What about other countries?  
In March 2010 there were 33 members of the Free Access to Law Movement. Their 
coverage and origins all differ enormously, despite their shared mission. As we have 
seen, many LIIs have universities as their driving force and indeed financial backers 
(AustLII, the original LII at Cornell, HKLII), others are funded by non-profit trusts, 
foundations or NGOs. This can be seen via BAILII whose Trust comprises courts, 
universities and the legal profession. The legal profession has funded LIIs like 
CanLII, Juri Burkina and CyLaw, as a professional and public service. Some of the 
problems faced by the LIIs include overcoming technology issues, locating 
investment and finding people to commit. Here’s a quick overview of some of the 
LIIs from Graham Greenleaf:7  
 
• AustLII (Australasian Legal Information Institute) started 1995, now 
contains nearly 400 databases of Australian law, including decisions of 120 
courts and tribunals 
• CanLII (Canadian Legal Information Institute) started 1993 as LexUM. 
LexUM then developed CanLII in 2000. CanLII contains over 150 databases – 
including historical and up to date versions of legislation from all 14 
jurisdictions 
• HKLII (Hong Kong Legal Information Institute) commenced in 2002 with 13 
databases and a bilingual system 
• PacLII (Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute) provides 180 databases 
covering the laws of 20 islands/territories 
 
Other LIIs include NZLII (New Zealand), CyLaw (Cyprus), JuriBurkina (Burkina 
Faso) and SALII (Southern Africa). More recently LIIs have been created to allow 
federated searching: one platform to search several LIIs at once. There are plans 
afoot for a EuroLII but currently those existing include: 
 
• AsianLII – portal covering 28 Asian countries (3 LIIs) 
• CommonLII – portal containing data from 56 commonwealth countries (11 
LIIs). The inclusion of the full series of the English Reports was an exciting 
addition 
• WorldLII – portal containing data from 183 countries (17 LIIs). Allows 
searching of 1400 databases, including at least two million cases 
                                                   
7 Graham  Greenleaf, ‘Free access to legal information, LIIs, and the Free Access to Law Movement’ in 
Richard A. Danner & Jules Winterton (eds), The IALL International Handbook of Legal Information 
(Ashgate, 2011) p.204 
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Do professionals really use the LIIs?  
As the situation in each country is so different, the success of the LIIs isn’t easy to 
measure. In both Australia and Canada, there does appear to have been a real move 
towards using the free resources provided by the LIIs in tandem, and sometimes in 
preference to the paid-for subscriptions. A survey on the use of CanLII as far back as 
2008 found that 43% of Canadian lawyers said they could do half their legal research 
via CanLII, and 71% stated that it had reduced their legal information costs.8  
In the UK BAILII is without doubt a popular service, with 40,000 unique 
visitors each week, viewing approximately 800,000 pages each week.9 A snapshot of 
the use of free resources for law can be seen in an MSc dissertation completed at City 
University in 2010.10 Sarah Jones focused her research around barristers’ chambers, 
surveying chambers librarians and barristers. Sixty-four per cent of those surveyed 
used BAILII at least a few times a week, with 52 per cent using sites like AustLII and 
CommonLII a few times a week. Participants also noted high use of sites like Eur-Lex 
(official portal of the European Union) and HUDOC (human rights materials).  
Free legislation sites were not held in much esteem; with too many issues 
perceived around trusting the currency of such a source. Seventy per cent of those 
surveyed said they would always use a subscription site for legislation.  
BAILII itself has recently conducted a detailed survey but the results are not 
available at time of going to press. A survey focused on an individual set of chambers 
in 2011 revealed approximately 500 pages of the BAILII site being accessed weekly. 11  
 
When is material ‘official’?  
Countries have been slow to grant their online representation of legal materials with 
the same ‘official’ status given to the print version. Claire Germain speaks of the 
confusion between ‘official’ and ‘authentic’, sometimes used interchangeably within 
this context and on other occasions as separate concepts. She defines authenticity as 
‘an online authentic legal resource is one for which a government entity has verified 
the content to be complete and unaltered from the version approved or published by 
the content originator’.12 This authenticity would normally be provided by encryption 
technologies.  
                                                   
8 Catherine Best, ‘Make CanLII your first stop for legal research’ (Law Society of British Columbia, 
October 2008) <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=480&t=Make-CanLII-your-first-stop-
for-legal-research>  accessed 11 March 2012 
9 ‘BAILII’s appeal for funding’ (BAILII, March 2012) http://www.bailii.org/bailii/appealdetails.html> 
accessed 09 March 2012 
10 Sarah Jones, ‘Freeing the law: a study of free online legal resources and their use by barristers’ (Msc 
dissertation, City University 2010) 
11 ‘BAILII’s appeal for funding’ (BAILII, March 2012) 
<http://www.bailii.org/bailii/appealdetails.html> accessed 09 March 2012 
12 Claire  Germain, Digitising the World’s Laws in Richard A. Danner & Jules Winterton (eds), The 
IALL International Handbook of Legal Information (Ashgate, 2011) p.193 
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In the UK the requirement to use the ‘official’ report within court (the Law 
Reports published by the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting), as per Lord 
Woolf’s practice direction13 means that reports on BAILII are useful for background 
research but not for court use. This is not unusual: many countries will not recognise 
the official status of their materials published online. In the European Union, the 
Eur-Lex website states that ‘only European Union legislation published in paper 
editions of the Official Journal of the European Union is deemed authentic’.14 France 
seems to stand out in this realm by declaring their free digital versions authentic in 
2004.15   
 
The backlash to LIIs 
In September 2011 an editorial in the Guardian16 discussed the online provision of 
judgments to the public, questioning to what extent a site like BAILII was actually 
improving access to judgments, particularly in light of it not allowing search engines 
like Google to index its judgments. BAILII says this is because judgments may 
sometimes need to be removed or altered at a later date, and not every search engine 
can guarantee that pages will not be cached, making older versions visible. Sir Henry 
Brooke, retiring Chairman of the BAILII trustees, defends their position further by 
stating that they provide ‘a searchable database of judgments on one website… 
[which is] sufficient to make this source of law freely available to the public’.17 He 
goes on to state that making it available to other search engines is unnecessary to 
achieve this objective.  
 
Free as in beer or free as in speech?  
Graham Greenleaf speaking at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London, in 
January, touched upon what we actually mean by ‘free access’ and how the concept 
fits in to our assumed values of liberty, democracy and the rule of law. Those aspects 
which relate to rule of law are interesting on several levels; does making legal 
information more accessible make justice more accessible?  
Some commentators have asked whether UK case law should be made 
accessible in the same way as UK legislation, but Greenleaf questions this: ‘If the rule 
                                                   
13 Practice Direction (Judgments: Form and Citation) [2001] 1 WLR 194 
14 Important legal notice (Eur-Lex) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/editorial/legal_notice.htm> 
accessed 07 March 2012   
15 Claire  Germain, Digitising the World’s Laws in Richard A. Danner & Jules Winterton (eds), The 
IALL International Handbook of Legal Information (Ashgate, 2011) p.194 
16 Editorial, ‘Courts: judgment day’ (Guardian, 25 September 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/25/criminal-justice-uk-digital-database> 
accessed 08 March 2012 
17 Nick Holmes and Sir Henry Brooke, ‘Judgment Day for BAILII’ (Society for Computers and Law, 
2011) <http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed22972> accessed 08 March 2012 
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of law belongs to citizens, not the State, access to law in ways not controlled by the 
State is clearly desirable, perhaps essential’.18  
The main driver for wanting to open up the law is that anyone should be able 
to find the law as it stands at the present time. The principle of ‘ignorance of the law 
is no excuse’ can be traced back to Roman times, and yet in 2012 we find ourselves in 
the position that access to the primary legal materials of the UK to those without a 
subscription to a commercial legal database is fairly patchy. A member of the public 
with no legal experience would find it extremely difficult, verging on impossible, to 
look for both the case law and legislation relating to their particular situation and be 
sure they had all the information required. We could go further and ask whether it is 
even enough to simply provide access to the law? How can it be made 
understandable too?    
Legal blogs have made inroads here, and offer those interested in legal 
developments, whether breaking cases, new legislation or legal reform and provide a 
place not only to gain this understanding but also to engage through comments. Law 
becomes accessible via the excellent critique offered by bloggers like the writers of 
the UK Human Rights Blog, The Small Places, PinkTape, Head of Legal and Nearly 
Legal. ‘Current Awareness’ sites like the one provided by the Inner Temple Library 
also play a big role in flagging up these legal developments, and the microblogging 
tool Twitter has had a significant impact on how such developments are 
disseminated. Our access to legal materials online for free is certainly improving, but 
our view of the landscape is far from panoramic.  
 
 
© Emily Allbon  
 
Emily Allbon is a Chartered Librarian and Fellow of the Higher Education 
Academy. She is active within the legal information community and created the 
Lawbore website in 2003. 
 
  
                                                   
18 Graham  Greenleaf, ‘Free access to legal information: roles in the expansion of liberty, democracy 
and the rule of law’ (IALS lecture, 17 January 2012) Video and slides available 
<http://ials.sas.ac.uk/news/Graham_Greenleaf_at_IALS_2012.htm> accessed 11 March 2012 
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Websites mentioned in this article 
 
 
• AsianLII http://www.asianlii.org/ 
• AustLII http://www.austlii.edu.au/ 
• BAILII http://www.bailii.org/ 
• CanLII http://www.canlii.org/ 
• CommonLII http://www.commonlii.org/ 
• Current Awareness from the Inner Temple Library 
http://www.innertemplelibrary.com/ 
• CyLaw http://www.cylaw.org/index-en.html 
• DOAJ http://www.doaj.org/ 
• EISIL (Electronic Information System for International Law) 
http://www.eisil.org/ 
• EUR-Lex  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm 
• HUDOC http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc 
• HKLII http://www.hklii.hk/eng/ 
• IALS Eagle-i http://ials.sas.ac.uk/eaglei/project/eiproject.htm 
• ICLR Online http://iclr.co.uk/products/product-catalogue/iclr-online 
• JuriBurkina http://www.juriburkina.org/juriburkina/  
• Lawbore http://lawbore.net 
• Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
• Legislation.gov.uk http://www.legislation.gov.uk/  
• Nearly Legal http://nearlylegal.co.uk/ 
• PacLII http://www.paclii.org/  
• PinkTape http://pinktape.co.uk/ 
• Southern African LII http://www.saflii.org/  
• The Small Places http://thesmallplaces.blogspot.com/ 
• UK Human Rights Blog http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/ 
• UKSC blog http://ukscblog.com/
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ACCESSIBLE LAW 
 
Nick Holmes explores what more we need in order to understand the 
law and introduces his FreeLegalWeb project 
 
Professor Richard Leiter, on his blog, The Life of Books1, poses ‘The 21st Century Law 
Library Conundrum: Free Law and Paying to Understand It’: 
 
The digital revolution, that once upon a time promised free access to legal materials, 
will deliver on that promise; it’s just that the free materials it will deliver, even if it 
comprises the sum total of all primary law in the country at every level and 
jurisdiction, will amount to only a minor portion of the materials that lawyers need in 
order to practice law, and the public needs in order to understand it. 
 
This article explores what more we need in order to understand the law and how this 
need can be met.2 
 
Free access to law 
Free access to primary law is of course a prerequisite for the interpretation and 
understanding of the law. In the UK and most countries with a common law 
tradition, the cause of free access to law is espoused by the Free Access to Law 
Movement, a collective of legal information institutes that began with the creation of 
the Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute3 in 1992. In the UK we are 
represented by the British and Irish Legal Information Institute (BAILII4), set up in 
2000 with the enormous help of the pioneering Australasian Legal Information 
Institute (AustLII5). 
In October 2002, at the 4th Law via Internet Conference in Montreal, the LIIs 
published a joint statement of their philosophy of access to law in the following 
terms: 
 
Legal information institutes of the world, meeting in Montreal, declare that, 
Public legal information from all countries and international institutions is part of the 
common heritage of humanity. Maximising access to this information promotes 
justice and the rule of law; 
Public legal information is digital common property and should be accessible to all on 
a non-profit basis and free of charge; 
                                                   
1 R Leiter, Life of Books <http://thelifeofbooks.blogspot.com> 
2 This article was originally published on VoxPopuLII, the blog of the Cornell LII, February 2011 at 
<http://blog.law.cornell.edu/voxpop/2011/02/15/accessible-law/> 
3 <http://www.law.cornell.edu> 
4 <http://www.bailii.org> 
5 <http://www.austlii.edu.au> 
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Independent non-profit organisations have the right to publish public legal 
information and the government bodies that create or control that information 
should provide access to it so that it can be published. 
 
So, to paraphrase liberally, we have a right to access the laws of our land, free of 
charge and openly licensed. ‘The problem for aggregators like LII,’ Leiter points out, 
‘is that the information that they provide is only as good as the sources available to 
them. And governments are just not very good sources of their own information.’6  
In the US, Law.gov is a movement working to raise the quality of government 
information, proposing a distributed repository of all primary legal materials of the 
United States. It believes that ‘the primary legal materials of the United States are the 
raw materials of our democracy. They should be made more broadly available to 
enable an informed citizenry,’ and that ‘governmental institutions should make these 
materials available in bulk as distributed, authenticated, well-formatted data.’ In 
other words, we need more than free access to law; we need free access to good law 
data. 
 
UK legislation 
We were fortunate that the previous administration’s Power of Information agenda 
was being implemented by the Office of Public Sector Information (OPSI), whose 
role also includes that of Queen’s Printer (of legislation). In December 2006, the 
long-awaited Statute Law Database (SLD) was published, having been more than 10 
years in development. This provided (subject to a number of shortcomings) point-in-
time access to all in-force UK primary legislation since the year dot, and access to all 
secondary legislation published since 1991. Responsibility for the SLD then lay with 
the Statutory Publications Office (SPO), part of the Ministry of Justice. In 2008 the 
decision was taken to merge the SPO into OPSI, who had been publishing all as-
enacted legislation since 1988. The merger would bring the online legislative services 
together, creating a single place where visitors could access the widest range of 
legislative content held by the government, alongside supporting material. That 
service is legislation.gov.uk7 launched in July 2010, which has now replaced the SLD 
and OPSI legislation services.  
The legislation.gov.uk interface provides simple and direct browse access to 
legislation by type, year and number, and simple or advanced searches to locate 
matching legislation. Primary legislation can be viewed as at any point in time since 
1991. More important than this improved access to legislation, however, is the fact 
that the content is open. It is all well-structured XML (Extensible Markup 
Language); any piece of legislation or legislation fragment can be addressed reliably 
and simply in various useful formats via the URI (uniform resource identifier) 
scheme; and any list of legislation can be delivered as an Atom feed. And a new 
                                                   
6 R Leiter. Life of Books <http://thelifeofbooks.blogspot.com> 
7 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk> 
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licensing model for public sector information was introduced at the same time: the 
Open Government Licence.8 
Unfortunately, there are insufficient government resources to maintain an up-
to-date, consolidated statute book, as public sector information consultant Shane 
O’Neill observed:9  
 
The lack of up-to-date consolidation – no fault of the Legislation.gov.uk team who 
have laboured valiantly on their Sisyphean task – must be a concern to those who 
harboured greater ambitions (not least government and judiciary). It leaves access to 
an up-to-date and consolidated statute book in the hands of those who have invested 
in and deliver highly exclusive legal information services. 
 
The legislation.gov.uk service is delivered by The National Archives (of which OPSI is 
part). John Sheridan describes the development in some detail in an earlier post on 
the Cornell VoxPopuLII site10: 
 
We had two objectives with legislation.gov.uk: to deliver a high quality public service 
for people who need to consult, cite, and use legislation on the Web; and to expose 
the UK’s Statute Book as data, for people to take, use, and re-use for whatever 
purpose or application they wish. 
 
There’s more about the technical project and the people behind it from Jeni 
Tennison, technical lead and main developer (at TSO), on her blog.11 
Sheridan is also on the expert panel of technologists advising the government 
on making public sector information more open and accessible on the web, an 
initiative which led to the development of data.gov.uk,12 which currently provides 
access to over 5,600 central government datasets. 
 
UK case law 
Unfortunately, the public provision of case law in the UK is woefully inadequate, and 
we have to rely on the efforts of the charitable BAILII to collate and deliver anything 
approaching a comprehensive collection of recent judgments. BAILII does a grand 
job in the circumstances, but, through no fault on its part, it is not comprehensive 
and it is not open. The various courts all publish their judgments in their own 
fashion, with no consistency of approach; in fact the High Court of England and 
Wales does not publish its own judgments at all, but passes selected handed-down 
judgments to BAILII (and others) to publish. To make matters worse, our right to 
access this case law is far from clear. There is some argument whether judges are 
public servants or not and hence whether their judgments are public sector 
                                                   
8 <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence> 
9 <http://www.shaneoneill.co.uk/NewsViews/legislation-gov-uk-the-myth-of-sisyphus>  
10 <http://blog.law.cornell.edu/voxpop/2010/08/15/legislationgovuk> 
11 ‘legislation.gov.uk: Credit Where it’s Due’ <www.jenitennison.com/blog/node/144> 
12 <www.data.gov.uk> 
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information or not. In addition, regarding older judgments, the low level of 
originality required for copyright protection in the UK means that almost all older 
cases are copyright of either the transcriber or the reporter (or the publisher who 
commissioned them). 
 
Understanding the law 
Does free access to law or, even better, free access to good law data, make the law 
accessible? Will it empower the average citizen? Unfortunately not. As Leiter says, it 
is only a fraction of what lawyers need to practice law and the public needs to 
understand it. The law is not practically accessible: it is difficult to identify, obtain 
and understand legal resources, and they are frequently out of date. Whilst it is 
reasonable to expect legal advisers to invest in the necessary commercial services to 
inform themselves, these services are becoming increasingly unaffordable for the less 
affluent law practices and third sector advice bodies. For the non-lawyer, the law is 
all but impenetrable, and solving many legal problems and resolving disputes is in 
practice affordable only to the rich or those who are eligible for some kind of state 
support. Lord Justice Toulson in R v Chamber13 bemoaned the complexity of 
legislation: 
 
To a worryingly large extent, statutory law is not practically accessible today, even to 
the courts whose constitutional duty it is to interpret and enforce it. There are four 
principal reasons. … First, the majority of legislation is secondary legislation. … 
Secondly, the volume of legislation has increased very greatly over the last 40 years … 
Thirdly, on many subjects the legislation cannot be found in a single place, but in a 
patchwork of primary and secondary legislation. … Fourthly, there is no 
comprehensive statute law database with hyperlinks which would enable an 
intelligent person, by using a search engine, to find out all the legislation on a 
particular topic. 
 
The give-us-the-data-and-we’ll-organise-the-world crowd also display a touching 
naïvety when it comes to the law. For example, on the launch of Legal Opinions on 
Google Scholar,14 Anurag Acharya, ‘Distinguished Engineer’ at Google, said: 
 
We think this addition to Google Scholar will empower the average citizen by helping 
everyone learn more about the laws that govern us all. … we were struck by how 
readable and accessible these opinions are. Court opinions don’t just describe a 
decision but also present the reasons that support the decision. In doing so, they 
explain the intricacies of law in the context of real-life situations. 
 
Any initiative that makes the law more accessible is to be welcomed, but to empower 
the average citizen you have to go the extra mile, by explaining the law. Lawyers and 
legal researchers have spent years learning the law and acquiring the skills that 
                                                   
13 R v Chambers [2008] EWCA Crim 2467 Available at: 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/2467.html> 
14 <http://scholar.google.co.uk>  
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enable them to navigate and reliably interpret primary law and precedent. They will 
find value in free access to law and in Google Scholar and other free services that are 
built on that, but they and the average citizen need more. That need is met largely by 
commercial publishers, and while there many smaller independent publishers who 
provide good value in their niches, as O’Neill observes: 
 
Legal publishing has long been dominated by two huge duopolists (Reed Elsevier’s 
LexisNexis and ThomsonReuters) whose scale alone enables them to provide a 
consolidation of the mix of primary, secondary, case law which characterises our 
common law system. This has created what [barrister Francis Davey] in The Times on 
23 May 2006 characterised as ‘a two-tier justice system with only the very rich able to 
access the full consolidated law while those lawyers doing pro bono work are 
discriminated against.’ 
 
But there is an increasing amount of quality free legal commentary and analysis on 
the web, and we can dream on. 
 
The law wiki dream 
Writing in Times Online in April 2006, the eminent Professor Richard Susskind, 
legal tech guru and adviser to the great and good, spelt out his vision for a ‘Wikipedia 
of English law’15 
 
This online resource could be established and maintained collectively by the legal 
profession; by practitioners, judges, academics and voluntary workers. If leaders in 
the English legal world are serious about promoting the jurisdiction as world class, 
here is a genuine opportunity to pioneer, to excel, to provide a wonderful social 
service, and to leave a substantial legacy. The initiative would evolve a corpus of 
English law like no other: a resource readily available to lawyers and lay people; a 
free web of inter-linked materials; packed with scholarly analysis and commentary, 
supplemented by useful guidance and procedure; rendered intensely practical by the 
addition of action points and standard documents; and underpinned by direct access 
to legislation and case law, made available by the Government, perhaps through 
BAILII. … A Wikipedia of English law could be an evolving, interactive, multimedia 
legal resource of unprecedented scale and utility. 
 
Susskind referred specifically to wikis and ‘a Wikipedia,’ and that was taken rather 
literally by those who enthusiastically first took up his challenge. But I don’t believe 
he necessarily intended it literally, and I don’t believe that ‘a Wikipedia’ or indeed the 
wiki platform is appropriate. Wikipedia has to be seen as a one-off; no wiki project 
since has come anywhere near its scale or success. We are most unlikely to build an 
encyclopedia of UK law from scratch; but why would we try when there is already a 
vast free legal web? 
 
  
                                                   
15 R Susskind ‘Quick, get into wikis – before everyone else’  
<http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/columnists/article703276.ece> 
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The free legal web 
In 2008, enthused by the developments in open government and by the amount of 
quality legal commentary that was percolating up on the web, I proposed to set up a 
service to exploit this – FreeLegalWeb.16 In the manifesto I listed the free access law 
resources then available, and I now list them with appropriate updates, here: 
 
• We have free and open access to legislation 
• We have other official documents, forms and guidance from government 
and a commitment to making these resources more accessible and 
encouraging user generated services. 
• We have another substantial free access primary law database – BAILII. 
• We have a number of specialists already maintaining specialist law wikis 
and enthusiasts contributing law articles to Wikipedia. 
• We have a growing number of law bloggers, many of whom provide 
succinct, expert ongoing commentary and analysis. 
• We have many other individuals, firms and publishers who publish case 
summaries, articles, updaters and guidance for free access on their 
websites. 
• We have public, charitable and private services providing free guidance 
and fora for the public faced with legal processes. 
• And finally, we have Web 2.0 technologies that enable (potentially) all 
these sources to be interrogated, aggregated, ‘mashed up’ and 
repurposed. 
 
That sounded like a free legal web to me; all we had to do was join it up and curate it! 
But how feasible is that? 
 
A ‘bunch of goo’? 
Bob Berring, legal research guru and Professor of Law at the University of California, 
Berkeley, gave his thoughts on the matter on YouTube in October 2009.17 He believes 
that government efforts in the provision of free legal information have failed because 
there are no incentives; and that ‘volunteer efforts’, worthy as they may be, are 
unlikely to be sustained. He rightly says that legal information is not easily packaged: 
we need a map and a compass to navigate it; it needs to be organised and value 
added. I think we all agree with that. But his conclusion appears to be that only 
Wexis have sufficient incentive and only they can mobilise the necessary army to add 
sufficient value for it to be useful. For Bob, the free legal information that’s out there 
is ‘a bunch of goo,’ and the only thing that can sort out the mess is ‘the market 
system’. That’s clearly not the case: 
                                                   
16 <http://www.freelegalweb.org> 
17 Available at: <www.youtube.com/watch?v=sko9oiNk5kI> 
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• government has an incentive to make legal information more accessible 
• the legal profession has an incentive to make legal information more 
accessible 
• various non-profits have an incentive to make legal information more 
accessible 
• citizens have an incentive to make legal information more accessible  
• and there are many private enterprises short of Wexis who have an 
incentive to make legal information more accessible. 
 
… How? 
 
Curating the legal web 
For help I’m increasingly turning to Jason Wilson, Vice President at Jones McClure 
Publishing. He has a nice clean minimalist blog18 with great pics accompanying each 
post. More importantly, he’s interested in the kind of questions I’m also trying to 
answer, such as Can we crowdsource reliable analytical legal content? 
 
I have given considerable thought to this problem (and I have a greater interest in 
solving it than most), and I just don’t see how a Demand Media or similar model 
could ever produce good or reliable analytical material.19 
 
But in the next breath he acknowledges that a lot of good stuff has indeed already 
been generated by the crowds, and asks how we will organise that legal web. Actually 
the question is buried at the end of a dense post about ‘exploded data’ (the value of 
analytical content): 
 
My thought at this point is that the legal web is in an infancy that we can’t even 
fathom yet. There is cloud of associated information that our current computer 
assisted legal research vendors cannot give to us based on their algorithms, especially 
when they remain in walled-in gardens that don’t account for the vast and valuable 
information being created by users. The question is whether we will step up to 
organize this sea of data, or wait until a program can do it for us? 
 
Moving on, in a more accessible post on Slaw he asks how we can effectively curate 
the legal web: 
 
Curating this growing body of analytical content will be difficult. It suggests a person-
machine process of locating and separating good content from bad, and categorising, 
verifying, authenticating, and editorialising that content. It will undoubtedly require 
the creation of a rich taxonomy to help organize and manage the content for later 
                                                   
18 <www.jasnwilsn.com> accessed May 2012 
19 J Wilson, <http://www.jasnwilsn.com/2010/07/15/crowdsourcing-analytical-content/> accessed  
May 2012 
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discovery, clean metadata, and a good search engine, and raises issues from data 
permanency to copyrights to brand dilution. It’s a mess. But a worthy one I think.20 
 
and in the comments to that post: 
 
I suppose the point to my post is whether we can wrap a wiki-like structure and 
interface around the legal web, and make it a destination for learning about both 
general topics and specific issues, rather than just a portal for all results that match 
search terms. 
 
Yes we can! However clever the machine, these tasks – ‘locating and separating good 
content from bad, and categorising, verifying, authenticating, and editorialising’ – to 
a large degree require human intervention. But that intervention need only be light 
touch once we figure out how most effectively to harness the wisdom of the crowds. 
 
Conclusion 
Free access to law is not a panacea, but there is plenty of scope for delivering more 
accessible law by leveraging not just free law but the free legal web; for delivering 
free services that are good enough for the average citizen, and for lower cost 
commercial services that are good enough for the average lawyer. ‘Big Law’ will 
continue to need Wexis, but the ‘lower-tier’ can be much better served.  
 
The final word I will leave with Tom Bruce, founder of Cornell LII:21  
 
We need to make informed choices between inexpensive automated approaches that 
work by brute force and the hand-crafted, highly-accurate approaches of legal 
bibliography that are not always scalable or affordable. We need to recalibrate what 
we mean by ‘authority’, and begin to think about measures of quality and reliability 
for legal text that avoid the creation of unnatural monopolies in legal information. 
 
 
© Nick Holmes 
 
Nick Holmes is a publishing consultant and Managing Director of legal information 
services company infolaw Limited (http://www.infolaw.co.uk); he also founded 
FreeLegalWeb (http://www.freelegalweb.org). He blogs at Binary Law 
(http://www.binarylaw.co.uk). 
                                                   
20 J Wilson <http://www.slaw.ca/2010/08/13/curating-the-legal-web/> 
21 ‘Text of the CALICON10 plenary talk’ <http://blog.law.cornell.edu/tbruce/2009/02/28/big-world> 
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CATCHING UP WITH THE 
TRANSPARENCY REVOLUTION 
 
A ruling allowing the media to access court documents  in extradition 
proceedings helps to entrench openness, argues David Banisar 
 
The Court of Appeal took a bold step forward in advancing court transparency in 
April 2012. The decision1 in Guardian News and Media Ltd v City of Westminster 
Magistrates Court2 established in common law for the first time the right of ordinary 
people and the media to obtain documents that are used in court cases. 
It has been a long time coming. The UK has undergone a transparency 
revolution over the past 10 years. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) has 
forced over 100,000 government bodies to make the information that they collect 
and use in daily actions available on request to the public. Recent government 
initiatives have made the expenditures of government bodies and local governments 
available online. Parliamentary bills, reports and proceedings are available online 
quickly. 
The courts were an early proponent of openness: open justice has been a 
principle since the 17th century. It is essential to ensure that courts are accountable 
by allowing any person to attend court hearings. But as other government 
institutions have become more open, courts’ practices have not evolved to the same 
extent. The decision to allow tweeting (in principle) is welcome and the BAILII3 
initiative and others have resulted in many decisions becoming publicly available, 
but many gaps remain. The ‘Justice Wide Open’ event at City University revealed that 
there were many legal and practical limits to open justice. Few local newspapers now 
cover local courts and even the larger national media only attend a few cases; 
transcripts remain the commercial property of the court reporters and video and 
audio recording of cases is forbidden for reasons that are hard to understand; non-
media such as community micro-sites have little access to anything; the FOIA only 
has limited application to the courts. 
In this case, the growing practice of judges and the lawyers moving to a more 
document-focused case system and referring to documents that are only partially 
read out triggered the need to change the rules. An average court case is a 
bewildering series of references to documents contained in the large boxes on the 
judges’ and parties’ tables. A member of the public or reporter has little chance to 
                                                   
1 Rob Evans, ‘Judgment over extradition case is victory for open justice’ The Guardian (London 3 April 
2012) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/apr/03/groundbreaking-judgment-extradition-open-
justice>, accessed April 2012 
2 R (Guardian News & Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates Court [2012] EWCA Civ 420 
3 At < http://www.bailii.org>, accessed April 2012 
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follow, especially when the documents are non-public and only briefly summarised. 
This decision will allow for better scrutiny of the arguments and the evidence, which 
is especially crucial in extradition cases where a foreign government is demanding 
the handing over of persons based on crimes different than under UK law. 
The Court based its decision on the common law rather than the still evolving 
case law on the right to access from the European Court of Human Rights, which is 
still being resisted by the courts here. But after reviewing cases from Canada, the US, 
New Zealand and South Africa, the court found that the rest of the world had moved 
forward on this and considered it wise to follow suit4. 
A strange aspect of this case was that the US government was the only party 
opposing the release of the documents. The documents that the Guardian were 
trying to obtain were so basic you really do have to wonder why there was any 
opposition to their release, especially since no arguments were made that their 
release would cause any harm. Had the case been held in the US, they would have 
been routinely made available to anyone who wanted them. Perhaps it was US fear of 
having to release evidence in more controversial future cases, such as the potential 
extradition of Julian Assange to the US. 
In the US, the Public Access to Court Electronic Records system allows anyone 
for a very small fee to be able to access most documents submitted electronically, 
including the briefs in any federal court case. It has over a million users. Taking this 
decision forward, the UK should now adopt a similar system of proactive disclosure. 
In the 21st century, open justice should be online justice. 
 
This article is reproduced with the permission of Guardian.co.uk, where 
the original version first appeared on 3 April 20125. 
  
David Banisar is senior legal counsel for Article 19, the Global Campaign for Free 
Expression. He has worked in the field of information policy for nearly 20 years on 
the intersection of human rights and ICTs including privacy, freedom of expression, 
cyber-crime and the right to information. 
 
 
                                                   
4 Article 19’s submission in the case is available here: < 
http://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/3011/12-04-03-UK.pdf>, accessed April 2012 
5 At: < http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2012/apr/03/guardian-court-
victory-transparency>, accessed April 2012 
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SECRET JUSTICE 
 
In this article, an abridged version of a chapter from her book The 
Silent State1, investigative journalist and activist Heather Brooke 
examines access to the English courts, arguing that the justice system is 
becoming a closed world, for which the public pays the bill 
 
Justice must be seen to be done. That’s the famous aphorism stated most succinctly 
in 1924 by Chief Justice Lord Hewitt2. But what happens when you put the rhetoric 
to the test and try and see some actual justice being done? That is what I set out to do 
in this chapter. If you’ve been in a court you’ll know what it’s like, but I want to delve 
right into the depths of the court service. I have done my utmost to drag Parliament 
into the modern democratic age and it seems the next institution in need of such a 
makeover is the courts. 
There are three main things the public need to know about courts: 
 
1. who is using them  
2. for what purpose (e.g. the case detail)  
3. the result 
 
We need to know these things to ensure justice is being done, to understand the laws 
under which we live and to make best use of the finite resources that fund the judicial 
system. If the courts are becoming the preserve of the rich, corrupt or brutal, then we 
need to know as we are footing the bill. Such an allegation is currently leveled at the 
High Court, which has become the epicentre of ‘libel tourism’ whereby wealthy 
businessmen, medical companies and even suspected terrorists from around the 
globe use the English courts to suppress stories they don’t like. 
Overall, our court service cost us £1.48 billion in 2008/9, up from £1.3 billion 
in 2007/8 (a 13.8 per cent increase). Civil courts make up £408 million of that, 
family courts £196 million and the remainder goes to the criminal courts. In 
addition, we pay £2.1 billion in legal aid costs, yet the records from these cases are 
not available to the public. Total staff costs are £859 million, of which £284 million 
goes to judges. Senior judges are paid a total of £180 million, of which 491 are 
judicial officers and 281 full-time-equivalent district judges (paid by the day). 
Salaries for a further 956 members of the senior judiciary are met from the 
                                                   
1 Heather Brooke, The Silent State (William Heinemann 2010). An extract from Chapter Six (150-186) 
is reproduced here with the kind permission of the author and publisher.  
2 The judge stated: ‘It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice 
should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.’ 
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consolidated fund, i.e. off-budget, so these headline figures don’t even cover the full 
costs. 
We pay a lot for our court system, but to be honest, it’s not enough. Courts are 
under-resourced, there aren’t as many as there need to be to meet demand, and 
facilities are in desperate need of modernisation. Open justice should be honoured as 
a point of principle, but if we’re going to invest even more public money in the court 
system it’s vital we understand where this money is going and receive some benefit 
for our considerable contribution. You might think there would be a drive in the 
judiciary to enable citizens to access the justice system in the easiest manner 
possible, for example without having to come to court, but that is not the case. Quite 
the opposite drive exists. Those few people who attend court either individually or on 
behalf of the public face a barrage of obscure, illogical and mercurially enforced 
rules. Trying to obtain court documents is about as easy and affordable as 
circumnavigating the globe. What this shows is the complete lack of regard within 
the judicial system for the public’s right to see justice being done. It is an 
afterthought, and very often not even that. There is simply no understanding that the 
courts exist solely for the interests of the public at large. And if the public can’t see 
justice being done then the entire system is little more than a cloistered club solely 
for the benefit of judges, lawyers and their lackeys, a sort of care in the community 
for the upper- middle classes and their servants. 
Some courts have dragged themselves into the 21st century and are equipped 
with modern technology (microphones to amplify the main participants and TV 
screens for CCTV footage or satellite link-ups), but the representation of the 
courtroom itself remains thoroughly nineteenth century. Back then, of course, the 
way people saw justice being done was to go along to their local court and sit through 
a trial. Before television or the internet, trials were the ultimate reality 
entertainment, revealing all the riches (and horrors) of humanity. I’m not a fan of so-
called reality TV – if I want reality, I get it the old-fashioned way and go along to the 
public gallery of a local court.  
 
Recording the courts 
In the age of real-time, zero-cost distribution, the obvious solution to the demise of 
the court reporter and the plight of the court sketcher is to use modern technology to 
allow people to see or at least hear trials as they happen or retrospectively. Yet the 
use of technology for broadcasting justice is firmly resisted by the courts, making it 
more difficult than ever to see justice being done – or, indeed, heard. It is in the 
production of transcripts that the greatest injustice is occurring, and there is no 
clearer example of how justice in Britain is solely for the rich. 
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Simply put, the courts’ refusal to allow people to tape-record open-court 
proceedings provides an opportunity for a few private companies to monopolise the 
transcription market. If you want to know what was said in court you have to pay one 
of these private companies a lot of money. It normally costs around £150–250 per 
hour of typing time, and – get this – before the transcription process begins, the 
courts make you sign a form stating that you will pay whatever amount the company 
decides! If they say it took them fifteen hours to type up the transcript you’re obliged 
to pay 15 x £250 = £3,750. If they say fifty hours that’s £12,500. And there’s no way 
to know beforehand how many hours they will charge you for.3 
‘You have to trust them and agree to pay them any amount of money they 
decide,’ Bronagh Taylor told me. She used to be a legal secretary but now works as a 
researcher at the BBC. ‘If there are difficult names and they have to rewind the tape 
that costs you more. You could be out thousands and thousands of pounds by the 
time they’re done. There’s no way round it and there’s no way of proving it didn’t 
take the amount of time they tell you. You’ve nothing to stand on once you’ve signed 
that form.’ 
It’s understandable that the typists themselves won’t know how long it will 
take them to transcribe the recordings until they actually begin, but why can’t the 
public make their own recordings or at least have access to any official ones, which 
they have paid for through their taxes? Many trials in the upper courts are now 
officially recorded (and in the case of the new UK Supreme Court, filmed4) yet these 
records are not made available to the public.5 All High Court hearings began to be 
digitally recorded from February 2010, but when I spoke to the court’s governance 
officer he told me there were no plans to let the public access these recordings 
directly. The reason given is one that should be familiar to you by now: unlike private 
companies, the public can’t be trusted, and might change the record so it would no 
longer be accurate. 
As it is, only the rich can afford to have transcripts made, either from the 
official sound recording or by paying for a court-approved private stenographer. 
Thus transcripts are the preserve of the wealthy and they remain locked in lawyers’ 
offices never to benefit the general public who are paying for the rest of the judicial 
                                                   
3 Even the judgments in all criminal, civil, admin and Court of Appeal cases are transcribed by a 
private company, Merrill Legal Solutions, which has a monopoly. Some judgments are now freely 
available online at < http://www.bailii.org> but by no means all. 
4 The Supreme Court comes equipped with four cameras in each room and proceedings are routinely 
filmed but very little of this footage has been broadcast. The only material seen in the court’s first few 
months was the first hearing, in particular a 38-minute clip on US public service channel C-Span and 
some film from the opening ceremony on 16 October 2009. We can see how important the televising 
of Parliament has become to public understanding; why can’t that be extended to the courts? 
5 Another example of the ridiculousness of this prohibition was in 1999 when the hearing for General 
Pinochet’s application for extradition was so packed at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court that a closed-
circuit TV was set up to accommodate the overflow of reporters. Technically this was a contempt of 
court but the judges decided that if two conditions were met it was legal: the footage could neither be 
recorded nor shown outside the court precinct. How’s that for showing the public justice being done? 
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system. This, it seems, is the judiciary’s idea of open justice – where the vast majority 
of court proceedings are seen only by a handful of lawyers and court officials while 
the public pay the bill but see, and hear, nothing. 
Section 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 makes it a contempt to use a tape 
recorder in court without the prior permission of the court. It is also a crime to 
publish ‘a recording of legal proceedings’ made in such a way ‘by playing it in the 
hearing of the public or any section of the public’. Current thinking in the judiciary is 
still in line with the 1974 report by the Phillimore Committee on Contempt of Court 
which thought that tape recorders ‘produce a more dramatic but not necessarily 
more accurate record of what occurred in court’. 
To this 36-year-old argument I counter: what could be more accurate than a 
verbatim sound recording? Why is it that the police must tape-record interviews with 
suspects with twin tapes, one of which must be given to the suspect? The reason is 
because this is considered the most accurate way of recording a proceeding. If this is 
good enough for the police then why not for the courts? 
Court officials say the public might tamper with the tape or mistranslate 
words in a transcription. Both these problems are just as likely to afflict a private 
transcriber or indeed a judge. Currently transcripts of cases can be made only with 
the consent of the presiding judge, who has the right to amend the wording of the 
judgment (and often does). Some litigants argue they have suffered as a result, with a 
judge amending what he actually said at the hearing to what he would have liked to 
have said. 
If the concern is with the authenticity of the tape it is very easy to validate a 
digital file using cryptographic hash functions. And what better way to ensure 
accuracy of a transcription than to let as many ears as possible hear the oral 
recording? When there is only one copy of a tape listened to by only one person, 
accuracy is much lower than if many copies are listened to by many people. So if 
accuracy is the argument then allow people to record open-court proceedings and 
post them online. I have a sneaking suspicion, however, that might actually be what 
puts off the court officials. Could it be they don’t want the public seeing what goes on 
in court? 
While most court hearings are at least recorded, tribunals generally are not. 
When I attended the Information Tribunal hearing for my own case about MPs’ 
expenses in February 2008, I put my tape recorder on the table ready to record every 
second of this scintillating event for those unable to make it to this open hearing. I 
was told that I could not record. Everyone seemed to accept this, but to me it seemed 
like another one of those ‘emperor’s new clothes’ moments. I asked why and was told 
it just wasn’t done. I pressed further and an official said it would be a contempt of 
court. I let it go at that and took copious notes. But later I regretted that I’d not 
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pushed for a better answer because this hearing became the basis for many articles I 
wrote and indeed a pivotal scene in the BBC4 dramatisation.6 
Can we have some rationality here: why else do we pay for such public 
hearings if not so the public can be informed in the most accurate and 
comprehensive way about them? Instead, the only public record of this public 
hearing comes from my and another reporter’s notes. How can this be more accurate 
than a verbatim recording? Clearly it’s not and yet this is the reality of the current 
law. I’m confident in my note-taking but I wasn’t making a verbatim account and I 
was rather preoccupied with being a participant in the case. 
What is the solution? I can tell you what it is not – privatising this very public 
service, which would serve only to screw the taxpayer further out of information they 
have already paid to create. Any solution has to be an open source with public 
formats; if digital recordings are made they should use a common format such as 
MP3 or similar so that even if a private company is involved there is no difficulty in 
passing the material back into the public domain. But ultimately I see no good reason 
why the people should not be allowed to record open-court proceedings themselves 
and at the very least access official recordings directly. 
 
It’s who you know 
Let’s take a trip down Fleet Street to the Gothic and ornamental Royal Courts of 
Justice also known as the High Court. On any day of the week there are important 
public issues being fought here – not just over private contracts but about medical 
negligence, judicial reviews of government policy, life-shattering decisions made in 
the family courts that have societal implications, and issues about press freedom and 
privacy. The Royal Court is a national court and as such an arm of government. 
It’s easy to get inside the building for starters and the public are right in the 
courtroom, bums warmed on wooden benches laid out like church pews in front of 
the judge’s altar. You get a very intimate experience of justice in the High Court and I 
can’t recommend it enough. The cases may not seem as dramatic, but privacy and 
libel cases are often noteworthy (and, frankly, entertaining – I once managed to 
catch the proprietor of Express newspapers Richard Desmond being quizzed by a QC 
on his knowledge of dildos7).  On the score of seeing justice being done in person the 
Royal Courts gets a definite thumbs up, but again no recording is allowed. 
To find out more I asked James Brewster, the editor of Strand News, an 
agency of seven reporters covering the Royal Courts. His office is across the street 
from the court up a tiny spiral staircase that winds past a beauty parlour and a 
jeweller’s. It’s another hovel with newspaper clippings on the wall, chipped mugs on 
                                                   
6 As a reminder of how rich you have to be to afford transcripts – the BBC budget couldn’t stretch to 
forking out for the transcript of my one-day High Court hearing so instead those scenes had to rely on 
my notes. 
7  This was Richard Desmond’s libel litigation against the biographer Tom Bower which Desmond lost 
on 23 July 2009. 
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chipped lino desks. It’s proper old school and I love it. I feel like I’m on the set of The 
Front Page. James is full of energy and I catch him in between covering a case and 
writing it up. I ask him how well he feels he can tell the public about what is going on 
in the Royal Courts. He tells me there are two main problems: reporting restrictions 
and access to documents. 
Reporting restrictions are orders made by a judge to prevent a reporter 
making public what he hears in court. James says his reporters live in fear of making 
a mistake because there is nothing mandating the order be served on them or even 
written down. 
‘You need to be very, very alert. The barrister will just stand up and say 
“Please can I have this reporting restriction?” and then the judge will say “yes” and if 
you’re not there you won’t know about it. We’re not served with the order. 
Occasionally it’s put on the door . . . Once we named somebody we shouldn’t have. 
The reporter popped to the loo. A reporting restriction was made. Nobody told us 
about it. Nothing was served on us and yet technically we could’ve been done for 
contempt of court. Fined, sent to prison.’ 
The bad news is these reporting restrictions are increasing. Ironically, it is the 
younger judges who are keener on closing courtrooms. Another problem is that many 
judges make reporting restrictions incorrectly because they rely on what they are told 
by counsel rather than checking the law themselves. 
‘In the Court of Appeal there is all due process, full consideration before 
imposing a reporting restriction, but in the High Court the judges have grown up 
with the Human Rights Act. Article 8 [privacy] has led to a change in the atmosphere 
of court to the point where the basic principle that there should be public access that 
is only prevented for exceptional reasons is now such that those reasons need not be 
exceptional.’ 
A new fetishisation of privacy has taken hold and cases, particularly involving 
medical negligence or children, which used to be reported as a matter of course are 
now closed. We can see what sort of negative societal effect such closed justice has by 
looking at the myriad problems that have erupted as a result of closure of the family 
courts. Some social services departments and experts are consistently seeing abuse, 
especially ‘emotional harm’, where there is none, and in other instances local 
authorities have flagrantly ignored the legal requirement that there should be 
minimum intervention in family life. Yet none of these issues can be addressed 
unless the courts are opened up. Social workers, judges and expert witnesses – all of 
whom are often vital to proceedings – can’t be held accountable.8 In addition, the 
                                                   
8 Camilla Cavendish has written extensively about the problems of secret family courts in her columns 
for The Times, and argues that it ‘should be perfectly possible to keep children’s and parents’ names 
out of the press while reporting the evidence in full [since] the media does this routinely in rape cases. 
But in the family division, reporting restrictions are enshrined in ten statutes, some of which can only 
be changed by Parliament.’ 
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High Court regularly issues injunctions prohibiting publication of various things but 
there is no central record of such orders so a request for a copy of any particular 
order will be met by blank stares unless you know the case number and, more likely, 
the name of the issuing judge and the date the order was issued. Many of these 
orders are open-ended, so you could easily be found in contempt for having breached 
an order which was made years earlier but which you had no way of knowing even 
existed. 
These are some of the problems with proceedings. What about documents?  
‘In court there’s a big gap between what we’re theoretically allowed to see and 
what we actually get to see,’ James says. ‘We’re allowed to see claim forms and 
particulars [in the hearing]. We get them from the court clerk in the courtroom but 
nine times out of ten those documents haven’t actually made it to the court file so we 
don’t get access to them. For some reason they get stuck in the office bureaucracy so 
when we ask can we see the papers they say: “No, terribly sorry, we haven’t got 
them.”‘ 
Inevitably, it comes down to that great British tradition of knowing the right 
people and keeping them sweet. 
The evidence from the bundles mentioned in open court is a public record, but 
again there is nothing requiring a copy to be made available to the public. The clerks 
don’t often have copies and so anyone wanting to see these records is entirely 
dependent on the whim of the parties’ lawyers. If they refuse access then you have to 
make an application to the judge. 
‘It’s wrong that independent reporters should be beholden to the parties and 
their lawyers in this way to access public documents,’ James says. ‘It gives them the 
opportunity, which they sometimes use, to exclude the press without any judicial 
intervention. And it makes us feel like a PR agency because we’re put into a position 
where we could be used by the parties’ lawyers to get their message across.’ 
Bronagh Taylor agrees. ‘If you know people then it’s easier.’ She says even 
lawyers can find it difficult to get documents from court. ‘It can often depend on the 
law firm – if you’re a prestigious one then you get things a lot easier. I’ve had other 
solicitors call me and say: “Can you try and get this because I’ve tried and I can’t get 
it?” It is definitely who you know and who you work for.’ 
Technically, ‘originating process’ documents – that is, all writs and claim 
forms – are public, but the reality is that they provide very little meaningful 
information. You’re given a writ book simply showing all the claim forms that have 
been issued but no factual detail, just Bloggs v Bloggs. If you want to search for a 
specific case then you have to pay a search fee. The sorts of investigations we did in 
America using court records to discern patterns of malpractice, abuse or litigious 
bullying by companies or institutions simply cannot be done in England and people 
are left to be defrauded, abused and put in danger as a result. 
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As James Brewster sums it up: ‘You can’t have a democratic society without 
covering one of the arms of government.’ But he knows all too well that as 
newspapers are cutting budgets so his own budget is cut to the wire and court 
reporting is not what it was or should be. The difficulty accessing documents only 
makes it more expensive and time consuming. 
Can it be this bad? I decide to try and get my hands on some court 
documentation. I used to do this in America when I was covering for the court 
reporter. I would trundle along to the clerk’s office, say ‘hi’ and introduce myself as 
the covering court reporter, and then spend the next thirty to sixty minutes going 
through all the court filings. If I wanted more details from a case I’d ask the clerk, 
who would pull the file, and I’d make photocopies. This all took a minimum of fuss 
and effort and was at no cost and very little inconvenience to the staff. I simply did 
my own thing and they let me. That was a county court but it’s the same in pretty 
much any American court. At the US Supreme Court you can find all this online, 
same with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Now let’s see the 
English equivalent. 
I head to the East Block of the High Court to a section bizarrely called ‘the 
bear garden’ where cases are filed. I’m going to use Jane Clift’s case against Slough 
Borough Council as my test case. I have the names of the parties (which is more than 
most people will have) but when I talk to the clerk in the customer information office 
he says I need the case number. Without it, no deal. 
‘How do I get that?’ I ask naively. ‘Is there a database somewhere I can look it 
up?’ 
To get the case number I have to go to the search room along the hall. Here I 
have a friendly chat with a man who says that in order to search I must pay a fee of 
£5 per fifteen minutes of searching. But I have to pay the fee before I search. ‘How 
will I know how long it will take to find something before I start searching?’ He says 
he’ll be lenient with me. ‘I’m not going to hassle you every five minutes, but if there’s 
a queue then you’ll have to go back and pay more money, though if you have the 
names then fifteen minutes should be enough.’ 
I head to the fees office, which is inconveniently placed at the other end of the 
corridor and round a corner. There is another queue. Here you wait and then pay 
your fee. Armed with this receipt I head back to the search room where hopefully I’ll 
get my case number. Then armed with this it’s back to the customer information 
room where I fill out a form requesting the documents I want. Then it’s another wait, 
from two to five days. If you want a photocopy then it’s another trip over to the fees 
office. You’ll pay £5 for the first ten pages, and 50p per page for subsequent pages. 
These charges apply to each document individually. If I wanted to see anything from 
the case files (which I do) then I would need permission for which I would have to 
complete another form and pay another fee (currently £75 if the application is on 
notice and £40 if the application is without notice or by consent). I’d have to go 
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before a ‘master’ to explain why, in the interests of justice, I should be given access. 
Surely in a democracy the default position should be the opposite: the case open 
unless someone explains to the ‘master’ why it needs to be sealed. Fortunately I can 
forgo these last stages because I happen to know the law firm that represented Jane 
Clift as they represented me against the House of Commons (remember, it’s all about 
who you know). 
That’s four different people in four parts of the East Block just to get one 
document which exists most likely in electronic form and could have been given to 
me at no cost whatsoever and without inconveniencing four different people. 
The entire justification given by the government for imposing fees is to cover 
administrative costs, but these costs are entirely artificial. Records can be filed 
electronically and as such the cost of duplication is zero. The court is making 
needless work for itself. 
James Brewster isn’t asking for a lot to cover the courts effectively. ‘I would 
like to see the courts living up to what the rules actually say. So that in practice we do 
get access automatically to the documents we are allowed to see.’ The list of 
documents automatically and readily available should be: 
 
1. claim form  
2. particulars of claim 
3. skeleton arguments (where the parties lay out their argument) 
4. witness statements once admitted into evidence.9 
 
‘If we just had those four we could cover every case. But you’d be amazed how 
difficult it is to get simply the minimum.’ I could go on: 
 
• Public access to case law is only for the rich through private legal databases; 
even access to the raw data needed to create a statute law database is 
continually blocked by officials at the Ministry of Justice despite over £1 
million of public money being spent on the project. 
• The new Supreme Court, which was meant to be a model of a new age of 
open justice, charges the public a minimum of £350 a time to access 
documents 
• A number of trials are now held in private using secret evidence not 
available even to the defendant.10 
                                                   
9 Other courts such as the Canadian Supreme Court and US Supreme Court provide all this 
information and more to the public online at no cost. 
10 A report on secret evidence by the legal human rights organisation JUSTICE in June 2009 revealed 
how in the last twelve years, the British traditions of open justice and the right to a fair hearing have 
been under- mined by the use of secret evidence in closed hearings. 
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• A children, schools and families bill makes it a contempt of court to report 
all but a tiny fraction of family court proceedings no matter the public 
implications. 
 
All manner of good reasons may be put forward for such secrecy, but once the right 
of the people to see justice being done is eroded, it is not long before there is no 
justice at all. 
We have a justice system paid for by the common people but whose 
proceedings are available only to the few: the legal profession and the rich, powerful 
or privileged. 
Where reporters were once a substitute for the people’s inability to go to the 
courts in person, now the media are under threat and what little resources remain 
are spent battling to gain access to information that should be automatically in the 
public domain. I came across the state’s silence even while writing this chapter. In 
August 2009 I put in my first interview request to the director of the Royal Courts of 
Justice. I was told he could not talk to me and I was referred instead to the Ministry 
of Justice press office. After repeated promises to get back to me with answers or 
even an interview, four months passed and I received no information at all from the 
ministry. 
The courts are in danger of becoming an elitist enclave entirely separate and 
out of touch with modern society. The privatisation of court transcripts and the 
numerous restrictions on the public seeing justice done – from the prohibition on 
sketching and recording to the poorly resourced public galleries – all betray an 
attitude that the information from open courts doesn’t belong to the public but to 
lawyers and court officials. The justice system is becoming a closed world, a 
cloistered sanctum of the legal profession, for which we pay the bill. 
We pay a lot of money for our judicial system11 though not enough. An open 
system with a jury costs more than a secret system with only a judge. In the past this 
cost was considered one worth bearing for the long-term health of our democracy. 
Increasingly, though, politicians have not thought it worthwhile to bear these costs.  
  
                                                   
11 The initial set-up costs of the new Supreme Court for which the public have paid but cannot see in 
action was £56.9 million. 
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Fewer trials have juries and fewer members of the public are able to see justice 
being done. Less is spent on the courts and money that could be used to improve the 
judicial system is instead diverted to reactionary policing methods and universal 
surveillance for which there is no evidence of effectiveness. 
 
 
© Heather Brooke 
 
Heather Brooke worked as a political and crime reporter in the US before moving 
to Britain where she is now a freelance journalist and freedom of information 
campaigner. She writes for all of the main UK national papers and has published 
three books: Your Right to Know, The Silent State and The Revolution Will Be 
Digitised.
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OPEN AND SHUT JUSTICE 
 
Mike Dodd examines the obstacles faced by journalists seeking to 
report the courts 
 
The principles of open justice are well established and widely discussed, and the role 
of the press and journalists in reporting and commenting on the justice system has 
been the subject of judicial comment and approval. In R v Felixstowe Justices Ex P 
Leigh1, Lord Justice Watkins cited with approval Lord Denning’s comments in The 
Road to Justice (1955), saying:  
 
[The press court reporter] is, I verily believe, the watchdog of justice. If he is to do his 
job properly and effectively we must hold fast to the principle that every case must be 
heard and determined in open court. It must not take place behind closed doors. 
Every member of the public must be entitled to report in the public press all that he 
has seen and heard. The reason for this rule is the very salutary influence which 
publicity has for those who work in the light of it… 
 
and adding:  
 
…Those observations suffice to emphasise to the mind of anyone the vital importance 
of the work of the journalist in reporting court proceedings and, within the bounds of 
impartiality and fairness, commenting upon the decisions of judges and justices and 
their behaviour in and conduct of the proceedings. 
 
But the practicalities of ensuring that justice is not merely done, but is seen to be 
done, continue to cause problems for those journalists who seek to report on the 
courts. 
Reporters regularly spend time in magistrates’ courts, Crown Courts, the High 
Court, and sometimes the Court of Appeal, observing and reporting on trials and 
hearings covering issues ranging from terrorism, murder and rape to shop-lifting, or 
allegations of medical negligence, and disputes over shoddy building work, land 
boundaries, or the terms of contracts. It is a simple job, one might think – 
information is given in open court, and should be reportable, and the basic details, 
such as names and addresses of defendants, the names of witnesses and so on should 
be obtainable from the court staff if they are not clearly given in open court. The 
journalist only has to listen, take a decent note, and write the story. 
But the journalist must also know that there are more than 60 separate 
statutes which cover the activities of the press. A fair number of these feature 
automatic or discretionary restrictions on what may be reported from a hearing or a 
trial. None of these restrictions, naturally, limits what the member of the public 
                                                   
1 [1987] QB 582 at 591 
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sitting next to the journalist may say to his chums as he discusses the events of the 
day in the pub that night – or, perhaps, the musings of the blogger who goes home 
and writes it all up on his website, in happy ignorance of the law. 
Many hearings in criminal courts, particularly those held in the early stages of 
a case, are covered by automatic restrictions which ban publication of all but the 
most basic details, so as to avoid prejudicing potential jurors when the case comes to 
trial2. 
Criminal and courts also may impose restrictions on reporting. They may 
order that reports of all or part of a hearing, or trial, should be postponed3, again 
because they believe that media coverage might prejudice the views of potential 
jurors at a subsequent trial, or decide that some information, such as the identity of a 
blackmail victim, must be kept from the public and cannot be reported at all4. 
Orders may give anonymity to juveniles appearing in adult courts5, while 
juveniles appearing in youth courts automatically get anonymity6. Courts may give 
anonymity to witnesses if they believe that doing so will improve their evidence or 
co-operation with one party or the other7. Victims of sexual offences are 
automatically entitled to lifelong anonymity8 – and in the near future, no doubt, 
provisions in the Education Act 2011 which give lifelong anonymity to teachers 
accused of offences against pupils in their care will come into force. 9 
So far, one might say, so good; most of these restrictions can be justified, at 
least to some extent. 
The difficulty, however, is not with the law, but with the way in which it is 
applied, or, in the terminology of the digital age, with the human interface. As often 
happens with IT systems, it is the operator – in the case of the justice system, the 
judges, magistrates, lawyers, clerks and other officials involved in it – which is the 
root cause of the problem. 
Magistrates and judges in criminal courts sometimes act as if their powers to 
restrict reporting are unlimited, and impose orders which are beyond their powers. 
Orders are made at the request of counsel who often appear not to have checked 
before making a request to see if the court has the power do make the order sought. 
Although the principles on which reporting restriction orders may be made are well 
established, courts continually make orders beyond their powers. For example, it is 
common for courts to purport to make orders banning the identification of adults by 
                                                   
2 See, e.g., section 8 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, covering remand and committal hearings 
3 Section 4 (2), Contempt of Court Act 1981 
4 Section 11, Contempt of Court Act 1981 
5 Section 39, Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
6 Section 49, Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
7 Section 46, Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
8 Section 4, Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, Section 1 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1992. The list of offences in relation to which anonymity for a victim applies was greatly extended by 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003  
9 Section 13, Education Act 2011, inserting section 141F into Part 8 of the Education Act 2002 
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using section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act, which can only be used in 
relation to those under the age of 1810. This damages the principle of open justice – 
and that damage too often remains, because the media find it too expensive to mount 
a proper challenge.  
Judges have been known to exercise non-existent powers to give anonymity to 
those accused of sexual offences on the grounds that identifying the defendant will 
‘automatically’ identify the victim. This is a nonsense. To say that a hypothetical 
offender called Artemus Jones raped a woman will not give away his victim’s name or 
identity. Neither will saying that the rape occurred in a certain town, or giving other 
details. In reality the judge is usurping the editor’s position; the legislation makes it 
clear that the onus is on the media to ensure anonymity for sex offence victims, and 
neither the 1976 or 1992 Act contains any provision empowering a court to order 
anonymity for an adult defendant. 
The Judicial Studies Board – now the Judicial College – has published 
guidance on reporting restrictions, entitled Reporting Restrictions in the Criminal 
Courts11. The latest edition, published in 2009, superseded separate guides on 
restrictions for the magistrates’ and Crown Courts. The guide sets out in detail the 
reporting restrictions which can be imposed, and the requirements which must be 
met. Yet it seems that few courts or judges have encountered this document, or have 
referred to it when facing a request for a reporting restriction order.  
When the law is applied properly, or if no restrictions are in force or imposed, 
journalists still find themselves facing other difficulties. 
Courts should have specific seating for reporters – but this is often unusable, 
having been colonised by court officials, probation officers, police and others. Many 
courts have no press seating. 
The Court Standards and Design Guide published on a CD Rom in September 
2004 by the Department for Constitutional Affairs – now the Ministry of Justice – 
seems to accept that the press should have reserved seating in courts. In states, on 
Page 6.3, in section on Section 6, Design Data Sheets & Court Room Design, under 
the heading ‘3 Elements of court room design: ‘Whether a courtroom is used for a 
Magistrates’ (section 7), Crown (section 8) or County Court (section 9) there are 
elements within the design that are functionally similar or identical. These generic 
aspects are covered here. They include: judges’/magistrates’ bench, clerk’s desk, 
witness box, jury desk, press desk, exhibits table, advocates’ bench, secure dock, and 
natural ventilation of courtrooms.  
But security staff in courts have been known to refuse to allow journalists into 
the body of the court, insisting that they cover cases from the public gallery, where, in 
many cases the acoustics are bad, the seating unsuitable, the view restricted or 
                                                   
10 Section 39 (1); see also the Court of Appeal decision in R v Southwark Crown Court, ex parte 
Godwin ([1991] 3 WLR 686; [1991] 3 All ER 818);  
11 Available online at: <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/5AC4E743-55FE-4E31-9FAB-
7BBEC3DF1B89/0/crown_court_reporting_restrictions_021009.pdf> 
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minimal, and they are exposed to the risk of threats by those who may not want a 
case covered or certain details reported. On Thursday 8 March 2012 reporters who 
arrived at Westminster Magistrates’ Court in central London to cover the first 
appearance of Royal Navy submariner Petty Officer Edward Devenney on a charge 
under the Official Secrets Act were told by court staff that they would have to sit in 
the public gallery, where the journalists say it is extremely difficult to hear what it 
being said.  
The dispute ended when District Judge Daphne Wickham agreed that 
reporters could sit in the body of the court. A spokesman for HM Courts Service said 
it was aware of the problem and was ‘addressing the issue’. Making journalists sit in 
the public gallery is also contrary to the HMCTS guidance on dealing with the 
media12 / 13. 
In addition, while the criminal courts regularly make orders restricting 
reporting, these are not kept on a central register. Governments have wasted millions 
on pounds of expensive and ambitious IT schemes, but nothing has been done to 
develop a central database through which current reporting restriction orders, and 
the information they seek to protect, can be double-checked. Any in-house lawyer, 
news editor or sub-editor who wishes to make sure that a case is not covered by a 
discretionary reporting restriction, or who wants to check the details of an order, had 
better do so before 4.30pm or 5pm, when most courts close for the day, because 
courts also do not have out-of-hours numbers to contact. 
This may be the digital age – but when it comes to information technology and 
ensuring the widest possible publication of what should be public information, the 
courts remain in the dark ages, while the public often remain in the dark. 
Even if one can get through to a court, a fair proportion of staff are unwilling 
to give journalists details of orders, some have been known to insist that requests 
must be made in writing, or that they can only photocopy and post the information 
sought. 
The Ministry of Justice was involved during the closing months of the last 
Labour government in discussions with media organisations about establishing an 
online database of reporting restriction orders, but the idea has since sunk without 
trace, a victim of the supposed cost. 
                                                   
12 Media guidance for HMCS staff, October 2010, Page 9: ‘It is normal to provide the media with seats 
in the well of the court during a trial. The media are entitled by law to hear and be present at all open 
court proceedings. They should not be forced to cover the trial from the public gallery – individual 
reporters may be at risk of intimidation from friends or relatives to parties in the case…’ 
13 In January 2009, staff at Woolwich Crown Court refused a Press Association reporter seeking to 
report on the case of R v Abdullah Baybashin access to the body of the court, telling her to cover the 
case from the public gallery – a sealed glass-fronted gallery high above the court, which can be 
reached only by way of a staircase and two corridors, making it impossible for journalists to approach 
counsel in the trial if they had queries or wished to clarify a point made during a hearing, and 
impossible to check details with the clerk. 
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An extra difficulty, particularly with criminal courts, is that despite the 
requirements of the Consolidated Practice Direction14  that reporting restriction 
orders must be written down when they are made, on occasion this simply is not 
done, with the result that an order might not be recorded properly for days, or might 
never be put down on paper. 
In the civil courts, Part 39 (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules states that ‘The 
general rule is that a hearing shall be in public’, but judges have been known to 
refuse to allow journalists in when they do turn up in the apparent belief that they 
have no right to attend a hearing, as have court security staff15. 
There are also problems getting information from civil courts. The High Court 
– including the Family Division – keeps no central register of orders and injunctions. 
Thus, there is no way to check with the court whether there is an active injunction in 
force, whether it be a privacy order or one intended to protect children involved in 
civil proceedings. Inquiries invariably draw the response that one has to know the 
case number before an order can be tracked, if it can be tracked. 
Is this, one wonders, acceptable in this digital, information technology age? 
In addition, many claimants who obtain interim injunctions leave them in 
place and take their cases no further, having in effect obtained a permanent ban 
which binds anyone and everyone aware of its existence. There are signs that this 
situation is now changing, following the report on injunctions and super-injunctions 
produced by a committee set up by the Master or the Rolls, Lord Neuberger. 
An extra difficulty in both criminal and civil courts if the frequent, almost 
knee-jerk refusal of many counsel to allow journalists to have copies of the skeleton 
arguments they submit to courts before a hearing, even though there have been a 
number of cases in which judges have declared that journalists should be given 
copies of the skeletons. In November 2011, barristers involved in a case in which HM 
Revenue and Customs was challenging the Football League’s rules on insolvency of 
football clubs refused to give journalists copies of their skeleton arguments, saying 
they were confidential documents. But Mr Justice David Richards said written 
arguments prepared by lawyers and parties in civil litigation were not ‘confidential 
documents’ and should be supplied to journalists, telling HMRC’s counsel: ‘They are 
not confidential documents. ‘You can do whatever you like with your skeleton 
arguments. You can post them on a website. Whatever you want.’ He added, ‘I would 
suggest that you do supply copies of skeletons to the press.’16 
                                                   
14 Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction, Part 1.3. The Direction is online at: 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/docs/ccpd-part-I-pds-of-general-
application-oct2011.pdf> 
15 See: ‘Security Guard tries to stop reporter entering courthouse’, Media Lawyer website, February 3, 
2011; ‘ I was wrong, says judge who ordered reporter out of court’, Media Lawyer website, August 19, 
2004 (journalist barred, temporarily, from hearing in Chambers) 
16  Media Lawyer website, November 30, 2011 
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In 2008 Mr Justice Eady ordered that journalist and legal observer Benjamin 
Pell should be given copies of skeleton arguments put into court as part of an 
unsuccessful application to stop Channel 4 broadcasting a programme about former 
SAS officer Simon Mann, who was at that time being held in Equatorial Guinea on 
charges of leading a coup attempt intended to overthrow the country’s government. 
But Mr Justice Eady said the parties did have the right to redact confidential material 
from the documents. 
In 2003, the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, held that barristers should 
give journalists copies of the skeleton arguments they prepare for court hearings if 
they were asked to do so. Lord Justice Judge, as he then was, said the court was 
supplied with skeleton arguments, which it read before the actual hearing, which 
analysed a vast amount of material. It would have been a waste of time for the 
skeletons to be read or repeated in court. The court had concluded that ‘the principle 
of open justice leads inexorably to the conclusion that written skeleton arguments, or 
those parts of skeleton arguments adopted by counsel and treated by the court as 
forming part of his oral submissions, should be disclosed if and when a request to do 
so is received’.17 
The media itself is active in working for open justice. Journalists regularly 
challenge orders made in the criminal courts, because they were wrongly made, or 
impose a substantial and unjustified restriction on reporting. But judges just as 
regularly ignore or reject challenges, insisting, in many cases despite clear authority 
to the contrary, that they have the power to do what they have done. Appeals can be 
made to the Court of Appeal under section 159 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 – but 
these involve considerable costs and time, and more often than not the decision is 
that the story is simply not worth it. 
National, regional and local newspapers are active in the field of open justice, 
as far as their resources allow. The Times has been campaigning to open up the 
Family Courts, while The Independent has spent a considerable amount of time and 
effort in prising open the doors of the Court of Protection, step by step and decision 
by decision over the past five or six years. 
There are justifications for some limits to reporting of cases in both the family 
courts and the Court of Protection. But as Lord Justice Munby, as he now is, has 
pointed out: ‘…it must never be forgotten that, with the State’s abandonment of the 
right to impose capital sentences, orders of the kind which judges of the family courts 
are typically invited to make in public law proceedings are amongst the most drastic 
that any judge in any jurisdiction is ever empowered to make’18. The family courts 
can have children removed from their parents, allow them to move abroad with one 
parent, while the Court of Protection may be asked to decide where a man with 
                                                   
17  R v Howell, Harris and May, [2003] EWCA Crim 486, at paragraphs 193-197 
18 Access to and reporting of family proceedings, a paper by Mr Justice Munby delivered at Jordan’s 
Family Law Conference on October 11 2005 
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severe autism should live, and who should control his life, or even decide if a patient 
should be allowed to die.  
These are powers which should not be exercised behind a veil of secrecy. 
While confidentiality to protect the individual concerned is justified, the courts and 
those professionals who give evidence in them should be open to media and public 
scrutiny. Only then can the public have true confidence that justice is being done, 
because they can see it being done.  
Our criminal and civil justice systems do operate on the principle of open 
justice – but there are still many issues to be tackled, and many problems which 
cannot be solved without first being acknowledged. 
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A CORRECTIVE TO BAD 
JOURNALISM 
 
 
Adam Wagner answers the Leveson Inquiry’s questions about 
blogging in journalism and law1 
 
The definition of ‘blogging’ is now extremely wide, so much so that the term ‘blog’ 
has become in essence meaningless. A blog can be a ‘web log’ within the original 
meaning of the word, that is a ‘personal journey’ published on the World Wide Web 
consisting of discrete entries (‘posts’)’2 but it can also be a news and comment 
website such as the UK Human Rights Blog3, a photo-sharing website, a website 
promoting a business.  In fact, practically any website can call itself a blog.  
Mainstream newspapers now produce ‘blogs’ online and as such the boundary 
between traditional journalism and blogging has also become unclear. The number of 
websites calling themselves blogs is phenomenal. There are now over 70m sites 
registered on WordPress alone, accounting for 800m page views each week. This is a 
significant proportion of the total number of internet sites worldwide. Moreover, 
Twitter allows individual users to publish statements and is in effect a smaller-scale 
(in respect of length of individual posts) version of blogging within its original 
meaning.  
Ethics should play a role in blogging, in the same way that ethics should play a 
role in society generally. It is in society’s interest that people are free to follow their 
chosen system of ethics, as long as their system of ethics does not unduly impinge on 
the freedom of others. Maintaining this, sometimes uneasy, balance is the basic task 
of a democratic state. A rough ethical system is emerging in respect of blogging and 
tweeting. This is not officially enforced by sanctions, but is unofficially enforced by 
other users. For example, one important principle of blogging is attributing (usually 
linking to) sources used in a post. 
 
Regulating blogs 
Barristers are regulated by the Bar Standards Board and blogging and tweeting are 
certainly caught by the Code of Conduct:4 a barrister was recently fined £2,500 for 
                                                   
1 This article is adapted from Adam Wagner’s written evidence to the Leveson Inquiry, available at < 
http://adam1cor.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/adam-wagner-leveson-statement-7-2-12-
signatureredacted.pdf> accessed May 2012 
2 ‘Blog’ Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog> accessed May 2012 
3 Adam Wagner is founding editor and regular contributor to the UK Human Rights Blog, a legal 
update service written by members of 1 Crown Office Row 
4 Available at: 
<http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1353125/word_version_of_full_code_of_conduct__
_annexes_jan_2012_.pdf> accessed May 2012 
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anonymously publishing inappropriate tweets during a trial, conduct which was 
found to be ‘likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the 
administration of justice or otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute’.5 I 
argue that the Bar Code of Conduct and the Legal Services Act 20076 also place 
lawyers under a professional obligation to increase public understanding of law 
through, for example, activities such as blogging.7 I do not think blogs can or should 
be regulated by a domestic system of regulation, for the following reasons: 
 
1. It is unworkable. Practically, it would be impossible to regulate all blogging. 
Hundreds of thousands of blogs are set up each day, let alone posts published, 
and the term is so elastic that the task would be simply too large and 
amorphous for any regulator to manage. Even if only popular blogs were 
targeted, say those over a certain number of hits, what is to stop an individual 
blogger simply setting up a new blog in order to avoid regulation?  
 
2. The current system already works. Criminal and civil law already provides a 
reasonable level of regulation. Bloggers, whether their websites are read by 
one or one million people, are subject to financial penalties for libel or quasi-
criminal sanctions if they commit a contempt of court. See, for example, the 
case of Elizabeth Watson (below), who was sentenced to nine months 
imprisonment (later suspended) for breaching a court order through 
information published on her personal website. Additionally, Justice Peart has 
said in relation to an Irish case involving the ‘Rate-your-solicitor.com’ website 
that ‘The civil remedies currently available have recently been demonstrated 
to be an inadequate means of prevention and redress’.8 
 
3. Self-regulation already exists. Blogging specifically and social media 
publishing more generally (notably Twitter) is to a large extent self-regulating. 
As lawyer and journalist David Allen Green put it in a recent blog post: 
 
Regulation is just not about formal ‘black-letter codes’ with sanctions and 
enforcement agencies. Regulation also means simply that things are done 
better than they otherwise would be: for example, when one ‘regulates one’s 
own conduct’. Bloggers and others in social media are willing and able to call 
out media excesses and bad journalism. The reaction is immediate and can be 
                                                   
5 The barrister was also struck off for separate offences. 
See <http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-and-professional-conduct/disciplinary-
tribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/?DisciplineID=75521> accessed May 2012 
6 At: < http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/regulatory-requirements/changes-to-regulation/legal-
services-act/> accessed May 2012 
7 See:  Adam Wagner, ‘Must lawyers blog and tweet?’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 24 May 2011) 
<http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/05/24/must-lawyers-blog-and-tweet/> accessed May 2012 
8 Tim Healy, ‘Website accused of defamation is closed by judge’, (Independent.ie, 1 February 2012) 
<http://www.independent.ie/national-news/courts/website-accused-of-defamation-is-closed-by-
judge-3005716.html> accessed May 2012 
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brutally frank. They are sometimes wrong, as are formal regulators. But they 
can take time and allow the media to produce better, more well-informed 
stories. 9 
 
Bloggers and others in social media are particularly willing and able to ‘call out’ each 
other’s conduct. The blogosphere and Twitter provide a vibrant, fast-moving and 
sometimes rather unforgiving arena for debate. As such, an enormous amount of 
self-regulation and correction already takes place. This is to a large extent the whole 
point of social media. People enjoy observing a lively debate, and Twitter 
demonstrates the extent to which they are also enthusiastic to contribute. Moreover, 
the more prominent a blogger or blog post, the more it is likely to be the subject of 
comment and criticism. This is an efficient system as almost by definition the more 
influential a blog post, the more heavily it is peer-reviewed. 
 
4.  There is a significant risk of chilling effect. Notwithstanding the extreme 
practical difficulties with regulating blogs, the risk of doing so would be to 
limit the currently vibrant arena for freedom of expression that helps to keep 
journalists and politicians in check. 
 
5.  There is already-existing regulation by other means. Some bloggers (such as 
lawyers and other professionals) are regulated by other means, thus bolstering 
the existing criminal and civil remedies available to victims of ‘bad 
blogging’.  Potentially the most damaging ‘bad blogging’ is a personal attack 
posted online. As stated above, there is already an array of civil and criminal 
remedies by which victims of ‘bad blogging’ can seek redress, and a relatively 
effective means of self-regulation through social media. Practically speaking, I 
cannot see how victims of ‘bad blogging’ could be given more effective forms 
of redress except by tweaking the current rules. A formal system of regulation 
simply would not work. 
 
Correcting the press 
The primary reason for setting up the UKHRB was to act as a corrective to bad 
journalism about human rights, and in under two years it has become a trusted 
source of information for journalists, politicians, those in government and members 
of the public. UKHRB operates alongside a number of other excellent legal blogs, run 
by lawyers, students and enthusiasts for free, which provide a similar service in 
respect of other areas of law. I would highlight, for example:10  
 
                                                   
9 David Allen Green ‘How to think about social media’ (New Statesman, 31 January 2012) 
<http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/david-allen-green/2012/01/social-media-regulation> 
accessed May 2012 
10 There are now many similar legal blogs – for a full list and hyperlinks see: 
<http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/04/24/roll-up-roll-up/> accessed May 2012 
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• Nearly Legal housing law blog 
• UK Supreme Court Blog  
• Inforrm  
• The Small Places  
• Head of Legal 
• Human Rights in Ireland 
• Law Think 
• Jack of Kent 
• Charon QC 
• Pink Tape  
• Eutopia Law 
• Panopticon Blog 
• Halsbury’s Law Exchange 
 
Human rights is an example of an area of law that is often misrepresented by the 
mainstream press.11 This can be the result of a lack of legal expertise amongst 
journalists, but also represents some newspapers’ editorial positions that are if not 
anti-human rights, then certainly anti-Human Rights Act. It is no coincidence, in my 
opinion, that the Human Rights Act 1998 is also widely considered to have bolstered 
privacy rights and as such threatens the celebrity news-driven business model of 
most newspapers.  
Five examples of bad human rights coverage that have been corrected by 
UKHRB, include:  
 
Myth one 
‘The illegal immigrant who cannot be deported because he had a pet cat’ 
This claim, and the ensuing ‘Catgate’,12 is the most famous example of the 
misrepresentation of human rights law in the past year, and perhaps ever. It involved 
the Home Secretary’s claim at the Conservative Party Conference: ‘We all know the 
stories about the Human Rights Act… The illegal immigrant who cannot be deported 
because – and I am not making this up – he had a pet cat.’13  
This myth was initially propagated by the press in 2009, and despite 
being rejected by the judiciary’s press office at the time,14 the story was repeated a 
                                                   
11 See UKHRB posts on poor reporting listed here: <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/category/blog-
posts/poor-reporting/ – also reproduced in an annex to this statement> accessed May 2012 
12 See posts at <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/10/05/the-lessons-and-shaggy-dogs-and-
catgate/> ; <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/10/04/cat-had-nothing-to-do-with-failure-to-
deport-man/> ; <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/10/06/what-the-first-catgate-appeal-
judgment-actually-says/> accessed May 2012 
13 ‘Theresa May speech in full’ (Politics.co.uk 4 October 2011) <http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-
analysis/2011/10/04/theresa-may-speech-in-full> accessed May 2012 
14 ‘Mail and Sunday Telegraph: cat-alysts for more anti-immigration feeling’ (Tabloid Watch, 19 
October 2009) <http://tabloid-watch.blogspot.com/2009/10/mail-and-sunday-telegraph-cat-
alysts.html> accessed May 2012 
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few weeks prior to the Party Conference in the Sunday Telegraph,15 which is 
probably why it was included in the Home Secretary’s speech. Moreover, despite the 
claim subsequently being rubbished by, amongst others, the Justice Secretary 
who called it a ‘complete nonsense example’,16 the Daily Mail still reported (‘Truth 
about Tory catfight: Judge DID rule migrant’s pet was a reason he shouldn’t be 
deported’) that the Home Secretary’s claim was accurate (for that reason, I placed the 
newspaper on the ‘legal naughty step’,17 a ‘regulatory’ innovation by the excellent 
Nearly Legal housing law blog).   
 
Myth two 
 ‘UK loses three out of four European human rights cases’ 
On 12 January 2012 the Daily Mail (‘Europe’s war on British justice: UK loses three 
out of four human rights cases, damning report reveals’) and Daily Telegraph 
(‘Britain loses three in four cases at human rights court’) reported – entirely 
uncritically – a report written by a Parliamentary Aide and signed by 10 backbench 
MPs which claimed the UK lost three out of four cases in the European Court of 
Human Rights. This was a misleading statistic as it ignored the thousands of cases 
brought against the UK that are struck out at an earlier stage, which amounts for 
around 97 per cent of all applications. 
 
Myth three 
‘Britain can ignore Europe on human rights’ 
In October 2011 the Times’ front page headline was ‘Britain can ignore Europe on 
human rights: top judge’.18 Upon analysis, the headline bore no relation to Lord 
Judge’s comments to the House of Lords Constitution Committee (see from 10:25).19 
It is also based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how the European 
Convention on Human Rights has been incorporated into UK law.20 
 
 
                                                   
15 David Barrett, ‘102 foreign criminals and illegal immigrants we can’t deport’ (Telegraph.co.uk, 11 
June 2011) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/8570639/102-foreign-
criminals-and-illegal-immigrants-we-cant-deport.html> accessed May 2012 
16 Nicholas Watt, ‘Conservative conference badge Clarke “regrets” accusing May of laughable attack on 
Human Rights Act’ (Guardian.co.uk, 6 October 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/oct/06/clarke-condemns-may-attack-human-rights-act> 
accessed May 2012 
17 Adam Wagner, ‘What the first #catgate appeal judgment actually says’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 6 
October 2011) <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/10/06/what-the-first-catgate-appeal-judgment-
actually-says/> accessed May 2012 
18 Frances Gibb, ‘Britain can ignore Europe on human rights: top judge’ The Times (London, 20 
October 2011) 1 
19  Available at <http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=9199> accessed May 
2012 
20  Adam Wagner, ‘Can Britain “ignore Europe on human rights”?’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 23 
October 2011) <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/10/23/can-britain-ignore-europe-on-human-
rights/> accessed May 2012 
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Myth four 
‘We must regain right to kick out foreign criminals’ 
A Daily Express editorial21 comment in respect of a European Court of Human 
Rights deportation decision was riddled with inaccuracies and misrepresentations of 
the specific case and human rights law generally.22 
 
Myth five 
‘Human rights prevented deportation of Phillip Lawrence killer’ 
This claim is made regularly by newspapers which are seeking to reduce the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ influence on deportation decisions e.g. 
see the Daily Telegraph:23 ‘The government had been prevented from deporting 
Chindamo to Italy, where he lived as a child, because of the Human Rights Act’. But 
Chindamo’s case was not decided according to human rights law. As was widely 
reported24 at the time of the tribunal decision in 2007, Chindamo’s arguments under 
the Human Rights Act played second fiddle to the main thrust of his case, which was 
founded on of EU freedom of movement law.25 
Despite this, the claim has been repeated for years in order to support a 
campaign against the Human Rights Act. In my view, there are a number of reasons 
why human rights law is often misreported,26 all of which can be applied equally to 
other poorly reported areas of law: 
 
1. Sloppy journalism: Journalists often write articles about court judgments 
without reading them first, or about trials which they have not personally 
attended. The latter is a particular problem in relation to family law – see e.g. 
Mr Justice Bellamy’s criticism of the Daily Telegraph’s Christopher Booker’s 
reporting as ’unbalanced, inaccurate and just plain wrong’,27 a 
                                                   
21 Stephen Pollard, ‘We must regain right to kick out foreign criminals’, (Express.co.uk, 30 June 2011) 
<http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/255823> accessed May 2012 
22 Adam Wagner, ‘More poor human rights reporting on Somali foreign criminals case’ (UK Human 
Rights Blog, 30 June 2011) <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/06/30/more-poor-human-rights-
reporting-on-somali-foreign-criminals-case/> accessed May 2012 
23 ‘Terror relocation rules: why human rights laws are so controversial’ (Telegraph.co.uk, 4 October 
2011) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/8804582/Terror-relocation-rules-
why-human-rights-laws-are-so-controversial.html> accessed May 2012 
24 ‘Chindamo deportation barred under EU law’ (Politics.co.uk, 22 August 2007) 
<http://www.politics.co.uk/news/opinion-former-index/policing-and-crime/chindamo-deportation-
barred-under-eu-law-$477468.htm> accessed May 2012 
25 Adam Wagner, ‘Telegraph wrong again on foreign deportation’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 8 
September 2011) <http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/09/08/telegraph-wrong-again-on-foreign-
deportation/> accessed May 2012 
26 A more comprehensive list of human rights myths which have been propagated by newspapers can 
be found here: <http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/human-rights/the-human-
rights-act/human-rights-act-myths/index.php> accessed May 2012 
27 L (A Child: Media Reporting), Re [2011] EWHC B8 (Fam) (18 April 2011) [193] 
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criticism supported by Sir Nicholas Wall in X, Y, and Z & Anor v A Local 
Authority28.   
This case has a very interesting history that highlights many of the legal 
complexities relating to the regulatory and legal sanctions which the Leveson 
Inquiry is investigating. Although the mother involved was ultimately found 
by Sir Nicholas Wall to be a fabricator who had coached her daughter to lie 
about being abused by her ex-partner, her case was taken up enthusiastically 
by journalists such as Mr Booker and also John Hemming MP, who chose 
(before Ms Haigh was exposed as a fabricator) to expose the ‘super-injunction’ 
against her in Parliament.29 Elizabeth Watson, a ‘private investigator’ who 
published allegations made by Haigh online, was subsequently sentenced to 
nine months in prison (later suspended30) for contempt of court arising from 
her blog about the case. 
 
2. No links to primary sources. Newspapers rarely link to primary sources, in 
particular judgments, which means that online readers are unable to test 
claims for themselves. This is why UKHRB seeks to publish links to judgments 
and other primary materials almost as soon as they are available, and I seek to 
do the same via Twitter. I also campaign regularly for courts to publish more 
judgment summaries and press releases as the Supreme Court now does to 
great effect. 
 
3. Lack of dedicated legal correspondents. Legal writer Joshua Rozenberg has 
told Legal Week that many national newspapers no longer have a designated 
legal correspondent, meaning that they ‘don’t provide the service they did’.31 
 
4. Merging of factual and opinion reporting. The boundary between ‘news’ and 
‘opinion’ in newspapers has all but disappeared, and this is confusing for 
readers. Editorial positions often leak into ‘news’ reporting: for example, 
reporting immigration decisions critically, quoting MPs with particularly 
strong views on one side of the debate and representatives of think tanks from 
only one side of the debate. 
  
                                                   
28 X, Y, and Z & Anor v A Local Authority [2011]EWHC 1157 (Fam) [102] 
29 Carl Gardner, ‘A cautionary lesson: the Vicky Haigh and Liz Watson judgments’ (Head of Legal, 6 
September 2011) <http://www.headoflegal.com/2011/09/06/a-cautionary-lesson-the-vicky-haigh-
and-liz-watson-judgments/> accessed May 2012 
30 Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Watson [2011] EWHC 2376 (Fam) (01 September 2011) 
31 ‘The geek shall inherit’ Legal Week (20 October 2010) 
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5. Wilful/reckless misrepresentation: Some newspapers have mounted 
campaigns against the Human Rights Act, which is their right, but those 
campaigns are sometimes bolstered by unbalanced reporting in ‘news’ articles 
as well as opinion pieces and editorials. The merging of factual reporting with 
opinion is particularly damaging when reporting the law. Complex rulings are 
difficult enough to summarise when just sticking to the facts. Adding another 
slant to the multiplicity of opinions which are already sewn into the fabric of a 
legal judgment is dangerous and unnecessary. 
 
The final factor mentioned above, wilful/reckless misrepresentation, is the most 
insidious. It is also the area where social media can and do help create balance 
through a free market for ideas. UKHRB regularly criticises articles about law in the 
mainstream media, as well as ‘naming and shaming’ journalists, and enough 
journalists read the blog (many subscribe by email or Twitter) for this to have some 
impact. For example, the Daily Telegraph’s Christopher Booker responded 
directly to my post asking whether journalists need to attend court to report on trials: 
 
I was again attacked last week by a prominent legal blogger, for reporting on cases 
where the system appears to be going tragically wrong, without having sat for days in 
court to hear ‘both sides of the story’.32 
 
Recommendations 
I would counsel against the idea that in future only accredited journalists should be 
provided with access to certain places or information privileges (as proposed by Paul 
Dacre in his evidence to the Leveson Inquiry33). Although I understand the rationale: 
providing an incentive to journalists not to lose their press card by way of a 
disciplinary sanction; this could have a significant detrimental effect on the work of 
non-professional ‘citizen’ journalists. 
It is also hard to see the justification for rewarding journalists with additional 
privileges whilst punishing bloggers etc. by removing privileges given that it is the 
poor ethical conduct of professional journalists that has led to the need for an inquiry 
into the ethics of the press. The legal blogs mentioned above help to correct bad legal 
journalism but also improve public understanding of the law. The sheer number, 
range and quality of legal blogs is in my opinion an excellent example of the public 
utility which blogging and citizen journalists can provide. 
Of course, there are bad blogs too. But any proposed system of regulation 
which could effect all blogs must be considered very carefully indeed as it risks 
                                                   
32 Christopher Booker, ‘Vicky Haigh saves her baby from the clutches of the social workers’ 
(Telegraph.co.uk 21 May 2011) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/christopherbooker/8528171/Vicky-Haigh-saves-
her-baby-from-the-clutches-of-the-social-workers.html> accessed May 2012 
33 Paul Dacre, Oral Evidence to the Leveson Inquiry, 6 February 2012 
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having a significant chilling effect on the excellent work that many bloggers currently 
do. 
 
 
© Adam Wagner  
 
Adam Wagner is a barrister based at One Crown Office Row, specialising in public 
law, public inquiries, human rights and medical law.  He is ranked as a ‘leading 
junior’ in the Legal 500 and is the founding editor of the UK Human Rights Blog. 
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COURT IN THE NET 
 
 William Perrin draws on his own experiences to set out a new 
charter for courts transparency, arguing that the current approach 
ensnares open justice 
 
Across the UK are hundreds of simple local websites that report community news 
and events.  Crime and anti-social behaviour are the most challenging topics they 
have to tackle.  In London’s Kings Cross, where I run a website1, the crime issues 
have been acute from anti-social behaviour to murder and large-scale organised 
crime.  Most local sites do not want to add to local fear of crime by just reporting 
incidents; we want to publish results and support our local criminal justice 
professionals in the police, crown prosecution service, courts and prisons.  Finding 
out what is going on in local courts would be very useful. 
I want to keep my community informed about what happens at our local 
magistrates’ court where justice is dispensed on our behalf.  But as a local website I 
cannot secure a simple list of upcoming events nor a list of results to publish for all to 
see.  I would like daily court results and timetables posted to a courts website, 
preferably with an RSS feed.  After all, you can go to the court and watch from the 
gallery or see the screens.  I have tried getting basic information from my local 
magistrates’ court but have been defeated. I sought basic material, such as a list of 
cases and results (i.e. which local people are up in court and who is innocent and 
guilty) – the type of information that gives people confidence that the system is 
working. 
Journalists complained to me that even though they have a privileged 
position, their job was not much easier and getting worse.  They said that court 
officers seemed confused or ignorant the complex and overlapping protocols of ‘data 
protection’ and ‘copyright’. As the resources and reach of the local press declines, the 
courts and the government should make it easier to get basic justice information to 
the public, not harder. 
In 1911, a paper based system where you queued up in person for a chitty with 
little certainty of success may have been fine; in 2012 it’s wrong; I can’t understand 
why basic information about our courts isn’t available online.  The courts are awash 
with procedural paper, presumably generated electronically at some point. It’s very 
simple to publish to the web these days: all you need is access to email to send a 
Word document or spreadsheet to the publishing services Scribd or Posterous2. 
                                                   
1 ‘King’s Cross Environment’ <http://kingscrossenvironment.com/> accessed April 2012  
2 At: <http://www.scribd.com> and <http://posterous.com/> 
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Nonetheless, we ought to expect better of a modern transparent system, costing 
hundreds of million pounds. 
The government appointed me to its Crime and Justice Sector Transparency 
Panel.  With the government’s drive to transparency and open data I tried to get to 
the bottom of the problem of obtaining electronically routine information about local 
courts.  I brokered a meeting between a specialist court reporting and news agency, 
Central News, and Ministry of Justice (MOJ) officials. The court reporters set out a 
fairly dysfunctional experience as they sought to get basic, consistent, common sense 
information from Court officials. MOJ staff were very helpful and undertook to 
address problems but it struck me that, given the other pressures following the riots 
in summer 2011, MOJ has an insurmountable managerial task to re-educate court 
staff in the minutiae of information management. 
To my mind the issues are more behavioural. Court staff want courts to be 
open but they have got into some bad habits and arcane procedures. Much could be 
done with proper leadership signals and setting out the fundamental elements in 
plain English. So I offered to write down a simple charter for transparency in the 
courts, of the sort that the Secretary of State and the Senior Presiding Judge could 
publish as co-signatories and might fit on one side of paper. 
With apologies for my lack of precise legal terminology here is a draft, for the 
way in which the Senior Presiding Judge and Secretary of State for Justice should set 
out the following basic principles of openness and transparency for courts of all 
types. This could also apply to tribunals and coroners’ courts with minor adaptation. 
 
Draft Courts Transparency Charter  
Courts are open to the public and the media, with only narrow exceptions. This is at 
the heart of delivery of justice in a modern democracy and a proud national tradition. 
The government, the judiciary and people who work in courts want courts to be open 
transparent and comprehensible to the public and the press. But the courts over 
hundreds of years have evolved into a complex system that is hard for outsiders to 
understand. 
In the interests of transparency and confidence in the justice system, people 
should be able to find out easily, on the internet: 
 
• what cases are expected to come up in a court from the time that they are 
scheduled 
• name, address and specific charges in all cases available from the time the 
case is scheduled (see ‘criminal cases’, below) 
• the full names, including first names, of judges, prosecution and defence 
lawyers, witnesses, and other professionals who speak during proceedings 
(e.g. magistrates’ clerks giving legal advice) from when they are known 
 William Perrin 91 
• judgments handed down from the end of the working day on which the 
case is concluded 
• next stage of the case 
 
The longstanding openness of courts must not be compromised by data protection or 
copyright. In particular, well meaning but misplaced concerns about the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and copyright must not stop the recording and transmission of 
information presented in open court. 
All the above is subject to contempt of court and protection of vulnerable 
defendants and witnesses – exceptions to immediate transparency that are 
fundamental to the efficient effective functioning of the justice system. Case 
information should be flagged where restrictions apply and those restrictions set out 
in writing. 
People who use information illegally or irresponsibly against the interests of 
efficient, effective justice or in such as way as to compromise the vulnerable may 
have their access to information withdrawn. 
It should be assumed that all information is available to the press and the 
public, apart from the general exceptions above. 
The best courts already meet these principles; we would like all courts to do 
so. 
 
Criminal cases 
In criminal cases, the following basic information should be readily available: 
 
• The full spelling of a defendant’s name. 
• Their date of birth and full home address, including door number and 
postcode. 
• The charges against them (including an opportunity to read them). 
• Written copies of any reporting restrictions applicable in the case. 
 
Charges should be set out in the form used in Magistrates court – ‘On 23/07/2011 at 
Oxford Street, London, assaulted Joe Bloggs contrary to section 39 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988’ 
 
Moving forward 
Since I first published this Charter online in November 20113, I have discussed many 
of the issues with experts. There are numerous issues that bear upon simple 
transparency, each of which requires teasing out: 
                                                   
3 ‘Would a “Transparency Charter” help make the Courts more open?’ 
<http://talkaboutlocal.org.uk/would-a-transparency-charter-help-make-the-courts-more-open/>  
accessed April 2012 
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• Contempt of court or information that might prejudice a trial leading to 
reporting restrictions. 
• Protection of vulnerable people such as children, some victims and witnesses. 
• Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 – this gives people a basic right to be 
forgotten as their convictions become ‘spent’. This can be important for 
rehabilitation and manifests as a removal of the need to declare a crime in 
some circumstances and ultimately a removal of the record. 
• Data protection and privacy; significantly, the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO) says that in respect of courts data this will be applied in the 
context of the ROA 1974, which implies a societal resistance to an indelible 
record.  Very detailed personal information tends to be read out in court such 
as full name, address and date of birth. 
• Copyright; judges, barristers etc. own the copyright to their judgements and 
argument with no practice in place to waive that, nor grant licences for reuse. 
• The lack of a legal underpinning for the traditions of open justice. 
• IT systems; it is very simple and very cheap today to publish basic documents 
to the web of the sort produced in courts.  But we need to understand what is 
held in MOJ data systems.  A simple start would be to experiment with a court 
that has a presiding judge or magistrate and chief clerk that want their court 
to be as open as possible. 
 
We have not as yet seen an attempt to work through this stack of issues.  I am 
concerned that tackling these issues one at a time will entail bureaucratic inertia, 
which risks steadily undermining the tradition and practice of open justice.  Open 
justice is sufficiently valuable in society such that we need rapid, decisive action to 
reaffirm our national commitment and re-establish open justice for the modern 
internet age.  
Given that we have had open justice for centuries, there is a good case for 
putting the burden of proof of harm upon people who might seek to constrain open 
justice.  This requires decisive action by leading judges, the Lord Chief Justice and 
the Senior Presiding Judge, and the Secretary of State of Home Secretary along the 
lines of the draft charter. 
 
 
© William Perrin  
 
William Perrin is a community activist in King’s Cross London, founder of the Talk 
About Local online community enterprise and member of the government’s Crime 
and Justice Sector Panel on Transparency. 
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TWITT(ER)ING OPEN JUSTICE? 
 
Taking a comparative perspective, Professor Ian Cram examines 
threats to fair trials in 140 characters – and identifies a common 
problem 
 
This paper takes as its focus some current threats posed to the administration of 
justice in both the United Kingdom and the United States. Both jurisdictions are 
experiencing similar problems which concern the flow of electronically-held 
information into and out of the jury room. It will be seen that the strong protection 
afforded to such speech under the First Amendment means that even where it is 
highly prejudicial, no action can be taken against media organisations or providers of 
electronic social media. Instead, emphasis is placed on insulating jury members from 
material that is not part of the criminal trial proceedings. By contrast, jury members 
who undertake private research into aspects of the trial are not in the same position 
as media organisations and risk being found in contempt in much the same way as 
jurors in England and Wales.  
The questions which this brief paper sets out to explore are as follows:  i) what 
sorts of threat does technology and the electronically-equipped juror pose to the 
fairness of criminal jury trials and ii) what possible responses might the criminal trial 
system make to counter any adverse impact on trial fairness/integrity.  To start with 
however, the constitutional context in which recent developments in the United 
States have occurred is set out. 
 
US First Amendment 
Congress shall make no law... abridging... freedom of speech or of the press... 
Most of us are familiar with this famous constitutional command. For present 
purposes, it is the application of the First Amendment to the reporting of court 
proceedings and, more broadly, to speech about matters pending before the courts 
that is of relevance. The underlying rationale for broad protection in the case of 
speech about courts and legal proceedings is to be found in the ideal of republican 
self-government. As Brennan J observed in the context of a successful challenge to an 
order closing a criminal trial to media and members of the public alike:   
 
[T]he First Amendment  ...has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our 
republican system of self-government. Implicit in this structural role is ... (the) 
assumption that valuable public debate – as well as other civic behavior – must be 
informed.1 
 
                                                   
1 Brennan J in Richmond Newspapers v Virginia 448 US 555, 587 (1980) 
94 Justice Wide Open  
 
Courts are entrusted with the exercise public power in the process of trying 
defendants in criminal cases and it follows that the public or community on whose 
behalf this power is exercised has an interest in learning about court proceedings. 
Knowledge of court proceedings and surrounding issues is vital therefore to the 
informed participation by citizens in public affairs.  That is not to say that 
restrictions on court-related speech could never be justified, it is rather that there is 
an extremely heavy constitutional burden on the state to show why the media should 
be prevented from commentating on pending/actual proceedings. This burden is 
expressed in the ‘clear and present danger’ standard. Essentially, this requires the 
state to show that the speech in question poses a clear and present danger of 
immediate and substantial harm (to say the administration of justice or a defendant’s 
fair trial rights) and that the restriction imposed on speech advances the 
governmental interest by minimally impairing the exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms. In effect, the standard means that sub judice contempt rules are wholly 
unconstitutional. In the case of prior restraints (or gag orders), these become 
extremely  hard to obtain, though not impossible.  
As the American Bar Association puts it in ABA Standard 8-3.1:2 
 
Absent a clear and present danger to the fairness of a trial or other compelling 
interest, no rule of court or judicial order should be promulgated that prohibits 
representatives of the news media from broadcasting or publishing any information 
in their possession relating to a criminal case.  
 
Even in cases where the publicity does cause a trial to be delayed and transferred to a 
different venue, the ABA guidance goes on to state that:  
  
No legal penalty or obligation may be imposed on reporters to avoid publicity about a 
case. No legal penalty may be imposed for even the most intense, exaggerated, biased 
or ‘hyped’ coverage of any criminal case (except the remedies provided by successful 
libel suits). 
 
Safeguarding criminal trials – the First Amendment way 
The obvious question to arise from the presumptive unconstitutionality of restraints 
on prejudicial pre-trial and during trial publicity is how does the US system uphold 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Consider the murder trial of OJ 
Simpson. Apart from the saturation television and news media coverage during the 
trial itself, which many considered to be hostile to the defence (it turned a serious 
criminal trial into an entertainment in which the lawyers and witnesses were 
competing for the ten second soundbite to kick off TV networks’ evening news 
programmes), there was also the prejudicial material aired by media organisations. 
                                                   
2 2006, 3rd edn and ‘The Reporter’s Key - Access to the Judicial Process’ 
<http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wpcontent/files_flutter/1273614736_20_1_1_7_Upload_File.p
df> accessed May 2012 
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This material was broadcast after Simpson was formally brought before the court for 
the first time to be told the charges he would be facing and famously included audio 
recordings of the 911 calls made by the victim on two previous occasions, including 
the time when Simpson broke a door to gain forcible entry. Nicole Brown Simpson is 
clearly heard to tell the emergency switchboard in a sobbing voice, ‘He’s back’, ‘I 
think you know his record’, ‘He is crazy’; at the time of these broadcasts, the 
admissibility of the 911 calls had yet to be determined.  
Accepting the serious potential for such material to cause prejudice to the 
fairness of particular trials, the criminal trial process in the US lays emphasis upon 
the range of curative measures that can deployed to safeguard Sixth Amendment fair 
trial rights. These include the voir dire, changing the venue or start date of trials or, 
in extreme cases, such as Simpson’s, sequestering the jury.  
 
An electronic threat to fair trials  
The OJ Simpson case brought together a combination of elements (celebrity black 
defendant and role model in an ethnic community; violent crime against his white 
wife, a racist police officer, flamboyant lawyers happy to play to the cameras) 
elements that do not usually present themselves in the one criminal case before a 
jury of twelve men and women. 
In 2012, a pressing threat to the fairness of jury trials would seem to come 
from within the trial process itself – namely the juror. Compared to previous 
generations, jurors today are much more likely to be electronically equipped and 
adept at tweeting, blogging, sending and receiving instant messages and Facebook 
updates. The modern juror is also accustomed to acquiring knowledge about events 
and individuals via Wikipedia and Google. 
In the celebrated 1957 film directed by Sidney Lumet, Twelve Angry Men 
Juror No 8 (whose character is played by Henry Fonda) is the one juror in a murder 
trial who initially stands alone in expressing doubt about the defendant’s guilt. At 
one point in the deliberations, he produces a knife that is identical to weapon said by 
the prosecution to have killed the victim. This action is central to the undermining of 
the prosecution’s case and helps persuade the other jurors to doubt their original 
conclusions of guilt. For present purposes, what is of interest here is that Juror No 8  
has done his own research and brought the product of this research into the jury 
room – something that is wholly contrary to the adversarial nature of criminal trials. 
The prosecution has no chance to rebut the pro-defendant inference which is 
suggested by the juror’s private inquiries.  
Today, the twittering/electronic juror might be thought to pose a different 
kind of threat to that created by Juror No 8 in Twelve Angry Men. At one level 
though the same challenge is posed to the criminal jury trial in which extraneous 
material (i.e. material not admitted in evidence to the court, and thus not tested 
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through the adversarial clash between prosecution and defence) finds its way into the 
jury room.   
As is well known, Twitter offers a micro-blogging text service – each time in 
140 characters whereby users of the service can post tweets for others to read and 
respond directly to. Internet links can also be posted and accessed. It is a powerful 
way of discovering what is happening just now and also participating in discussion of 
those events.  
 
Problematic information flows in the electronic era 
We can think of electronic media as posing two distinct sorts of challenge to criminal 
court proceedings. In the first type of challenge, untested information/material flows 
into the jury room, for example when a juror does private internet research away 
from the courtroom and later discloses the results to fellow jurors during their 
deliberations. Secondly, there may a problematic flow of information/opinion away 
from the jury room. This could arise via tweet updates on jury room experiences – 
including deliberations or simply ‘blogging’ about the experience of jury service.   
 
Why might disclosure of a juror’s private research to fellow jurors be troublesome?  
Two main reasons can be advanced here; first as was seen above, it introduces 
untested and possibly prejudicial material into deliberations. This undermines rules 
of evidence as there is no opportunity for prosecution/defence to challenge the 
products of private research. It is also costly where, as a result of the outside 
interference, a retrial is ordered. Not only is there a financial cost in a retrial, there is 
also a risk of additional trauma for victims and witnesses caught up in the 
proceedings when they have to return to court at a later date.  
 
What threats are posed when information/opinion leaves the jury room? 
The obvious concern here is that the finality of jury verdicts will be undermined, a 
feature of English criminal trials that is underpinned by s.8 of the Contempt of Court 
Act 1981.3  Separately, it may be thought that juror to juror exchanges would be 
inhibited and therefore quality of jury deliberations adversely affected.  
 
What is happening in practice?  
It is becoming clearer that for a new generation of jurors, the temptation to go online 
during trial proceedings is difficult to resist.  Research by Cheryl Thomas for the 
Ministry of Justice in 2010 disclosed that between 5% and 12% of 668 jurors 
admitted to researching case details on the internet.4 
                                                   
3 See AG v Scotcher [2005] UKHL 36 on the limited scope of disclosure  available to jurors who have 
concerns about the safety of criminal convictions.  
4 <http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/are-juries-fair-research.pdf> 
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In January 2012, juror and university lecturer Theadora Dallas was jailed for 
breaching the trial judge’s direction not to search internet for trial related materials. 
She had told fellow jurors what she had found about defendant (including a previous 
rape allegation). Her actions caused the trial to be halted.5 
Seven months previously in separate proceedings, another juror Joanna Fraill 
discussed the progress of jury deliberations on Facebook with a defendant who had 
been earlier been acquitted in the same proceedings and whose co-defendant (and 
boyfriend) was waiting to learn his fate. Fraill admitted revealing details of jury 
deliberations and also doing a Google search on the co-defendant. She was jailed in 
June 2011 for 8 months.6   
For some devoted (and possibly addicted) users of social media, the prospect 
of a lengthy spell of jury service is less than welcome. In Oct 2009 one person 
summoned for jury service tweeted ‘Wow. Jury Duty. First Time ever. Can I be 
excused because I can’t be offline for that amount of time?’. 
In the next section, technology-induced mistrials and near mistrials in the 
United States are briefly discussed. These may point up some difficulties that may lie 
ahead in our own courts. This is followed by discussion of a range of official 
responses that have been employed to combat threats to the integrity and fairness of 
jury trials  
 
The US Experience 
A snapshot of the first six months of 2009 reveals a flavour of technology-induced 
mistrials or near mistrials.  
 
1. March 2009: collapse of a federal drugs trial in Florida after 8 out of 12 jurors 
admitted private online research into defendants’ names and definitions of 
medical terminology. The trial was in its seventh week when the judge halted 
the trial. 7  
2. July 2009: political corruption trial against a former state senator – juror 
tweeted during trial and made posts to his Facebook page – defence motion 
for a mistrial rejected on the basis that the juror had not read any of the tweets 
posted to him in response of his original tweet. There had been no flow of 
information into the jury’s deliberations and therefore no prejudice had been 
caused to the trial.8 
                                                   
5 O Bowcott, ‘Juror jailed over online research’ The Guardian (London 23 January 2012) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jan/23/juror-contempt-court-online-research> 
6 J Deans, ‘Facebook juror jailed for eight months’ The Guardian (London 16 June 2012) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jun/16/facebook-juror-jailed-for-eight-months> 
7 D Funcheon, ‘Jurors Gone Wild: the Feds Slink Away from a Flubbed Internet Pharmacy Case’  
Miami New Times (Miami, 23 April 2009) <http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2009-04-
23/news/jurors-and-prosecutors-sink-a-federal-case-against-internet-pharmacies/>  
8 J Schwarz, ‘As Jurors turn to Web, Mistrials are Popping Up’ New York Times (New York 18 March 
2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html> 
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Why do jurors engage in private research? 
An informed policy response to jurors’ use of social media and electronically 
available materials ought to be based upon the reasons why jurors engage in such 
practices.   Several such reasons suggest themselves viz: 
 
1. A curiosity to gain background information on key participants in trials. 
2. A belief that justice will be better served if more not less ‘information’ is 
before the jury. 
3. Cultural reasons; the younger (and not so young!) juror is accustomed to 
finding information online and has the technological means (Iphones, 
Blackberry etc.) and expertise to reach online material. More generally 
perhaps a dependence on instant communication to friends/access to 
information. 
 
Possible responses 
One fairly drastic solution might be to ban iPhones, Blackberries etc. from the 
courtroom. An obvious difficulty here is that such a move doesn’t stop out of court 
communications/information flow. An alternative approach may be for the trial 
judge to make explicit both the type of technology that jurors are prohibited from 
using and importantly the reasons why these technologies are being restricted. An 
example might be, ‘Google Earth may not be used to check location details in the 
present case’ or, ‘Twitter updates on progress of trial to followers are strictly 
prohibited’. Jurors would then be told that unless they are each able to abide by the 
instruction, then it may become necessary to sequester jurors until a verdict is 
delivered. This type of instruction has been used in US courts.9  
  One possible downside to this approach is that a technology-specific rule is 
likely to be under-inclusive as technology progresses, so any rules will need regular 
updating. One US juror is thus reported to have blogged as follows:  ‘Hey guys! I 
know that jurors aren’t supposed to talk about their trial, but nobody said that they 
couldn’t live blog it, right? Am I right or am I right?!?!’ 
By contrast, more generalised instructions for example ‘do not use the internet to 
research the case’ ‘do not talk about the trial to others’ may cause confusion among 
jurors about what precisely is covered. 
Perhaps more need to be done by way of educating jurors about the reasons 
why the use of electronic devices is prohibited and spelling out clearly which devices 
are prohibited and when the prohibition ceases. Judges may also want to spell out 
clearly the serious consequences of breaching any instruction and remind jurors of 
the Fraill and Dallas cases, both of which resulted in custodial sentences. Other 
avenues worth considering include offering encouragement to fellow jurors to inform 
                                                   
9 D Shelton, ‘No Googling—No Texting’ Jury Instruction Video, National Center for State  Courts 
<http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Jury/Jury-Selection-Trial-and-Deliberations/Resource-Guide.aspx> 
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promptly on jurors who fail to adhere to the instruction prohibition; requiring jurors 
to make a declaration of non-use of specified devices at the start and conclusion of 
trial. 
At a deeper level however, some instances of juror misconduct may reflect an 
inappropriately casual attitude towards the important and solemn function of 
determining the guilt or innocence of fellow citizens. Yet at other times, it might be 
argued that the inquisitive juror who engages in private research to further their 
understanding of the case and its background is an entirely different individual to the 
casual juror – one who takes his/her civic responsibilities entirely seriously and 
wants to deliver the right verdict. This person is avid for more information and is not 
content for the legal experts to have the stage solely to themselves.   To meet the 
concerns of this type of juror, thought may need to be given to the idea of moving 
away from wholly adversarial trials thereby allowing jurors a more active role within 
proceedings than they currently enjoy. This would perhaps offer a means of 
satisfying the curious (and conscientious) juror who has his/her own questions about 
the events at issue in the trial and remove a principal reason for online activity. One 
problem with this approach is that jurors may well want to ask of the judge is: ‘Does 
the defendant have previous convictions?’ and they may not be receptive to the 
judge’s response as to why that information cannot be given. There is however 
research in the United States which suggests that some judges (in trials in New York 
and Pennsylvania) view as a positive experience the practice of allowing jurors to 
submit written questions during the course of the trial.10 Perhaps this is something 
that the English and Welsh criminal court system should be open to exploring. 
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10 C Morrison, ‘Jurors behaving badly’ (2011) 62  Hast LJ 1597;  J Turgeon & E A. Francis, ‘Improving 
Pennsylvania's Justice System Through Jury System Innovations’ (2009) 18 Widener L.J. 419, 449  
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JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
OPEN JUSTICE AND SECURITY 
 
Dr Lawrence McNamara examines how the judiciary contributes to 
legal reform through ‘extra-judicial’ statements 
 
This paper1 examines how the judiciary are present in and contribute to law reform 
processes through ‘extra-judicial’ statements (i.e., statements made other than in 
judgments). It focuses on recent debates about open justice, especially in matters of 
terrorism and security. It aims to explain why judicial contributions are largely 
absent from these law reform debates, to critically consider the implications of that 
absence for contemporary debates surrounding proposed reforms to the 
management of evidence in civil proceedings, and to suggest some avenues for the 
expression of further, legitimate extra-judicial statements.  
A brief explanation of the government’s proposals to introduce ‘Closed 
Material Proceedings’ (CMPs) into civil proceedings generally will be helpful. The 
proposals arose from a small number of civil cases involving Guantanamo detainees 
which the government claimed it could not adequately defend without disclosing 
sensitive information that would risk damage to national security.  The government 
sought to use CMPs but the Supreme Court held in Al Rawi that the common law did 
not allow for CMP in civil actions and that legislation would be required if the 
government wanted that path to be available.2  
The government published the Justice and Security Green Paper on the issue 
in October 2011, proposing the use of CMPs in civil proceedings generally and 
seeking responses by 6 January 2012 as part of the consultation.3 Of 90 responses 
received, 84 have been published.  They are from a wide range of government 
agencies, lawyers (including special advocates who currently work within CMP 
systems), policing agencies, NGOs and others.4 There is no response from the 
judiciary in England & Wales.  
 
                                                   
1 The author runs the Law, Terrorism and the Right to Know research project at the University of 
Reading.  The project is funded under the RCUK ‘Global Uncertainties’ research priority.  Contact: 
www.reading.ac.uk/LTRK and  l.mcnamara@reading.ac.uk.  My thanks to Sam McIntosh for 
comments on this paper. 
2 Al Rawi & Ors v The Security Service & Ors [2011] UKSC 34 
3 Justice and Security (Green Paper, Cm 8194, 2011) 
4 The remaining six responses have not been published because, the Cabinet Office indicates, the 
authors have not yet consented to publication.  However, the Cabinet Office has published a summary 
of those six identified the authors as ‘4 individual members of the public and 2 are private companies’: 
Cabinet Office, ‘Reponses to the Consultation’: 
<http://consultation.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/justiceandsecurity/responses-to-the-consultation> (Last 
accessed: 18 March 2012) 
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Judicial views: from judgments to ‘judicial engagement’ 
In judgments, judicial views are often expressed strongly.  The Al Rawi decision 
contains clear views on security, fair trials and open justice.  For instance, Lord 
Brown, stated that the general adoption of closed procedures would damage ‘the 
integrity of the judicial process and the reputation of English justice.’5 Lord Dyson 
said that open justice is a fundamental feature of common law trials and of British 
justice.6 Lord Kerr saw closed procedures as problematic because they prevented 
evidence being adequately challenged: ‘To be truly valuable, evidence must be 
capable of withstanding challenge. I go further. Evidence which has been insulated 
from challenge may positively mislead.’7    In extra-judicial statements, judges will 
usually be more circumspect.  
 
The traditional views and their development 
The position has changed over time. Under the ‘Kilmuir rules’ of 1955 judges 
remained silent on ‘the controversies of the day’ to ensure that the ‘reputation for 
wisdom and impartiality remain[ed] unassailable.’8 The ‘Mackay Rules’ in 1987 
removed the general view that judges should stay silent and, in view of the principle 
of judicial independence, said it was up to each judge to decide for themselves 
whether and how they wished to take part in public debate.9  The most recent high 
watermark is found in March 2012 when the principles under which judges may 
speak extra-judicially were discussed by one of the most senior judges, the Master of 
the Rolls, Lord Neuberger.10  His analysis warrants some attention as it sets out some 
proposed principles which may shape judicial contributions to public debate for 
some years to come.   
Lord Neuberger argues that judges have not been completely restricted from 
entering into contemporary debates.  Even under the Kilmuir rules, he argues the 
senior judiciary could ‘comment on matters which affect[ed] the proper 
administration of justice; that is to say on matters which impinge on the judicial 
branch of the State; on the court’s ability to fulfil … its constitutional function of 
doing justice.’11   
                                                   
5 Al Rawi & Ors v The Security Service & Ors [2011] UKSC 34, [83] 
6 Ibid, [10]-[11] 
7 Ibid, [93] 
8 AW Barnett, ‘Judges and the media – the Kilmuir rules’ [1986] Public Law 383. This short piece 
made public for the first time and published in full a letter from the Lord Chancellor to the Director-
General of the BBC which contains what is thought of as the Kilmuir rules. In a brief introduction 
Barnett observes (383), ‘the essence of that letter has no doubt since been refined by later Lord 
Chancellors and their advisers into a statement that may be brought to the attention of judges when 
necessary.’ However, the substance of the rules would appear to have remained constant.   
9 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Master of the Rolls, ‘Where Angels Fear To Tread: Holdsworth Club 
2012 Presidential Address’ 2 March 2012 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/mr-speech-holdsworth-lecture-
2012.pdf> (Last accessed: 18 March 2012) (‘Neuberger, “Where Angels Fear to Tread”‘) 
10 Ibid, [18] 
11 Ibid, [17], references omitted 
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Independence ‘can be compromised through the judiciary being drawn into 
discussions with the executive and legislature, which, for instance, call on the 
judiciary to offer legal advice, to comment on the lawfulness or constitutionality of 
policy or proposed legislation.’12  In the legislative context the main intersection has 
occurred where the judiciary have given evidence to Parliamentary committees.13 
But, as Lord Neuberger explains, the lines are clearly understood by all concerned: 
‘Judges cannot, for instance, comment on individual cases. They cannot comment on 
political matters or matters of public policy, but can rather comment on the practical 
consequences of certain policy choices. Most pertinently they cannot offer such 
committees legal advice, just as they cannot provide the executive with legal advice.’14  
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 has brought about a more complete 
separation of powers, especially through the judiciary’s departure from the House of 
Lords. Lord Neuberger points out that it ‘reduced the avenues by which the Judiciary 
could enter into public debate, so the remaining avenues are almost inevitably likely 
to be more travelled.’15 However, it does not necessarily lessen the imperative for – or 
practice of – judicial caution.  
 
Lord Neuberger’s principles 
Against that background Lord Neuberger makes his own contribution to the 
framework within which judicial engagement should occur.  
The foundations of the principles lie in ‘mutual respect’, especially between 
the judiciary and the executive.  It is ‘quite inappropriate’ for politicians to criticise 
judges or their decisions.16 If they ‘slang each other off in public’ it undermines the 
constitution, democracy and the rule of law.17 Mutual respect means ministers and 
judges ‘must respect the other’s turf and not trespass on it.’18 It means judges ‘should 
not answer back’; it is ‘unseemly and more undermining’ to do so.19 However, it does 
not mean that judges should not speak at all. On the contrary, Lord Neuberger says 
extra-judicial comments have ‘more benefits than drawbacks.’20 
This is fundamentally right. The individual and collective experience of the 
judiciary, and their established constitutional role, means they should contribute to 
public debate about substance and processes of justice. The challenge is how they 
should do so without compromising the constitutional roles of any branch of the 
state. 
                                                   
12 Ibid, [25] 
13 For example, the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Queen’s Bench Division both gave 
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution: Sixth Report of session 2006-
07, Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament (HL 151, 11 July 2007) 
14 Neuberger, n 9, [29] 
15 Ibid, [34] 
16 Ibid, [36] 
17 Ibid, [37] 
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid, [36] 
20 Ibid, [54] 
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Lord Neuberger attempts to shape the engagement rules by formulating seven 
principles.21 I will, with respect, re-formulate these into two principles that might be 
more easily applied. The first is freedom. It is concerned with scope and limits of 
when a judge should be able to speak. The second is caution. It is concerned with 
whether a judge who is legitimately able to speak should choose to do so. In this 
framework the principles are: 
 
1. Judicial freedom: Subject to the caveat that they should not seek publicity for 
its own sake or for causes, judges should be free to comment extra-judicially 
on ‘a wide range of issues’. These include, but are not limited to, ‘areas such as 
constitutional principles, the role and independence of the judiciary, the 
functioning of the legal system, and access to justice, and even important 
issues of law.’ (These are Neuberger principles six and one.)   
 
2. Judicial caution: Even if free to comment then, before deciding whether to do 
so, a judge should carefully consider the potential effects any comment may 
have on: 
 
(a) the separation of powers. The judge should pay careful consideration to the 
importance of judicial independence from both the legislature and the 
executive. (Neuberger principles two and four.)  This is especially 
important where the proposed comment will address ‘politically 
controversial issues, or matters of public policy’. The judge should consider 
the potential affects in light of both the substance of the proposed 
comment and the terms in which it will be made.  A judge should not 
trespass on the territory of the other branches of the state, and reticence 
may be preferable at the territorial borders. (Neuberger principle four.) 
 
(b) the individual judicial independence of the judge. Very importantly, a 
judge must consider whether the specific issue may later arise for 
determination in court.  If it may then the judge should make it very clear 
that ‘the judicial mind is not closed.’ A judge should also consider the 
audience and the impact a comment may have. In particular, she or he 
should consider whether, if disseminated widely (including via the media), 
it might call into question ‘their ability to carry out their fundamental role 
of doing justice according to law.’  (Neuberger principles two and five.)  
 
(c) the institutional independence of the judiciary generally. A judge should 
take account of the reputation and standing of the judiciary in all the 
circumstances at the time. Those circumstances include considering the 
                                                   
21 Ibid, [46]-[53]. 
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frequency, nature and content of comments he or she has made previously, 
and which other judges have made. A judge should also include 
consideration of the most appropriate way to express differences of 
opinion with other judges. A judge should note particularly that the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 makes the Lord Chief Justice the head of 
the judiciary in England and Wales, and only in exceptional circumstances 
would be it be appropriate to comment if the view was ‘on a policy or 
constitutional issue which is inconsistent with [the LCJ’s] position.’22 
(Neuberger principles three and seven.)   
 
Lord Neuberger’s principles put judicial engagement on firmer ground and a more 
explicit constitutional footing than in the past.  
Judges will still inevitably be cautious of any public engagement with 
audiences outside the legal profession.  Most will remain silent or traditionally 
cautious in discussion of any contentious issues, and rightly so.  At the very senior 
end of the spectrum, though, while they will choose their battles carefully, Lord 
Neuberger may have laid the ground for some interesting and well-chosen comments 
in the next couple of years.   
What, then, might this mean for judicial contributions to debates where 
terrorism and security are concerned? 
 
Judicial views on security, terrorism and the Green Paper 
Judicial comments on terrorism laws are rare but not unheard of.  Sir Adrian Fulford 
published a piece after presiding over the trial of men accused of the failed ‘21/7’ 
bombings in London.23 Judges in other jurisdictions have also published work in the 
area.24 These have been reflective comments. When looking forward, however, the 
type of forthright views expressed by the Supreme Court in Al Rawi would be less 
likely to be advanced in extra-judicial comments.  Terrorism and security matters are 
regularly the subject of legislative activity and are almost certain to come before the 
court in a wide and perhaps not always predictable range of circumstances.  In Lord 
Neuberger’s terminology, they fall squarely into the category of matters which may 
come before the court, and which are of considerable political controversy.   
However, extra-judicial comments are not precluded.  Lord Neuberger himself 
spoke in 2011 about closed proceedings, open justice and security concerns. He 
described closed proceedings as ‘a clear derogation from the principle of open 
                                                   
22 Ibid, [49]. The Master of the Rolls is ambiguous here.  It is not clear whether the phrase 
‘inconsistent with his position’ means inconsistent with the LCJ’s position on a policy or constitutional 
issue, or inconsistent with the LCJ’s position as head of the judiciary.  I have presumed it means the 
former. 
23 Sir Adrian Fulford, ‘Terrorism trials in the new century: How have things changed since the IRA 
trials? (2008) 48 Medicine Science Law 185 
24 For example, Justice A G Whealey, ‘Difficulties in Obtaining a Fair Trial in Terrorism Cases’ (2007) 
81(9) Australian Law Journal 743-759 
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justice’, but noted that the courts will sometimes be closed and Parliament can 
legislate to limit open justice:    
 
 [O]pen justice is a sacred part of our constitution and our administration of justice. 
But … in certain, narrowly defined circumstances, the general principle can, indeed 
must, be set aside.25   
 
The extra-judicial technique is to emphasise the importance of the issues without 
trespassing into the territory best occupied by other branches of the state. By 
contrast, the judgments in Al Rawi addressed more specifically what the appropriate 
balance is. 
 
The Justice and Security Green Paper 
There is little judicial contribution to the Green Paper debates, or at least little that is 
visible.  The Justice Secretary, Ken Clarke, explained in evidence to the Joint 
Committee of Human Rights’ Inquiry into the Green Paper what the judicial 
contribution has been.26 The evidence is extracted at some length below, with the 
questions, as it shows the relationship between the three arms of the state and the 
adherence to traditional principles. 
    
Q 210 Baroness Berridge: … [W]e are dealing with an unusual situation here 
where we are considering a form of judicial process. Have you had representations 
from the judiciary in relation to the proposals in the Green Paper, and if so what 
representations have been made?  
 
Mr Clarke:   I have discussed it with the … Lord Chief and the two High Court 
judges who he asked to consider this matter and discuss it with me. One thing we are 
absolutely clear about is judges do not advise Ministers on matters of policy. Judges 
will discuss the broad issues involved, will discuss their experience of these cases, will 
certainly offer points about procedure, process and how they would best like to do 
their job, but in the end separation of powers is such that the judges have to reach a 
point where they retreat and say, ‘That is a matter for Parliament, that is a matter for 
you Minister, a matter for whether Parliament is going to agree with you; I cannot 
advise you on that’. 
 
  
                                                   
25 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Master of the Rolls, ‘Open Justice Unbound?’ Judicial Studies Board 
Annual Lecture, 16 March 2011 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/mr-speech-jsb-lecture-march-
2011.pdf> (Last accessed: 18 March 2012), [44, 51-60], references omitted.  
26 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Inquiry into The Human Rights Implications of the Justice and 
Security Green Paper, Evidence of the Secretary of State for Justice, 6 March 2012   
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-
rights/JCHR_6_March_transcript_UNCORRECTED.pdf> (Last accessed: 18 March 2012)   Audio: 
15:58:57 
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Q 211 Mr Shepherd: And the Law Officer? 
 
Mr Clarke:  [We all]27 have contact with the judiciary, and certainly the Attorney 
and the Solicitor have regular contact, and I have had meetings on this subject with 
judges, but you can only take it so far. They want to know what we are contemplating, 
and I want to know what their view and process are, but we are all very clear that they 
cannot give advice on policy to the Government of the day. 
 
Q212 Baroness Berridge: I just want to follow that up. I know they can only go so 
far, but Parliament is involved in this scrutiny process now and when the legislation 
is put forward. Will Parliament have the opportunity of hearing those representations 
that the judiciary have made?  
 
Mr Clarke: We are proceeding on the basis that we will publish the responses we 
have had to the consultation-the written ones, that is-if the consultees agree, and 
most we have released. I do not think the judges have put in any written evidence, 
and I can only say that, if the Select Committee want to hear from judges, have a go at 
the Lord Chief Justice, but I am not sure he will agree to come. He would want all 
kinds of reassurances about what kinds of questions he will be asked, and no judge 
will appear here and give an opinion on our Green Paper and the merits of it. ….  You 
would not have the faintest chance of persuading them to do that. Nor do they 
express their view to me either: ‘Yes, we agree with that; no, we do not agree with 
that’.  … 
 
Q213 Baroness Berridge: Do you appreciate, though, our concern that a limited 
amount of representation has been given of the judicial view to the Executive and to 
the Lord Chancellor, which will not then be given to Parliament?  
 
Mr Clarke: I cannot compel judges to respond to a consultation process, nor can I 
compel judges to appear before Parliament. The judges are right to be highly sensitive 
to the circumstances in which they might do that, but they do sometimes come and 
appear before Select Committees. I assure you, I have not debated with any judge the 
merits or otherwise of any part of this by way of a discussion on policy. I have had 
general discussions. The judges are quite scrupulous, and they are not going to start 
getting drawn into whether or not they agree with a Minister on an item of policy. 
They will not do that even when they are talking in private to a Minister. 
 
The Justice Secretary’s answer to question 212 was slightly erroneous. There is one 
very brief written judicial response from the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, 
submitted by his legal secretary to the Cabinet Office as a Green Paper consultation 
response. It reads, in full:  
 
The Lord Chief Justice has asked me to indicate that these proposals may have 
considerable implications for the conduct of inquests in Northern Ireland, but that as 
the proposals are policy matters and may give rise in any event to the need for 
                                                   
27 The uncorrected transcript, ibid, reads: ‘The law have contact …’ but on the recording it is clearly 
audible that the phrase is ‘We all have contact …’: Parliament TV, Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
Committee Room 8, 6 March 2012, 16:00:02  
<http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Main/Player.aspx?meetingId=10435>, (Last accessed: 18 March 
2012) 
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judicial decisions the judiciary of Northern Ireland does not intend to respond 
further.28  
 
The letter embodies the reticence and arm’s length of established principles but 
provides absolutely no substantive indication of what the ‘considerable implications’ 
might be.  It seems perhaps overly cautious but, given the potential for judicial 
decisions ahead, the caution is understandable. 
Is there a problem with such a great absence of judicial input into the Green 
Paper debates?  And is there a way around it?    
 
Conclusion 
There is good reason for judicial caution in engaging in extensive extra-judicial 
debates surrounding the Green Paper. Lord Neuberger’s mutual respect foundations 
dictate this in all the circumstances. For the most part, there is not a great problem 
with the minimalism of extra-judicial contributions to the Green Paper debates. 
While Lord Neuberger is correct that, on the whole, extra-judicial contributions to 
debate have more benefits than drawbacks, that would probably not be the case here.  
These are high stakes issues. The separation of powers, the constitutional integrity of 
the arms of the state and the individual and institutional independence of the 
judiciary are not to be trifled with.  However, there are some distinct concerns and 
opportunities that arise and which could be addressed even within that framework. 
First, the principles of mutual respect which oblige judges to limit their extra-
judicial comments arguably place a concomitant obligation on the executive to treat 
with respect the judicial views that are expressed within judgments.  In the Green 
Paper, there is not a considered treatment of the scope and depth of the views in Al 
Rawi which are critical of the proposition that closed material proceedings would be 
appropriate in civil cases. As the consultation response by the Special Advocates 
observes, these judicial views ‘have not been recognised or addressed in the Green 
Paper.’29     
Secondly, there have been discussions between the executive and the judiciary 
(as the Justice Secretary told the JCHR), but those remain hidden from view. This is 
highly unsatisfactory.  It is not clear what those representations or conversations 
involved. It seems from the Justice Secretary’s evidence that they went beyond the 
minimal scope of the letter regarding the Northern Ireland inquests, and moved at 
least into observations based on experience, though certainly not delving into policy 
                                                   
28 Letter from Claire Archbold, Legal Secretary to the Lord Chief Justice, to the Justice & Security 
Consultation, Cabinet Office, 6 December 2011, complete text of letter.  Published as Response 82, 
‘Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland’, 
<http://consultation.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/justiceandsecurity/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/xx_NI_Judiciary.pdf> (Last accessed: 18 March 2012) 
29 A McCullough QC, M Chamberlain and 56 others, ‘Justice and Security Green Paper: Response to 
Consultation from Special Advocates’, [16], Published as Response 9, ‘Special Advocates’ 
<http://consultation.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/justiceandsecurity/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09_Special%20Advocates.pdf>  (Last accessed: 18 March 2012) 
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or legality views. As Baroness Berridge points out, the legislation involves a form of 
judicial process, and parliament will not get to hear the representations that the 
judiciary have already made.  This lack of openness does not enhance the 
transparency which is appropriate under the separation of powers. While the 
Parliamentary committee could ask judges to appear, that is also not entirely 
satisfactory. A better path is to have a formal, written and open expression of views 
so that both the executive and the legislature – and the public – have access to the 
representations that have been made by the judiciary.30 
Thirdly, and following from this, there is good reason to put those 
contributions on a formal footing.  In Lord Neuberger’s framework there is 
constitutional room to do so. Where policy ‘goes to the heart of the functioning of the 
judicial branch’ then comment is not merely permissible, but there is arguably a 
judicial duty to comment.31 It might well be thought that closed proceedings, access 
to evidence and evaluation of evidence fall into that category.   
The Judges’ Council would be one possible body, though it was said at an 
expert meeting in 2006 (and it appears members of the judiciary there subscribed to 
this view) that the Council ‘would be unsuitable for this task as it is undemocratic, 
hierarchical, and has no mandate to bind the judiciary as a whole.’32  However, if a 
suitable representative body could be identified then it would avoid it falling to 
individual judges to give evidence to committees, which rightly concerns Lord 
Neuberger.33 It might pay attention to international experience as a guide. The 
Judicial Conference of Australia (JCA), for example, upon invitation made a 
submission to the parliamentary committee that was inquiring into a Bill concerning 
mandatory sentencing.34  
Finally, judicial participation in research provides a fourth avenue for 
engagement. In the field of terrorism and security, the Law, Terrorism and the Right 
to Know project has done some substantial work in this area.35  With the support of 
the senior judiciary and the assistance of officials in the office of the Lord Chief 
Justice, a number of judges have participated as interviewees, including several who 
have presided over terrorism trials and related cases. The interviews are all 
                                                   
30 The JCHR Report subsequently recommended that judicial views be sought in an open and 
transparent way: Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Justice and Security Green Paper: Twenty-
fourth Report of Session 2010-12 (HL Paper 286, HC 1777), [33] 
31 Neuberger, n 9, [44] 
32 ESRC Seminar Series, The Role of Civil Society in the Management of National Security in a 
Democracy, Seminar Three, ‘The proper role of the judiciary’, 24 January 2006, p 2 
<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/articlesandtranscripts/esrc_seminar_3_judiciary.pdf> (Last 
accessed: 20 May 2012)   
33 Neuberger, n 9, [29] 
34 Judicial Conference of Australia, ‘Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs Inquiry into the Migration Amendment (Removal of Mandatory Minimum 
Penalties) Bill 2012’  <http://www.jca.asn.au/publications/JCA_Senate_Submission.pdf > (Last 
accessed: 18 March 2012) 
35 See above, n 1 
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confidential and no individual will be identified in the publication of any results. The 
project is ongoing and findings are expected to be published in late 2012.   
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‘SECRECY’ IN THE COURT OF 
PROTECTION 
 
Lucy Series asks whether the judiciary’s approach can be explained 
by due caution or conspiracy  
 
The Court of Protection hears cases relating to some of the most morally and 
politically contentious issues of our day and about some of the most excluded and 
silenced people in our society.  It is surely a good sign that the media, MPs and 
campaigners are sufficiently concerned about their plight that they take such an 
interest in this court’s new jurisdiction under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA).  
Yet there is a difficult balance to be drawn between protecting the privacy of the 
individuals and families at the heart of these cases, and ensuring that the wider 
democratic objective of transparency in our justice system is met.  The Court of 
Protection is frequently described in the media as ‘secretive’, yet according to its 
judges this is an ‘old shibboleth’ which should be laid to rest.1  Despite judicial efforts 
to permit greater media access and reporting, the reality is that the Court of 
Protection does not function like other courts, and information about its activities is 
still relatively limited.   
There are many arguments in favour of greater transparency in the Court of 
Protection.  In the most general of terms it is often said, following Jeremy Bentham, 
that: 
 
Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spirit to exertion and the 
surest of all guards against improbity.  It keeps the judge, while trying, under 
trial.2 
 
It is important that the decisions of the Court of Protection judges are open to public 
scrutiny in order to promote faith that its rulings are just and fair, and to prompt 
debate and reform if it is felt that they are not.  Publicity is important for promoting 
wider understanding of the work of the court, for ensuring that politicians, officials 
and the wider public understand the kinds of issues it routinely handles.  The Court 
of Protection often relies upon the evidence of expert witnesses; evidence which 
cannot be scrutinized, debated and subjected to peer review without greater 
openness.  Many cases coming before the courts involve public authorities in the 
course of the health and welfare duties; surely their activities, particularly where they 
                                                   
1 Court of Protection, Court of Protection Report 2010 (London 2011) p3 
2 Bentham, J., ‘Draught of a New Plan for the Organization of the Judicial Establishment in France’ 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol iv (1843 Edinburgh: Tait) 
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impinge upon such fundamental human rights of such vulnerable citizens, should be 
subjected to scrutiny? 
Despite strong arguments in favour of greater transparency in the Court of 
Protection, it can be extremely difficult to achieve without also impinging upon the 
interests of the courts’ users.  In this paper, I will outline this tension in two separate 
debates concerning transparency in the Court of Protection: media freedoms to 
attend and report Court of Protection proceedings; and the routine publication of 
anonymised Court of Protection judgments.  I will argue that the courts have had 
good reason to be cautious about greater media access to hearings and litigants, but 
that the court could take greater steps towards transparency through introducing 
routine publication of anonymised judgments. 
 
Media attendance and reporting restrictions in the Court of Protection  
The legal basis for reporting restrictions in the Court of Protection is an amendment 
to s12(1)(b) Administration of Justice Act 1960 (AJA), which makes it a contempt of 
court to publish any information relating to proceedings sitting in private brought 
under the MCA. 3  Interestingly, publication of information concerning cases heard in 
the Family Division of the High Court under the ‘inherent jurisdiction’4 rather than 
the MCA are not subject to such restrictions, despite a commonly held belief to the 
contrary5.  The general rule in the Court of Protection is that hearings shall be 
brought in private6, meaning that s12(1)(b) AJA reporting restrictions will apply.  
However, r91 Court of Protection Rules 2007 permits the court to authorise the 
publication of information relating to private proceedings, and r92 permits the court 
to hold the hearing in private but to impose restrictions on the publication of any 
information in relation to those proceedings.   
In 2009 the Court of Protection permitted journalists to attend court and 
report proceedings for the first time7 in a case relating to the world famous blind and 
autistic pianist Derek Paravicini8.  But contrary to The Independent’s subsequent 
claims, this was not the creation of a ‘new right’9, but merely the first time the media 
                                                   
3 Introduced by s10 Schedule 6 Mental Capacity Act 2005 
4 The ‘inherent jurisdiction’ is the legal basis upon which the court made decisions concerning adults 
who lacked mental capacity prior to the MCA.  In general, the MCA has replaced the inherent 
jurisdiction, but it is occasionally still exercised in relation to vulnerable adults who have capacity.  
For an interesting discussion, see: Szerletics, A., ‘Vulnerable Adults and the Inherent Jurisdiction of 
the High Court’ Exeter Autonomy Project Briefing Paper v1.1 (University of Essex, 2011) 
http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/vulnerable-adults-and-the-inherent-jurisdiction-of-the-high-court 
5 RB (Adult), Re (No 4) [2011] EWHC 3017 (Fam) 
6 r90 Court of Protection Rules 2007 
7 Cahal Milmo ‘Secret court open to public gaze after Independent campaign’ The Independent 
(London 14 May 2010) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/secret-court-open-to-
public-gaze-after-iindependenti-campaign-1973014.html> 
8 Re P [2010] EWHC 1592 (Fam) 
9 Romana Canneti ‘Shining a light into darkness at the Court of Protection’ The Independent (London 
27 February 2012) <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/romana-canneti-shining-
a-light-into-darkness-at-the-court-of-protection-7441319.html> 
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had chosen to exercise their pre-existing ‘right’ to attend and report Court of 
Protection proceedings, as laid down in the Court of Protection Rules 2007.  Since 
that time, The Independent reports that they have ‘won’ every application to attend 
Court of Protection proceedings.10  However, although the rules do permit the media 
to attend court and to publish information relating to proceedings, the media 
complain that the application process is ‘cumbersome, time consuming and 
expensive’11, and requires them to commit significant resources to the cost of an 
application without any guarantee of a story at the end of it.12  It would be a shame if 
this had a chilling effect on reporting of Court of Protection proceedings, and 
perhaps it would be desirable to have a more lightweight media application process.  
However it is unlikely the media will ever be granted the unfettered access to the 
court desired by some.  The overriding objective of the Court of Protection includes 
ensuring that the interests and position of the incapacitated adult are properly 
considered13 and that all parties are on an equal footing14.  Without knowing what 
information the media might seek leave to report, nor how this might affect the 
rights and interests of the parties to a case, it is difficult to see how the court could 
offer journalists any ‘guarantees’ to a story in advance. 
There are several respects in which the interests of court users may come into 
tension with the wider interests of transparency and publicity, the first of which is 
time and resources.  Every application the media make to attend court must be 
scrutinized by all the parties to a case, and late applications can lead to exasperating 
delays for decisions on pressing matters15.  The court’s decisions to permit media 
attendance and reporting are usually framed in terms of a balancing exercise 
between the Article 8 rights (respect for private and family life) of incapacitated 
adults and their families, and the Article 10 rights (freedom of expression) of the 
media.  In London Borough of Hillingdon v Neary & Anor (Rev 2)16 Mr Justice 
Jackson commented, ‘Publicity can have a strong effect on individuals, particularly if 
they are not used to it, or if... they are vulnerable to anxiety and to changes in their 
environment.’17  
                                                   
10 Ibid 
11 Phillips, G. ‘Family Courts and Transparency’ (Paper) The All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Family Law and The Court of Protection (Houses of Parliament, London 29 March 2011) p17 
http://familylaw.allpartyparliamentarygroup.org.uk/transparency/docs/APPG4_Gill_Phillips_Speec
h.pdf 
12 Canneti, R. ‘Shining a light into darkness at the Court of Protection’ The Independent (London 27 
February 2012) 
13 Court of Protection Rules 2007 r3(3)(b) 
14 Court of Protection Rules 2007 r3(3)(d) 
15 For example, in the case P v Independent Print Ltd. & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 756 a late application 
was made by The Independent Newspaper to attend an important and long awaited hearing about P’s 
welfare.  The court had no alternative but to adjourn a hearing about important welfare decisions in 
order to seek expert evidence on the impact that the publicity itself would have on P’s wellbeing. 
16 [2011] EWHC 413 (COP)  
17 Neary v Hillingdon, [15] 
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However, Jackson J also emphasised that there must be evidence which 
supported a proper factual basis for the claim that any given individual would suffer 
an adverse effect from publicity.18  He also stressed that there was a genuine public 
interest in the work of the Court of Protection, and that it was not in the interests of 
the public in general or the individual litigants in any case for its work to be 
considered as secretive19.  It was, he said, important that the media were able to 
report routine cases, that reflected the lives of ordinary people, as well as 
extraordinary cases like that of Derek Paravicini.20  
In W v M & Ors21 Mr Justice Baker found that the Article 6 rights (to a fair 
trial) of litigants might also be compromised if their capacity or willingness to 
participate in litigation were affected by the threat of media publication of identifying 
information, or attempts by the media to contact them.22  This highly controversial 
case concerned whether a feeding tube should be withdrawn from a woman in a 
minimally conscious state to allow her to die.  In an earlier unpublished ruling the 
court had issued an injunction banning reporters from approaching 65 named 
individuals involved in her care, or approaching within 50m of four named 
properties.  This injunction was dubbed ‘draconian’23, even ‘evil’24, by campaigners 
emphasising the public interest in the case.  However it is worth noting that the 
injunction did not prohibit reporters from attending or reporting court proceedings, 
merely from ‘doorstepping’ or identifying a very severely disabled woman, those 
charged with caring for her, and her grieving family.   
In a later hearing these restrictions were reduced to cover merely her family; a 
decision which was accepted by The Times Newspapers Ltd – the only media outlet 
who actually sent representatives to court – on hearing the evidence of the family.  
The judgment described the family as being so fearful of media harassment that 
without such an injunction they might not have brought their case to court; when one 
reads the judgment in its 43,000 word entirety it is impossible not to have sympathy 
with their position.  It is important that vulnerable litigants have confidence in 
protections against intrusive media interest so that publicity does not have a chilling 
effect on the cases that are brought to the Court of Protection.  Nowhere in the media 
does it seem to be appreciated that if these cases are not brought to court, difficult 
decisions regarding adults who lack mental capacity do not go away. Outside of the 
                                                   
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
21 [2011] EWHC 1197 (COP) 
22 Ibid, [38] 
23 Solicitor Mark Stephens, quoted in Martin Beckford ‘Secrecy fears after court bans contact with 65 
people’ The Telegraph (London 19 April 2011)<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/8459270/Secrecy-fears-after-court-bans-contact-with-65-people.html> 
24 John Hemming MP, quoted in Steve Doughty ‘Judge makes first ever order banning publication of 
information on Facebook and Twitter to prevent woman in coma from being named’ The Daily Mail 
(London 13 May 2011) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1386541/Injunctions-hit-
Facebook-Twitter-order-bans-publication-information.html> 
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Court of Protection, disputes and complex moral and political questions are simply 
resolved by other means, which may offer fewer guarantees of fairness, equality of 
arms or scrutiny.  Indeed, this was a growing problem prior to the introduction of the 
MCA.  It may well be that the media are frustrated that their access to Court of 
Protection cases is restricted, but they should bear in mind that if litigants are driven 
away from taking these decisions to the Court of Protection through fear of media 
harassment, such decisions will be made in places far further from view. 
 
Publication of anonymised transcripts of Court of Protection decisions 
Another means by which the decisions of the Court of Protection make their way into 
the public domain is the publication of written judgments, usually in anonymised 
form.  However, despite some improvements, the framework for publication and 
dissemination of these rulings still leaves much to be desired.  Many judgments are 
delivered ex tempore, meaning publication would incur significant transcription 
costs.  However, even those judgments which are delivered in written form do not 
routinely make their way into the public domain.  Leave to publish any judgment is 
left to the discretion of the individual judge, and although senior judges – including 
the President of the Court of Protection Sir Nicholas Wall25 and Lord Justice 
Munby26 – have exhorted their colleagues to routinely publish written and 
anonymised judgments, this plea does not seem to have met with widespread 
enthusiasm. 
The Court of Protection itself has complained that ‘practitioners and judges 
have been hampered by a lack of reported case law and inconsistent reporting of 
judgments handed down by the Court of Protection’.27  It was suggested28 that the 
problem had been resolved with the creation of a dedicated Court of Protection 
database on BAILII29 in October 2010.  The BAILII Court of Protection database is 
certainly welcome, but for reasons which are unclear it still has remarkably few 
published judgments.  For example the BAILII website has only 20 published 
judgments for 201130, yet the Court of Protection makes thousands of decisions each 
year, and issues hundreds of welfare orders.31  The independent website Mental 
Health Law Online32 hosts significantly more Court of Protection judgments than 
BAILII; it is unclear why judgments which can be published on this site are not 
                                                   
25 Hill, A., ‘Court of protection should be open to public scrutiny, says leading judge’ The Guardian 
(London 06 November 2011) 
26 Lord Justice Munby ‘Lost opportunities: law reform and transparency in the family courts’ [2010] 
CFLQ 273 
27 Court of Protection, Court of Protection Report 2010 (London 2011) p9 
28 Ibid 
29 <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/COP/> 
30 <http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/COP/2011/> [accessed 16 March 2012] 
31 Data for 2011 is not yet available, but see the Court of Protection Report 2010 (n27), p25 for data on 
2010. 
32 <www.mentalhealthlaw.co.uk> 
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routinely published on the other.  The 39 Essex St Court of Protection Newsletter33 is 
widely read in court and legal circles, and Jordans Publishing recently launched a 
new series of Court of Protection Law Reports, although the price tag may be off-
putting to non-legal audiences.  Despite these efforts, however, the majority of Court 
of Protection decisions are not published, anonymously or otherwise. 
It is often suggested by lawyers that where a case is of legal importance it will 
be published, however recent cases in the Court of Protection suggest this is not 
uniformly happening.  In A London Local Authority v JH & Anor34 District Judge 
Eldergill was referred by counsel to the unreported case Re: GC35 which he found 
‘helpful’ in reaching his decision.  More recently, the Court of Appeal was asked in K 
v LBX36 to consider ‘an apparent conflict between the line of High Court/COP 
decisions which are at odds with a developing line of cases at the same level’.37  One 
of these two apparently conflicting lines of Court of Protection case law was well 
publicised and well known to lawyers and health and social care professionals; it 
suggested that where a decision must be made about where an incapacitated adult 
should reside, priority should be given to placement in the family home.  However, a 
second line of case law, unpublished and unknown to most professionals and lawyers 
had also been evolving in the Court of Protection; this line of reasoning suggested 
that there was no such ‘starting point’ or priority for family placements.   
Readers with an interest in health and social care will quickly realise the 
significance of such a change of direction in mental capacity case law.  In the first 
instance hearing of K v LBX, which is itself still unreported38, Mrs Justice Theis had 
relied upon an unreported judgment by Roderic Wood J39 and her own ‘more recent 
experience of such cases’ to argue that there had been a ‘philosophical and practical 
shift’ towards placements promoting ‘greater independence’ rather than maintaining 
the status quo of family life.40  From the perspective of equality of arms, of legal 
certainty, of ensuring that health and social care professionals are appraised of the 
correct approach to take when making best interests decisions on behalf of 
incapacitated adults, it seems indefensible that counsel and judges should be able to 
refer to, and rely upon, judgments which are not in the public domain.  It also seems 
likely that such failures to publish written judgments of legal significance could be in 
violation of the UK’s obligations under Article 6 European Convention on Human 
Rights.41 
                                                   
33 For backcopies, see: <http://www.mentalhealthlaw.co.uk/39_Essex_Street_COP_Newsletter> 
34 [2011] EWHC 2420 (COP); no paragraph numbers are available for this judgment. 
35 [2008] EWHC 3402 (Fam), per Hedley J 
36 [2012] EWCA Civ 79 
37 K v LBX (n36) [1] 
38 As of 19 March 2012, although it is my understanding that efforts are being made to seek 
permission from the judge to publish the ruling. 
39 D County Council v LS [2009] EWHC 123 (Fam) (unreported) 
40 K v LBX (n36) [27]  
41 Pretto & Ors v. Italy (App No 7984/77) [83] ECHR 15; (1984) 6 EHRR 182 
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However, even ensuring that cases of legal interest are published will, in my 
view, be insufficient to quell concerns about transparency in Court of Protection 
proceedings.  As Munby LJ has written: 
 
Releasing for publication only those judgments which are ‘reportable’ means 
that the public obtains a seriously skewed impression of the system. What one 
might call ‘routine’ judgments in ‘ordinary’ care cases and private law cases 
should surely also be published -- all of them, unless, in the particular case, 
there is good reason not to.42  
 
For example the activities of public authorities in relation to incapacitated adults 
which bring them to the Court of Protection may not be of ‘legal’ interest, but they 
are of significant social and policy interest.  Requiring routine publication of 
anonymised judgments, including the identities of any public authorities involved in 
the cases, would go some way towards dispelling a view which is taking hold in some 
quarters that the courts, experts and public authorities are in cahoots, exercising 
sinister and unaccountable powers over vulnerable people and silencing those who 
speak out.  The reality I suspect is not that the courts are engaged in some sinister 
conspiracy, rather that the current haphazard system for publication is struggling 
amidst high and growing judicial workloads.  It was found in a pilot project to 
routinely publish certain rulings under the Children Act 1989 that judges struggled 
without additional resources allocated for transcription and anonymisation.43  The 
difficulty may also be judicial culture.  The judges of the Court of Protection see this 
work day-in, day-out, and perhaps they do not understand the fascination and 
concern even the most routine-seeming cases may hold for the wider public.  Yet for 
as long as publication rests on judicial discretion it will be hard to promote public 
faith in the inner workings of the court amidst unverifiable, and hence uncontestable, 
hints and allusions that darker forces are at work in those other, unpublished, cases. 
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42 Lord Justice Munby ‘Lost opportunities: law reform and transparency in the family courts’ [2010] 
CFLQ 273 
43 Ministry of Justice, ‘The Family Courts Information Pilot: November 2009-December 2010’ 
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